R v Istvan Szobollodi

On 22 April 2024, in the Crown Court at Bristol, Mr Szobollodi was found to be in contempt of court and ordered to pay a financial penalty of £700. He now applies for an extension of time of four days to apply for leave to appeal against that finding and that sanction.

Summarising the facts briefly, Mr Szobollodi was summonsed to attend court for jury service. He was unwilling to act in that role. He was one of a panel of prospective jurors who were required to go to a particular courtroom for the purposes of a ballot of the jury to hear a sexual offence trial. The trial was listed before a recorder. Before the process of empanelling the jury began, Mr Szobollodi sent a note to the recorder which said:

Arrangements were made for Mr Szobollodi to appear before the recorder so that this matter could be investigated. The recorder considered whether he should deal with the matter himself or refer it to a superior judge. In reflecting upon this, the recorder considered section 20 of the Juries Act 1974 (to which we shall return) and also the common law offence of contempt of court.

The recorder expressed the initial view that Mr Szobollodi was not yet in breach of section 20 of the 1974 Act, because he had answered the jury summons and had attended the court. In the event, the recorder felt it best to refer the matter to a senior judge, namely the resident judge at Bristol, and the recorder himself continued with his scheduled trial.

Later that day Mr Szobollodi appeared before the resident judge (to whom we shall refer for convenience as "the judge"). Mr Szobollodi was not represented.

After a discussion in which Mr Szobollodi explained that in his native Hungary there was no equivalent of the jury system, and that he did not believe in the system as operated in this country, the judge explained to him that jury service was an obligation of persons resident in this country, who may be punished by way of a financial penalty for refusing to do what was required of them. He asked Mr Szobollodi, "Is that something that you want to put yourself at risk of or do you want to just think about it and perhaps be prepared to change your mind?" Mr Szobollodi made plain that whilst he understood what was being said to him, he was taking a principled stance and would not alter his view.

The judge said this:

Mr Szobollodi gave further explanations as to why he did not believe in the system of jury trial and that there was then discussion as to his financial means.

The judge gave a ruling, in which he referred to Mr Szobollodi having been discharged from the panel which had been brought before the recorder earlier that day, and referred to his own hearing that afternoon.

The judge ruled:

The judge then imposed a fine of £700 and gave directions as to time for payment.

At the conclusion of that hearing Mr Szobollodi was discharged from further attendance at the court and therefore did not take part in any further proceedings.

Unhappily, the court office wrongly recorded the judge's decision as a conviction and sentence. In a further error, it recorded the decision as a finding of contempt of court by breach of section 17 of the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996, a statutory provision which is wholly irrelevant to this case. We emphasise that those errors were made in the court office and do not reflect the decision which the judge had pronounced in court.

When Mr Szobollodi learned that the court record showed a criminal conviction, which he feared would result in his being unable to renew his licence as a door supervisor, he commenced this appeal. That was four days after the time limit for an appeal had expired. Had he been in time, he would have been entitled to appeal as of right.

The very unfortunate consequence of the incorrect manner in which the decision had been recorded was that Mr Szobollodi did in fact lose his job. We are told today by counsel that it may be that under the rules of the relevant supervising body, even a correct recording of a finding of contempt would have been an impediment to the renewal of the necessary licence; but be that as it may, it appears that the incorrect recording of a conviction was the decisive factor.

Mr Szobollodi now has the benefit of representation by Mr Wainwright. The Crown Prosecution Service is not a party to this appeal, but the court is grateful to His Majesty's Attorney General for instructing Mr Robottom to make written submissions and to appear before us today. The court has been assisted by the submissions of both counsel.

The grounds of appeal, briefly summarised, are that:

Summarising very briefly the relevant legal framework, we note that the law relating to contempt of court, which has developed in a piecemeal fashion over very many years, is the subject of a recent Consultation Paper by the Law Commission. In the context of criminal proceedings, it is the subject of guidance quite recently given to judges and magistrates by the Senior Presiding Judge. The Crown Court has an inherent power to deal with contempts of court. We agree with counsel that if a contempt is proved and a sanction is imposed for it, the court record should not refer to a conviction or a sentence. The court's decision should be recorded as a finding of contempt: see R v Yaxley-Lennon [2018] 2 Cr App R 30.

Specific powers in relation to jurors are conferred by section 20 of the 1974 Act, which, so far as relevant for present purposes, provides:

Contempt proceedings in the criminal courts are also the subject of provisions of the Criminal Procedure Rules. Rule 48.5 (so far as material for present purposes) provides:

In the transcript of the brief hearing before the judge, no reference was made to section 20 of the 1974 Act. Mr Wainwright submits that it can nonetheless be inferred from reading the transcript that the judge was exercising his power under section 20 to deal with the matter as a contempt of court rather than as a summary offence, the contempt consisting of a breach of the provisions of section 20.

We regard this as a difficult point, and listening to the submissions of both Mr Wainwright and Mr Robottom, it appears to us that a number of legal issues are raised by the facts which we have briefly summarised.

The issues are these:

These difficult and interesting legal points were not considered by the judge. No submissions were made to him about them, and he therefore gave no considered ruling upon them. This court, as a court of review, is therefore put into a difficult position, as there is no ruling by the judge specifically addressing jurisdictional points of this nature.

What is, however, clear is that the reason why the judge did not hear any submissions about these matters was that Mr Szobollodi was not legally represented and did not himself make any submissions to the judge about these matters. That then brings us to the submissions made by Mr Wainwright as to procedural failures in the course of the hearing.

Summarising the submissions of counsel, Mr Wainwright's reasons for contending that Mr Szobollodi did not receive a fair hearing are as follows.

Mr Robottom submits that strict compliance with the provisions of rule 48 is not an essential prerequisite of a fair hearing. Minor departures from the provisions of the rule may occur but the hearing may nonetheless be fair. Mr Robottom accepts that the judge did not specifically ask Mr Szobollodi if he admitted the relevant conduct and did not specifically tell Mr Szobollodi that he could apologise. Nonetheless the relevant conduct was substantially set out and was not disputed, and the judge twice gave Mr Szobollodi the opportunity to think about what the judge had said and to put forward any reason why he should not be ordered to pay a financial penalty.

Mr Robottom acknowledges, however, that this court may regard as a more significant feature the fact that Mr Szobollodi was not told that he may take legal advice, and was not told that he may wish to take advice as to whether he may have a defence in law to the allegation of contempt.

With all respect to the judge, we are satisfied that he fell into error in failing at the first stage of the proceedings to explain to Mr Szobollodi that he could take legal advice and that a reasonable opportunity would be given for him to do so if he wished (rule 48.5(2)(a)(vi) and (b)), and in later failing to explain what the procedure at the enquiry would be (rule 48.8(1)(b). If it were not for those serious procedural errors, we would agree with Mr Robottom that the judge had in substance taken the steps required by rule 48, and, if Mr Szobollodi had been represented or had been given an express opportunity to seek legal advice, this court could have been satisfied that he was not prejudiced by those departures from the precise terms of the rule.

But in the absence of a clear explanation to Mr Szobollodi that he could seek legal advice if he wished ,and a clear explanation of what exactly was being alleged against him and what the procedure would entail, the judge was deprived of the opportunity to hear submissions on the important matters which we have mentioned; and Mr Szobollodi was deprived of safeguards which should have been afforded to him before a serious finding was made against him and a significant financial penalty imposed. The finding and penalty therefore cannot stand.

The errors which we have identified were not of Mr Szobollodi's making. He has paid the financial penalty in full, a payment which he will now be able to recover. As we have noted, he has also suffered the loss of his employment. In those circumstances it would be unjust to require him to face a rehearing of the issue of contempt.

For those reasons, we grant the necessary short extension of time. We allow the appeal, and we quash the finding of contempt of court and the imposition of a financial penalty.