R v GBE

This is the hearing of an application by His Majesty's Solicitor General for leave to refer a sentence which the Solicitor General considers to be unduly lenient.

The victim of the offending has the benefit of lifelong anonymity pursuant to the provisions of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act. The Respondent (who we will refer to by three letters because of the relationship with the victim and to ensure that the victim's anonymity is preserved) is a 34-year-old man. He had before these convictions one previous conviction for driving with excess alcohol in 2014, a reprimand for battery in 2007, and a caution for battery on 6 August 2017.

The Respondent was charged on 3 January 2024 with two counts of rape and also with assault occasioning actual bodily harm contrary to section 47 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 and controlling or coercive behaviour contrary to section 76 of the Serious Crime Act 2015. The offences were alleged to have occurred between October 2017 and October 2020. The Respondent was arrested in March 2021 and denied all of the offences at the time.

The Respondent appeared before Hastings Magistrates' Court in January 2024, and the case was sent to the Crown Court at Lewes. On the indictment there were three counts of rape. There was a pre-recorded cross-examination of the victim in June 2024. There was a trial which occurred between 25 February and 11 March 2025. The Respondent was acquitted of the three counts of rape but was convicted of the offences of assault occasioning actual bodily harm and controlling and coercive behaviour at the trial.

On 2 May 2025 the Respondent was sentenced to 2 years' imprisonment suspended for 2 years with the following requirements: 300 hours' unpaid work and 15 days' rehabilitation activity requirements, on both counts, concurrent with each other.

The application for leave to refer the sentence is made on the basis that: (1) the judge's notional sentence of 3 years 4 months was too low; and (2) the reduction from 3 years 4 months to 2 years (a reduction of over 40% for delay) was too substantial. We grant leave for the reference because these are arguable points. We are grateful to Mr Hookway and Mr Walker for their helpful submissions.

So far as the factual matters are concerned, and being careful to avoid any inadvertent identification of the victim, it is necessary to say this. In October 2017 the victim and the offender began a relationship. They had intermittently lived with one another at the victim's home in Eastbourne, and with them was the victim's daughter from a previous relationship who was then aged about 8 to 12 years. In June 2019 the victim and the Respondent had a daughter. Initially the relationship was happy, but things deteriorated. The offender's behaviour changed, and he became aggressive, violent and controlling towards the victim. Their relationship ended in October 2020. During the period of the offending, the victim found steroids in the Respondent's car, and she inferred that he used those drugs and they affected his moods. He would also drink alcohol, and the assaults occurred when he was intoxicated.

The controlling behaviour included routinely accusing the victim of infidelity. He took her phone and searched through her social media accounts for evidence of contact with men, and at the sight of any innocuous contact he accused her of being unfaithful. He prevented her going out on occasions. One of her friends gave evidence about an occasion when she was out shopping with the victim and the Respondent rang and demanded she returned. He controlled what she could wear, who she saw and even the colour of her hair, and he was verbally abusive. That included telling the victim that she was a bad mother to her children.

There was one incident of assault occasioning actual bodily harm. The Respondent was with the victim in their kitchen. He smashed some glasses and told the victim she was disgusting. He poured a bottle of wine over her head. He then put his hand over her throat and strangled her until she passed out. He also screamed the words, “Die, fucking die” at her. When she came round, he was throwing water in her face, and he told her to be quiet and calm down. He also kicked her in the ribs during that incident. That was denied at trial, but the jury were sure it had occurred.

The other occasions of violence were reflected in the overarching count of coercive and controlling behaviour. The difficulty that we have in this particular reference is that the judge did not identify what counts of violence he was sure occurred, and in circumstances where we have mixed verdicts where the jury were sure that the victim had been the subject of some offending but were unsure in relation to other matters, it is difficult to know exactly what offending the judge was sure took place. The evidence at trial was that the Respondent had become aggressive and smashed bedroom walls; he had pushed the victim against the wall, calling her a “shit mum”, and that had been witnessed by the victim's older daughter; and the Respondent had told that daughter that “Your mum, she's a shit mum”.

We have also had the opportunity to see some of the messages, which are abusive. One of them was, “I honestly can no longer refer to you as a woman because women have respect and control. You're just a disgusting fucked-up little liar.”

On a date in October 2020 there was another allegation of assault because of infidelity. During that incident, the Respondent struck the victim in the face and caused a black eye. She remained at home for three weeks in an attempt to hide her injury, and we have seen a photograph of the black eye. Some friends and family noticed and told her to leave the Respondent. At that stage the victim decided to pursue the relationship, as at other times her supervening motivation was to maintain her family home for her children, and she had mixed feelings for the Respondent.

There was another date in 2020 where the victim sought refuge in her bedroom. She described other occasions where she had attempted to hide with her daughter in her bed and been dragged out by her hair.

Then there was a final incident when the victim had been out. She returned home to sleep on the sofa. The next morning the Respondent had taken their daughter to his parents' house. She rang the Respondent, and he accused her of being unfaithful and refused to return their daughter. When she later returned, he threw the phone at her, causing a bruise and cut lip. We have seen a photo of that. The police were called, but at that time the victim did not want to make any complaint.

On another occasion the police were called because the victim was screaming.

In 2020 a friend recalled an incident where she had stayed at their home and the next morning the Respondent had been aggressive, calling the victim a “slag” and throwing baby wipes at her face.

The relationship finally ended in October 2020. Thereafter contact was maintained for the benefit of the daughter.

The judge was the trial judge and carried out the sentencing exercise. Mr Walker had appeared at the trial but was unable to attend the sentencing. There was a victim personal statement from the victim showing that she had felt controlled, had been diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder, and lived in a state of anxiety and had installed cameras around her house.

There was a pre-sentence report showing that the Respondent still denied the offences. He was assessed as posing a medium risk of reoffending and a medium risk of serious harm to partners.

There were, on the other hand, character references. Those showed that the Respondent was paying the mortgage on a new home, that he had in the interim started and continued a good relationship with his new partner, and that they were expecting a child in June 2025.

The judge when sentencing did not identify, as we have already indicated, the acts of violence in the coercive and controlling relationship, and said at the start of the sentencing remarks:

“By the skin of your teeth in one respect, but also by your conduct over the last five years, you're going to avoid an immediate custodial sentence.”

The judge noted in particular the delay in the five-year period since the offending and the Respondent's relationship with his new partner and their child.

The judge found that the offending for the assault occasioning actual bodily harm was harm category 1 because of the effect on the victim, and culpability A because of the strangulation. That gave a starting point of 2 years 6 months and a range of 1 year 6 months to 4 years' imprisonment under the offence-specific guideline. The judge found that the coercive and controlling behaviour was category 1 because of the fear of violence on many occasions and significant psychological harm, and higher culpability A because the conduct was intended to maximise fear or distress. That gave also a starting point of 2 years 6 months and a range of 1 to 4 years.

There were aggravating factors of the previous assault on a partner, but the judge also recorded that there were a lot of mitigating features in the case, including the support that he had given to his mother during her illness and support to other family members.

The judge considered that because of the delay and the effect on the children, he could reduce what he said was the sentence of about 3 years 4 months on the controlling and coercive behaviour, and 2 years concurrent on the actual bodily harm, to a sentence of 2 years and suspend the sentence, imposing the requirements that we have already indicated.

The child, expected in June 2025, has been born. The Respondent has kept up his financial obligations to his first child with the victim and he had kept up his relationship with his first child until March 2025 when the contact was suspended by the Family Courts as a result of the convictions. It seems that contact is about to start again (depending on our judgment) in the Family Supervised Centre next week. The Respondent worked as a bricklayer; he had a new partner and lived in a mortgaged property.

There is a report from a probation officer dated 7 July 2025 which detailed the Respondent's post-sentence behaviour. It is apparent that the Respondent accepts more of his behaviour but is still in denial about some of his offending. His engagement with probation was judged as being of a high standard, with only one agreed absence for the birth of his daughter with his new partner. He had completed four out of the fifteen rehabilitation activity requirement sessions, and he appeared to have opened up to the probation officer about the effect of his attempts to continue contact with his daughter. The probation officer identified that a custodial sentence would put him at risk of losing his job and home and disrupting the Family Court proceedings and delay undertaking interventions.

We have also seen a letter which was uploaded this morning from his mother indicating the details of her illness, which it is not necessary to give in this judgment, but also the considerable support that the Respondent has given to her.

So far as the issues on this reference are concerned, we do consider that the judge was entitled to come to an overall sentence of about 3 years 4 months by reflecting all the offending for both sentences on the count of coercive and controlling behaviour and taking account of the mitigation that was available to the Respondent. This included his work, the fact that he continued to pay his financial obligations in respect of his first child, his new relationship which he had developed in the interim since the offending, and his new child, his assistance with his mother, and the fact that this would have been a first custodial sentence.

In that respect, therefore, we do not accept the first ground of the reference.

The second ground is that there was no justification for the reduction from 3 years 4 months to a sentence of 2 years which was then suspended.

Reference was made to the authorities. There was reference made to Timpson [2023] EWCA Crim 453 and later authorities. In Timpson there had been a delay of 2 years 10 months, and it was said that a reduction of 40 % was too much, but obviously every case is fact specific. That said, in our judgment, the reduction from 3 years 4 months to 2 years was not only lenient, it was unduly lenient. In those circumstances, we would therefore allow the reference.

The question remains whether to exercise our discretion (which it is common ground exists) having found the sentence to be unduly lenient, not to increase the sentence. In our judgment, taking account of: the very helpful recent report from the probation officer which shows of progress being made by the Respondent and the fact that he has already discharged part of the punitive aspects of the suspended sentence; the matters that are disclosed in the further letter from the mother; the fact that over this five-year period there has been a new relationship and a new child; we find that this sentence was unduly lenient but we will exercise our discretion not to increase it.