R v Nicholas Lynn

On 3 May 2023, in the Crown Court at Kingston, the applicant (then aged 35) pleaded guilty to conspiracy to supply cocaine (count 2) and conspiracy to supply cannabis (count 3). On 19 October 2023, he pleaded guilty on re-arraignment to perverting the course of justice (count 4).

On 19 April 2024, he was sentenced to 15 years and 3 months' imprisonment on count 2, 5 years' imprisonment on count 3 and 18 months' imprisonment on count 4. All the sentences were ordered to run concurrently.

The applicant now renews an application for an extension of time of 12 days to apply for leave to appeal against sentence after refusal by the Single Judge.

The facts of the case are set out in the Criminal Appeal Office Summary and do not need rehearsing here. The sole point which the applicant seeks to argue is that he should have been given the same degree of credit for his pleas of guilty as was given to some of his co-accused. He says that they were given credit of 20 per cent when they were sentenced by a different judge on a different occasion. He was given credit of 15%.

In this case, the applicant and his brother had served Defence Statements indicating that the case was to be contested. The trial was fixed for 8 May 2023. At the defence request, the case was listed on 3 May 2023 when both of them pleaded guilty. The applicant had appeared in the Magistrates' Court in February 2021. It appears that much of the reason for the delay was that the brothers wanted to wait for the outcome of legal arguments advanced by others as to the admissibility of EncroChat evidence. In the event, the pleas were entered before those arguments were resolved. In these circumstances they were obviously not entitled to the maximum credit for a plea of guilty which is an allowance of one-third. If a plea of guilty is not entered at the first opportunity, the stage at which it is entered will determine the amount of credit that is given. The applicable sentencing guideline provides that the reduction will decrease to 10 per cent for a plea of guilty entered on the first day of a trial. Having regard to when the applicant's pleas were entered, it was for the judge to decide how this affected the amount of credit to be given. 15 per cent credit at the stage of the applicant’s pleas of guilty appears to be entirely reasonable.

However, the applicant argues that he should have been given 20 per cent credit. He says this because two co-defendants were afforded 20 per cent credit. Mr Dawod had been sentenced by a different judge and given 20 per cent credit. He had pleaded guilty 7 days before his trial, and 15 months elapsed since he had pleaded not guilty. The judge who sentenced Mr Dawod also sentenced Mr Talbot who pleaded guilty on the day of his trial. Mr Talbot was also allowed credit of 20 per cent. Again, 15 months had elapsed since his plea of not guilty.

A judge has a discretion about how much credit to afford for late pleas of guilty. Some variation in these circumstances is not surprising. On its own, there is nothing objectionable about an allowance of 15 per cent in the circumstances of the applicant's case. The fact that two other defendants may have been given a slightly more generous allowance by another judge does not provide an arguable ground of appeal. In fact, the applicant had delayed for 2 years rather than 15 months before pleading guilty but, for all we know, there may be other aspects of the respective cases where the applicant was dealt with more favourably than Mr Dawod and Mr Talbot. Without a minute examination of all comparable factors between the respective cases, it is impossible to say. What matters is whether the allowance made in this applicant's case for his guilty pleas was in accordance with the applicable sentencing guidelines. The judge's allowance was compliant with the guideline and in those circumstances these applications must be refused. There is no arguable ground of appeal.