R v Kyle Joseph Peters

The appellant, Mr Kyle Joseph Peters, was sentenced on 14 March 2025 to 33 months' imprisonment by HHJ Dhir KC at the Central Criminal Court, in respect of a conviction of a single count against him of violent disorder, contrary to section 2(1) of the Public Order Act 1986. On a guilty plea on 1 March 2024 (being the morning of an intended Newton hearing) the appellant removed a basis of plea and pleaded guilty accepting the prosecution case against him. The appellant appeals with the leave of the Single Judge on the basis of a submission that the sentence was manifestly excessive. In particular, he points to what he says was an error in principle on the part of the judge in choosing too high a starting point. He also says that there was a disparity between the way in which he was treated relative to other defendants in respect of the public order offence.

The appellant was not involved in the killing of Givani Espuet on 30 October 2022 and he was not charged with an offence of homicide. Kadeem Hibbert and Sahid Kpaka were convicted of murder and Courtney Forrester was convicted of manslaughter. This was in respect of the death of Givani Espuet, who was killed on 30 October 2022, aged 21 years old. Hibbert, Kpaka and Forrester were also convicted of violent disorder for which they received concurrent sentences.

The appellant along with Bruce Hutchinson, Andre Brown-Watson, Firat Tato and Omari Knight, who had already been sentenced prior to the sentence of the appellant, participated in group violence outside the Aura Club on the Harrow Road. Those defendants, like the appellant, were convicted of violent disorder as a standalone offence without being convicted of an offence of homicide. We are aware of their sentences. The appellant does not rely on any argument of disparity as between those defendants in respect of their sentences and his own.

It must be stressed at the outset that it has never formed any part of the prosecution case that the appellant was guilty of participation in an offence of homicide in respect of Givani Espuet.

The prosecution prepared a written note to which it referred in the course of its oral opening. The prosecution case was accepted by the appellant upon the abandonment of a basis of plea rendering a Newton hearing unnecessary. Paragraph 10 of the note read as follows:

It should be added that the knife was about 10 centimetres in length. It was caught by a Ring Doorbell footage. The judge applied the sentencing guidelines for this category of violent disorder as culpability level A, that is to say the targeting of an individual or individuals by the group and participating in an incident which involved widespread and/or large-scale acts of violence on people and participating in an incident involving serious acts of violence. It did result in the death of one individual and serious fear and/or distress and/or disruption albeit that the appellant was not responsible for the unlawful killing nor was he ever prosecuted for it. Further, it was harm level 1 in that the case involved extreme category 2 factors in that the incident resulted in the death of one individual and/or serious fear and/or distress and/or disruption.

The judge applied the starting point of 4 years for a category 1A offence with a range of 3 - 4.5 year years' custody. The judge identified aggravating factors that (i) the appellant took a knife to the scene and produced it, and further (ii) he acted under the influence of alcohol. The judge identified mitigating factors, namely that (i) the appellant had no relevant previous conviction; (ii) he is a family man with a young daughter; (iii) he did not commit any offences while on bail for this matter and while awaiting sentence; (iv) he had a full-time responsible and well-paid job and (v) after being initially involved in the violence he walked away before the fatal stabbing occurred.

The judge ordered that the sentence was 3 years before allowing a reduction of 3 months for the plea just before the commencement of the Newton hearing. In other words, the judge sentenced at the bottom of the range for a category 1A offence, thereby giving a very substantial reduction for mitigating factors.

In his submissions on behalf of the appellant Mr Milner submitted as follows. Firstly, the judge erred in selecting too high a starting point and should have sentenced by reference to category 2A or 1B, either of which would have been a starting point of 3 years' custody with ranges of 2 to 4 years. On this basis the reduction for mitigation circumstances could have taken the sentence down towards 2 years. Second, the sentence for violent disorder in respect of the appellant was greater than the sentence for the same offence in respect of the defendants Hibbert, Kpaka and Forrester but they were not so in charged with violent disorder. Kadeem Hibbert and Sahid Kpaka were convicted of murder, life sentences with a minimum term to serve of 22 years and 17 years respectively and Courtney Forrester was convicted of manslaughter as determinate sentence of 10 years. Their respective sentences had starting points of 3 years in respect of violent disorder and not 4 years as in the case of the appellant.

The lack of consistency was said to be that they were each sentenced concurrently on violent disorder on the bases of the same characterisation of the nature of the offence and a starting point of 3 years. There were allowances for reduction for guilty pleas of 10 per cent in respect of Hibbert, 25 per cent in respect of Kpaka and 25 per cent in respect of Forrester. The sentences for violent disorder, after the reductions, were 2 years 6 months. Hibbert after a reduction for mitigation 10 per cent for a late guilty plea, 2 years 3 months for Kpaka after reduction for 25 per cent for a guilty plea and 1 year 10 months for Forrester after reduction for mitigation and 25 per cent for a guilty plea. They were all less than that for the appellant, who was sentenced to 2 years 9 months after reduction from 3 years for a guilty plea. The judge gave a higher sentence for violent disorder to the appellant despite his mitigation which, it was submitted by Mr Milner, was in some respects greater than that of the other defendants particularly in that he had no relevant convictions.

Having considered these arguments carefully we are satisfied that the sentence was not manifestly excessive nor was it wrong in principle for the following reasons. First, the judge selected the correct starting point of a category 1A offence and the reasons given characterised it as such. Second, the judge allowed very significantly for mitigation by coming down to the lowest part of the range to take into account all of the mitigating factors.

The comparison with the other defendants who were sentenced in respect of homicide offences, as well as violent disorder, did not provide any disparity argument for the following reasons, namely:

We have no doubt that the court adopted a proper starting point for a standalone offence. The court adopted a proper approach identifying and taking into account aggravating and mitigating factors. The court allowed a very substantial reduction for mitigation. The effect is that there was no error in principle. It was a correct sentencing exercise. It was undertaken by a judge who was extremely familiar with the facts, having tried two cases arising out of the incidents in question. She therefore had a feel for the relevant facts and the culpability of the participants and the nature of the harm. The judge was particularly familiar with the numerous CCTV recordings and with those involving the appellant, of which the judge was reminded in the presentation by the prosecution on the plea of guilty.

In all the circumstances, the sentence was not manifestly excessive. Accordingly the appeal is dismissed.