R v BBZ

The provisions of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992 apply to this case. Under those provisions, where an allegation has been made that a sexual offence has been committed against a person, no matter relating to that person shall during that person's lifetime be included in any publication if it is likely to lead members of the public to identify that person as the victim of the offence. This prohibition applies unless waived or lifted in accordance with section 3 of the Act.

Given the family relationship between the applicant and the victim of the offences, it is necessary to make an order that the name of the applicant should be anonymised in any publication of this judgment or reporting of these proceedings. We make such an order and direct that the applicant be referred to only by the random initials BBZ. We make it clear that this order is designed to protect the identity of the victim and is not made for the benefit of the applicant.

On 10 December 2024, following a trial in the Crown Court at Lewes before Mr Recorder John Hardy and a jury, the applicant was convicted of four counts of rape, two counts of indecent assault and two counts of indecency with a child. He was later sentenced to a total of 23 years' imprisonment.

The applicant renews his application for leave to appeal against conviction and for a representation order following refusal by the single judge. He also seeks leave, pursuant to section 23 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968, to introduce fresh evidence. In addition, he applies for bail.

For the purposes of this renewed application we can deal with the facts of the case briefly. The applicant was the victim's stepfather. He began to sexually abuse her when she was about 10 years old. The abuse progressed from initially touching her breasts and encouraging her to touch his penis, to digital penetration of her vagina. When she was aged 12, he raped her for the first time. From the age of 13 he repeatedly took her to a remote spot where he would rape her. He also abused her physically, including punching her in the stomach in case she was pregnant.

While the victim's mother was confined in hospital for the birth of a child, the applicant made the victim stay in his bed and raped her each night.

The sexual abuse continued until the victim was around 16 years old.

Although the victim told a friend about the abuse when aged about 15, she did not report it to the police until much later in life. On one occasion she was spoken to by the police, but she denied everything. She later said that she had been told to do so by her mother, who had died by the time of the trial.

In addition to calling the victim, the prosecution called the victim's half-sister (the applicant's daughter), her son and two friends. All gave evidence of earlier complaints about the abuse. The half-sister also provided evidence about matters of family background. Documentary evidence from the deceased mother's medical records and from the DVLA corroborated aspects of the victim's account and contradicted things said by the applicant in evidence.

The applicant's case was that nothing sexual had ever occurred between him and the victim; nor had he ever been violent towards her. He maintained that the case against him was a complete fabrication.

The applicant's proposed grounds of appeal, which are of his own composition, made no complaint about the judge's legal directions or his conduct of the trial. The applicant maintained that the allegations against him were fabricated and that he had been wrongly convicted. He also raised complaints about his legal representation at trial.

Having submitted his proposed grounds of appeal, the applicant repeatedly sent additional letters in which he made further submissions, many of them repetitive. He applied to admit fresh evidence from his daughter and son-in-law.

Given the complaints made against his legal team, the applicant was invited to, and did, waive legal professional privilege, so that a response could be obtained from his trial counsel and solicitors.

We have seen and considered those responses. We note in particular the care taken by counsel to deal with the allegations made against him and to provide relevant documents to assist the court in considering those allegations.

The single judge considered the applicant's proposed grounds of appeal and additional representations. In refusing the applications, he set out his reasoning at some length and in a manner that would be readily understandable to the unrepresented applicant.

We have considered afresh the proposed grounds of appeal and the representations placed before the single judge. Having done so, we reach exactly the same conclusion as he did. The single judge plainly took considerable time and care in explaining why none of the matters raised gave rise to any arguable ground of appeal. We entirely agree with his reasoning and with the explanations he provided. The applicant has had a copy of the single judge's reasons. We cannot improve on them and there would be no benefit in repeating them.

Following notification of the single judge's decision and reasons, the applicant has provided further letters and submissions. We have considered all the new material. We have looked carefully to see whether it raises anything at all which might give rise to an arguable ground of appeal which casts doubt on the safety of the conviction. Having done so, we are satisfied that it remains the case that the applicant has raised no properly arguable ground of appeal such as to justify granting him leave to appeal. Much of the new material simply rehearses the same arguments that he has advanced previously.

The applicant maintains that the case against him was fabricated. He disagrees with the single judge's assessment of the relevance of the new evidence upon which he seeks to rely. However, the single judge's reasoning is undoubtedly legally correct.

In addition, the applicant makes unsubstantiated allegations of police corruption in relation to an entirely different matter in Scotland. They have no bearing upon this renewed application.

In short, there is nothing contained in any of the substantial written material which the applicant has now placed before this court to justify granting the applicant leave to appeal against his conviction for all or any of the offences. Accordingly, we agree with the single judge. This renewed application must be refused. In the circumstances all other applications fall away.

The applicant was expressly warned as to the court's power to make a loss of time order. The single judge identified that this was a case in which the court would be likely to consider doing so. The applicant has made no representations as to why we should not direct that some time spent in custody as an applicant should not count towards sentence. The application had been fully and fairly considered by the single judge. Despite the warning, the applicant chose to pursue a totally unmeritorious application. Such applications hamper the court's ability to process meritorious applications in a timely fashion.

We accordingly make a loss of time order. We direct that 28 days shall not count towards the sentence.