R v Kyle Woods

On 12 June 2024, in the Crown Court at Manchester, the appellant (then aged 32) pleaded guilty to an offence of dangerous driving. On 25 October 2024, he pleaded guilty to causing grievous bodily harm with intent to resist or prevent his apprehension.

On 6 December 2024, he was sentenced to 6 years and 4 months' imprisonment for the grievous bodily harm offence. No separate penalty was imposed for the offence of dangerous driving. He was disqualified from driving for a period of 8 years and 2 months and ordered to take an extended re-test.

He now appeals against sentence with the leave of the Single Judge.

The facts of the case were as follows. On the evening of 5 May 2024, PC Jamie Wiley attended a property in Beech Road, Sale, in response to allegations of domestic violence and harassment by the appellant towards his partner. The address was the home of her parents. The appellant had already attended the house a number of times that day. PC Wiley took an account from the partner. In the event, those allegations were not pursued.

PC Wiley left the premises at 11.20 that night, intending to search for the appellant, having been provided with the details of his van. As PC Wiley got into his marked police vehicle, he saw a van with a faulty front light drive towards him. It was heading in the direction of the parents' house. PC Wiley drove his vehicle to the side to allow the van to pass. Realising that the van belonged to the appellant, PC Wiley manoeuvred his car into the road to prevent the appellant from being able to drive out of Beech Road as it was a cul-de-sac. PC Wiley got out of his vehicle and approached the appellant's van. The appellant wound down his window and PC Wiley asked him to get out. The appellant replied: "What for?" PC Wiley said: "I need to talk to you." The appellant wound his window back up and turned the van around. He then drove towards PC Wiley.

On the body worn footage and CCTV footage, PC Wiley could be heard shouting to the appellant to get out. He held out his palm, indicating for the appellant to stop. The appellant ignored PC Wiley's demands and attempted to drive the van through the inadequate space between the police car and the pavement. This was also where PC Wiley was standing. PC Wiley moved but the appellant struck both the police car and PC Wiley with his van. A witness saw the wheels of the van on top of the police officer. The appellant then made off.

PC Wiley was taken to Accident & Emergency and referred to the fracture clinic. On 13 May, he was diagnosed with a left ankle fracture. He was treated with a walker boot and crutches and advised not to bear weight on his leg. He had a number of follow-up appointments with the fracture clinic and was referred for ongoing physiotherapy. He described having pain in his left knee during a physiotherapy appointment on 9 July 2024.

The appellant was arrested on 6 May 2024. When interviewed, he denied being the driver of the vehicle.

The appellant had a number of relevant previous convictions, including for violent disorder in 2006, driving without due care and attention in 2017, dangerous driving in 2018, attempted robbery in 2019, escape from custody in 2020 and harassment in 2023. He had served sentences of imprisonment and was subject to a community order for the offence of harassment when the present offences were committed.

PC Wiley had made three victim personal statements. He explained that he had been diagnosed with blood clots in his left leg which had caused him considerable psychological distress. The incident had re-triggered PTSD from an earlier incident. Pain persisted in his left leg and he had sciatica in his lower back as a result of being crushed under the axle of a large vehicle. It is plain from everything that we have seen that the effects upon him were very serious.

The judge did not have a pre-sentence report. None was necessary, then or now. The judge had a letter from the appellant in which he expressed his regret for what had happened, and a letter from his partner in which she explained the difficulties she was experiencing in caring for two young children on her own. The children had significant health issues. There was a positive report from prison which was to the appellant's credit.

There was a basis of plea in which the appellant said that he had not intended to harm PC Wiley. He had been going to see his partner. It was a stressful time for them. Their baby had been born prematurely and he and his partner had had a falling out. On seeing PC Wiley, in the heat of the moment, he decided to leave the scene. It was said that in his eagerness to depart, he had tried to squeeze his vehicle through the gap available to him.

The judge's attention was drawn to three authorities. In R v Talbot [2012] EWCA Crim 2322, the Court of Appeal upheld a sentence of 8 years' imprisonment for an appellant who pleaded guilty to causing grievous bodily harm with intent to resist or prevent his apprehension. The appellant was driving a car and hit a police officer who tried to speak to him. He sustained a broken leg. The court noted that the guideline for offences which involved an intention to cause really serious harm had a starting point of 12 years' custody for an offence in the top category. It was conceded by the appellant's counsel that the judge had been entitled to consider the guideline although it was not directly applicable. The court said that the judge's starting point of 10 years' imprisonment before credit for plea was not manifestly excessive. The court said that it was obvious on the facts of the case that really serious harm to the victim was close to an inevitability, notwithstanding that the appellant said in his basis of plea that his motive was to escape. We should say that the current guideline for section 18 offences where there is an intention to cause really serious harm was effective from 1 July 2021.

In R v Heywood [2014] EWCA Crim 2006, 8 years and 9 months' imprisonment was upheld for an appellant who pleaded guilty at a relatively late stage to causing grievous bodily harm with intent to resist arrest. He hit a police officer with the car he was driving. The court said that the driving involved a clear and obvious risk of serious consequences for others and that recklessness of this kind did not fall far short of intent. The judge had been entitled to pay some regard to the levels of sentence to be imposed for section 18 offences with an intention to cause really serious harm. Although that guideline did not cover the offence when it involved an intention to resist arrest, the court noted that Parliament had imposed the same maximum sentence of life imprisonment for both kinds of offence. That was a recognition, the court said, by Parliament, of the exacerbating effect of serious harm caused by someone seeking to avoid lawful arrest.

Finally, in R v Lennox [2020] EWCA 1082, the Court of Appeal observed that an intention to resist arrest was less culpable than an intention to cause really serious harm and that any difference in culpability had to be reflected in the sentence.

When he passed sentence, the judge said he was sure that the appellant was well aware that PC Wiley was present near to where he was intending to drive his van between the police car and the pavement. The appellant had executed a highly dangerous manoeuvre. The force of the impact caused the officer to fall to the ground. He became trapped under the wheels of the van and the appellant drove over him. The judge said he was fortunate not to have killed him. If his upper body had been knocked under the wheels of the van rather than his lower body, he may well have killed him. He had known that the space he was driving through was confined and that the officer was in the confined space. The applicant's actions, said the judge, presented an obvious risk of striking him and causing him very serious injury.

The judge considered the sentencing guideline for offences of causing grievous bodily harm with intent to do so. He said that harm would have been in category 2 and that culpability was high because he had used his van as a weapon or the equivalent thereof. The starting point for such an offence would be 7 years' imprisonment with a range from 6 to 10 years' imprisonment. There were aggravating features. He said that non-emergency workers can effect lawful arrests and the fact that the victim was a police officer was an aggravating feature. The appellant had been subject to a community order. He had relevant previous convictions. If it had been covered by the guideline, the offence, the judge said, would have merited a sentence at the top of the range. That sentence would be reduced to 8½ years' imprisonment because of the intention to avoid arrest rather than to cause really serious harm and because of the appellant's personal mitigation. With the reduction of 25 per cent for the plea of guilty, the result was the sentence of 6 years and 4 months' imprisonment.

It is now argued on the appellant's behalf that the sentence was manifestly excessive because the figure of 10 years' imprisonment before allowance for mitigating factors was too high and the reduction for the absence of an intension to cause really serious harm and for personal mitigation was insufficient.

We are grateful to Mr Jarvis for his helpful submissions both orally and in writing which we have carefully considered. We have considered the authorities to which he referred the judge. None of them is a guideline case and the results of the cases are fact specific. We have had some regard to the section 18 guideline where the intention is to cause really serious harm, although that was not the offence for which this appellant had to be sentenced.

In our judgment, if this appellant had intended to cause really serious harm to a police officer with a large van, he could have expected a sentence in double figures before allowance for mitigating factors. Whilst we have sympathy for the appellant's personal circumstances as outlined, they are of limited weight when it comes to mitigating an offence of this seriousness and with the consequences for PC Wiley that we have outlined.

The significance of the distinction between an intention to avoid arrest and an intention to cause really serious harm will depend upon the circumstances of the case. In the instant case, we have been able to see for ourselves from the film that the appellant was attempting to drive a large vehicle through a small gap in very close proximity to a police officer who was trying to stop him. The judge was right to describe the manoeuvre as "highly dangerous". In our judgment, the risk of causing very serious injury was very high. The result was that there was both an intention to evade arrest and a high degree of recklessness in so doing. The combination of those factors was not so very different from the culpability involved in an intention to cause really serious harm.

We are satisfied that the judge took proper account of the appellant's personal mitigation and of the absence of an intention to cause really serious harm. In arriving at the final sentence of 6 years and 4 months' imprisonment, we have also concluded that he took proper account of the culpability and harm factors in the case and of its aggravating factors as we have described them. For those reasons we are satisfied that the sentence passed was not manifestly excessive and this appeal must therefore be dismissed.