R v Rana Smiha Reddy Yellambai

The provisions of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992 apply to this offence. Under those provisions, where an allegation has been made that a sexual offence has been committed against a person, no matter relating to that person shall, during that person's lifetime, be included in any publication if it is likely to lead members of the public to identify that person as the victim of the offence. This prohibition applies unless waived or lifted in accordance with section 3 of the Act. We will refer to the complainant in these proceedings as "the victim".

This is an appeal against sentence. It is brought with the leave of the full court: [2025] EWCA Crim 364 (Edis LJ, Martin Spencer J, and the Recorder of Coventry), following the refusal of leave by the single judge. The full court refused leave to appeal against conviction.

On 11 September 2023, following a 15 day trial in the Crown Court at Leicester before His Honour Judge Brown and a jury, the appellants, Vahar Manchala, Rana Yellambai and Ajay Doppalapudi were each convicted of one count of kidnapping. This was count 1 of a multi-count indictment. As we will explain, there were other counts in respect of which the individual appellants were either acquitted or the jury was discharged because it was unable to agree on a verdict.

On 6 October 2023, the trial judge sentenced each of the appellants to ten years' imprisonment.

The facts of the offending in broad outline were that the three appellants picked up the victim, a 40 year old woman, in their car in central Leicester at about 4 am, following a night out on 15 January 2022. The victim had been out drinking with friends and relatives, and was drunk. She was going home alone, and she entered the appellants' care willingly because the appellants gave her the false impression that the car was a taxi.

Manchala, who was sitting in the back seat, engaged in some sexual activity with the victim as the car was travelling along and when stopped at a petrol station.

The appellants did not take the victim to her home, but took her to an isolated spot in a rural cul-de-sac called Chapel Lane. There the victim was taken out of the car and was undressed. The victim managed to escape. She ran across fields to the hard shoulder of the M1 where she was found by police in a very distressed and traumatised state.

The judge explained the factual basis for the sentences in his sentencing remarks. We will set this out in greater detail later in this judgment. The key point, however, is that the judge sentenced on the basis that the motive for the kidnapping had been sexual and that by the end of the incident the appellants had detained the victim with the intention of raping her. The judge was not sure that at the outset, when the victim was picked up, there had been an intention to rape her. He sentenced on the basis that the intention at that stage was to engage in sexual activity, presumably with her consent. However, by the time they reached Chapel Lane, the appellants knew that the victim would not consent to what they wanted to do with her and at that stage they would have raped her if she had not escaped.

We do not accept the submission advanced on behalf of the appellants that the judge sentenced on the basis that the kidnap had been effected by force, rather than by fraud; or on the basis that the victim had been assaulted during the course of her ordeal. The judge did not say that the kidnap had been effected by force. He made clear that he sentenced on the basis that it had been effected by trickery. The judge said in his sentencing remarks that he was sure that the appellants would have raped the victim at the roadside but for her escape. But that is a different matter from sentencing on the basis that the assaults, whether sexual or other types of assault, had been perpetrated by a particular appellant.

The trial that ended on 11 September 2023 was a retrial. At the first trial there were six counts. The jury was at that trial unable to agree upon count 1 (kidnap). The jury was also unable to agree on two further counts of sexual assault: count 2, which related to kissing the victim on the face in the back seat of the car as it was travelling along; and count 3, which related to touching the victim's breasts in the back seat. As for count 4 (assault by penetration, again in the back seat of the car as it was moving), the jury was unable to agree in respect of Manchala who had been in the back seat with the victim; but they acquitted Yellambai and Doppalapudi, who had been the driver and the front seat passenger respectively.

Count 5 (rape) was alleged to have taken place after the car had stopped in Chapel Lane. The judge at the first trial, His Honour Judge Mooncey, directed an acquittal on this count at the end of the prosecution evidence on the basis that there was no case to answer because the victim could not recall what it was that had penetrated her vagina.

Count 6 (assault by penetration) was an alternative to count 5 and related to the events in Chapel Lane. The jury was unable to agree on this count also.

At the retrial, the appellants were tried on the same counts as at the first trial, save for those of which they had been acquitted. The appellants were found guilty of count 1 (kidnap) by a majority of 11:1. As for counts 2 and 3 (sexual assault consisting of kissing the victim's face and touching the victim's breasts in the car), the jury was unable to agree in relation to Manchala, but acquitted Yellambai and Doppalapudi, in the latter case following a majority direction.

Only Manchala faced count 4 at the second trial (assault by penetration in the back seat of the car), as Yellambai and Doppalapudi had been acquitted of this count at the first trial. At the second trial the jury was unable to agree on this count against Manchala.

Finally, the jury was unable to agree on count 5 (assault by penetration of the victim's vagina in Chapel Lane).

It follows that the appellants fell to be sentenced only for the single offence of kidnap. The judge notified the defence teams in advance of the sentencing hearing that he was considering sentencing on the basis that the kidnap was with intent to rape the victim, and he invited submissions on the issue, which the prosecution and defence duly made.

Each of the appellants filed broadly similar, though not identical, grounds of appeal. At the court's direction they then filed a joint skeleton argument. The contents of the skeleton argument and the oral submissions made on behalf of the appellants make clear that the grounds of appeal relied upon by the appellants are essentially the same. They fall into three parts, which can be summarised as follows:

We will deal with these grounds in turn. We make clear, however, that we have considered and taken into account all of the grounds of appeal for each appellant and all of the submissions made on behalf of each of them.

The prosecution has also filed a single skeleton argument, in addition to separate respondent's notices which addressed each appellant's individual grounds of appeal.

The appellant Manchala was represented before us by Mr Trevor Siddle of counsel; Yellambai by Mr Mohammed Bashir; and Doppalapudi by Mr Roy Headlam. The prosecution is represented by Mr David Matthew. All were trial counsel.

As we have said, the judge did not sentence the appellants on the basis that they had intended to rape the victim from the outset when they first picked her up in Leicester city centre. Rather, the judge concluded that at that stage they had kidnapped her in order to engage in consensual sexual activity with her. However, when it became clear that she was not prepared to do what they wanted to do with her, their intentions changed. By the time they had taken her to the secluded spot at Chapel Lane, their intention was to rape the victim. They were only thwarted in their aim because the victim escaped.

Each of the appellants gave evidence to the court, as did the victim. It had been Manchala's case that there was consensual sexual activity between himself and the victim in the car when it was stopped at the petrol station and then on the way to Chapel Lane. It was the case of both Yellambai and Doppalapudi that no sexual activity had taken place between themselves and the victim at any time. All three appellants denied that the victim was dragged from the car in Chapel Lane, or that she was put to the ground, or that she was undressed in any way.

The appellants submit that the jury did not need to decide why the appellants wanted to kidnap the victim The case had been advanced to the jury as one of kidnap by fraud. They pointed out that, had it been the Crown's case that the appellants were kidnapping the victim by fraud so as to commit a sexual offence upon her, it was perfectly open for the Crown to have charged an offence under section 62 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 – intentionally committing any criminal offence, namely kidnap, with intent to commit any relevant sexual offence, namely rape. This was not done. The appellants submitted that in the absence of a conviction under section 62, there was no proper evidential basis from which the judge could conclude that any of the appellants intended to rape the victim in Chapel Lane. None of them had been convicted of any non-consensual sexual activity in relation to the events of that night. They were either acquitted, or the jury was unable to agree, on the counts relating to sexual offences. There were no injuries consistent with any assault on the complainant. There was no damage or soiling to any of the victim's clothing, such as might be expected if she had been put to the ground in a country lane by force.

Furthermore, the appellants submitted that it was wrong in principle for the judge to sentence on the basis of an intention to rape, when the jury had not been required to consider or decide whether there had been an intention to rape in order to reach its verdict on the kidnap. The appellants relied upon R v Davies [1989] 1 Cr App R(S) 380, to which we will return.

The appellants also referred to a comment that the judge directed to the victim in court at the end of his sentencing remarks when complimenting her on her courage in giving evidence. He said:

The appellants' counsel submitted that this comment showed that the judge had erred in reaching the conclusions of fact that informed his sentencing decisions. In finding that he accepted everything that the victim had said, he was effectively saying that he accepted, to the criminal standard, that the victim had been sexually assaulted in the way that she had described. It was submitted that this was inconsistent with the acquittals and the jury's failure to agree in relation to the sexual offence counts.

We do not accept that the judge erred in any respect in the way in which he reached conclusions about the factual basis upon which he sentenced the appellants. The starting point is that the judge directed himself correctly upon the approach that he was required to take. He said:

In the present case the judge was obliged to consider whether he could be sure of the appellants' motive, because this was plainly a relevant consideration when deciding what the appropriate sentences should be for the offence of kidnap. The jury's verdict on kidnap did not mean that there was only one possible interpretation on the question of motive. The judge was right to go on to consider if he could be sure of the appellants' motives. If, as turned out to be the case, he was sure, then he was right and obliged to sentence on that basis. If he had not been able to be sure of motive, then, as he said in the sentencing remarks, he would have been obliged to pass sentence on the interpretation of motive that was most favourable to the appellants.

Moreover, it is clear from the sentencing remarks that the judge did not fall into the trap of sentencing the appellants for offences of which they were not convicted. The judge expressly stated that he was not doing so. He said that if he had sentenced the appellants for rape or digital penetration, the sentence would have been much higher – in the region of 15 years' imprisonment or more. He said that if the appellants had been found guilty of sexual touching, the sentence would have been higher than ten years' imprisonment.

It is true that in his sentencing remarks the judge acknowledged that if the appellants had been charged and convicted of an offence under section 62 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, then the jury's verdict would have made plain that they were satisfied that there had been a sexual motive for the kidnapping. However, the fact that the appellants had not been charged with, or convicted of, this offence did not mean that the judge was prohibited from reaching his own view, if he was able to, of the appellants' motives at the various stages of the kidnapping incident.

There are obvious good explanations for the decision not to charge the appellants with an offence under section 62 of the 2003 Act. First, it was never the prosecution's case that the appellants had at the outset of the offending kidnapped the victim with the intention to rape her, which came later; and second, it would overburden an already complicated indictment.

The appellants' argument does not gain any support from Davies. That was a very different type of case. In that case the defendant was convicted of the now obsolete offence of buggery, which could be committed with or without consent. The prosecution had declined to charge him with rape, and the jury had been directed that consent was not an issue for them to consider. This was because the issue in the case had been whether the buggery had taken place at all. The judge proceeded to sentence on the basis that the buggery had been non-consensual. The Court of Appeal held that the judge had been wrong to do so. This was because section 142 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 provided that non-consensual buggery amounts to rape. The court said that since that provision came into force, where non-consensual intercourse is alleged, whether vaginal or anal, it must be charged as rape. It was not permissible for a man convicted of a lesser offence (buggery) to be sentenced as if he had been convicted of a more serious one (rape), unless a Newton hearing had taken place.

The reasoning in Davies is specific to cases of buggery. Moreover, even in Davies, the court said that the judge would have been entitled to sentence on the basis of the facts about which the judge was sure about non-consent if a Newton hearing had been held. Davies is not authority for the broader proposition that a judge may not sentence on the basis of a factual finding that was not an essential ingredient of the offence. Indeed, as we have said, authorities such as King and McGlade make clear that a judge is obliged to consider whether he or she can reach such a conclusion, if it is pertinent to the sentencing exercise.

We mention in passing that McGlade was also a case of buggery, but one which was decided prior to the coming into force of section 142 of the 1994 Act. In that case, the Court of Appeal approved the approach of a judge who had sentenced on the basis that he could be sure that the buggery was non-consensual, even though that was not an essential element of the offence.

The next question is whether, as the appellants submit, the fact that there were acquittals or failures to agree in relation to the counts concerning offences of a specifically sexual nature meant that it was not open to the judge to conclude that there was a sexual motive behind the kidnap from the outset, and an intention to rape at the final stage.

We do not accept this submission. The fact that the judge at the first trial accepted a submission of no case to answer on the counts of rape is not inconsistent with the finding of an intention to rape at Chapel Lane. An intention to rape is not the same thing as going through with the rape itself.

Similarly, the fact that the appellants Yellambai and Doppalapudi were acquitted of, and the jury was unable to agree on a verdict in respect of Manchala for, the offences of sexual assault and assault by penetration, which were alleged to have taken place in the car, is not inconsistent with the basis upon which the judge sentenced the appellants. We repeat that an intention to rape does not require that any sexual assault actually takes place. The judge sentenced the appellants on the basis that, at first, they had kidnapped the victim with a view to taking part in consensual sexual activity with her. Once again, the judge's conclusion that there was an intention to rape by the time the appellants reached Chapel Lane is not inconsistent with the jury's failure to agree on count 5 (assault by penetration of the victim's vagina in Chapel Lane). One of the appellants may have had an intention to rape, even though no penetration in fact occurs.

It is significant that there were no counts of attempt in relation to the sexual offences, and also that the appellants did not contend at trial that the jury should do anything other than give separate consideration to each count on the indictment. In other words, it was accepted that the count of kidnap was separate from the other counts.

We next address the submission that the judge's statement that he had accepted everything that the victim had said in terms of the factual matrix of the case was inconsistent with the jury's acquittals and failures to agree in relation to the sexual offence counts. Once again, we do not accept this submission. The acquittals and failures to agree do not necessarily mean that the jury rejected any part of the evidence of the victim. The victim had admitted that she was very drunk and that she did not clearly remember every part of the incident, particularly the latter part. In his ruling at the first trial that there was no case to answer on the count of rape, Judge Mooncey explained that he did so because it was the victim's evidence that she could not be sure that it was a penis that had penetrated her. It follows that the directed acquittal on the count of rape was not based on a rejection of the victim's evidence.

As for counts 2 to 4 (allegations of sexual assault in the back seat of the car), the jury may, as the single judge pointed out, have taken the view that the front seat occupants, Yellambai and Doppalapudi, may not have know about or encouraged what was going on in the back seat; or the jury may have decided that they could not be sure that the there appellants did not reasonably believe that the victim was consenting to the sexual activity with Manchala. These conclusions would not have involved rejection of the victim's evidence. She had given evidence to the effect that whilst the sexual activity was going on, she had not struggled but instead had made pointless conversation and had tried to find other ways of making Manchala stop, without making him mad. In other words, on her own evidence, the victim had not made her dissent clear because of fears of the potential consequences.

Count 5 related to the assault by penetration in Chapel Lane. The victim was able to describe some of the events at this stage of the incident, but she also said that this was the bit that was not so clear in her head. She said that she was taken from the car, had her trousers pulled down, and was put on her back on the grass. She said that one of the appellants had his trousers down, that her mouth was penetrated by "fingers or something", that one of the appellants was on top of her, that another was holding her, that her vagina was penetrated by some object, but that she was unable to say with certainty that it was a penis. The victim was unable to identify a particular appellant as being the perpetrator of a particular act at this stage of the incident.

It is understandable, in light of this evidence, why the jury could have been unable to agree on a verdict of assault by penetration for any of the appellants, despite accepting the evidence of the victim.

The appellants all denied that the victim was dragged from the car at Chapel Lane and was then placed on the ground and undressed. The jury's verdicts and failures to agree in respect of the sexual offences do not mean that they must have accepted this evidence or that they could not be sure that it was not true. The jury could logically have decided to acquit and/or to fail to agree on the counts relating to sexual offences, even if they accepted the victim's evidence rather than the appellants' evidence on these matters.

The final question on this part of the appeal is whether there was sufficient evidence to justify the judge's conclusion that he could be sure that there was a sexual motive for the kidnapping from the outset and that by the time that the car arrived at Chapel Lane he could be sure that their intention was to rape the victim.

There was ample evidence for the judge's conclusions in this regard. As we have said, the judge had presided over the trial. The trial lasted 15 days. The victim gave evidence, as did each of the appellants. In advance of the sentencing hearing, the appellants' counsel had been given the opportunity to put forward motives other than a sexual motive for the kidnap. They did not do so. Nor did the appellants suggest any other motive in their evidence, during which they denied that there was a kidnapping at all. As the judge pointed out, there was no evidence that was consistent with any other motive for kidnapping the victim. This was not a hostage case. There was no ransom demand. There was no robbery motive. The appellants had not taken the victim's possessions which had been left at Chapel Lane when she escaped, except for her handbag which was disposed of by the appellants. There was no sign of injury to the victim, or of an intention to assault her in a non-sexual manner. Nor were there any drugs or any domestic violence context to the case. In the absence of any other explanation, a sexual motive for the kidnap was the only possibility left.

More than that, however, the evidence which the judge was entitled to accept inexorably pointed both to a sexual motive at the outset and to an intention to rape by the time the appellants arrived at Chapel Lane. The judge pointed out the following features of the evidence in his sentencing remarks. The appellants had been drinking whisky that evening at their shared house in Leicester. They did so until 3.30 am, when they decided to get into the car and drive into central Leicester. They were in a three door Audi TT. The judge rejected the appellants' contention that they had been looking for food, because there was no evidence of any calls to food outlets. The judge was satisfied that the appellants were looking for somebody to pick up for sex. Doppalapudi's phone had been used to call for a sex worker at 3.26 am, a few minutes before the car set off. The car had circled around the city centre before the appellants came across the victim.

The victim had been out drinking with her friends and was very drunk. When the car stopped next to her in the street, the victim was alone. She thought that it was a taxi. The appellants in the front seat, Yellambai and Doppalapudi, got out and talked to the victim. They tricked her into thinking that the car was a taxi and helped her into the back of the vehicle, next to Manchala. Doppalapudi accepted in his interview that the victim had thought that she was getting into a taxi. The back seat of the Audi was a very confined space. There were no rear doors and thus the victim was trapped. The victim thought that she was going to be taken home. The driver, Yellambai, set off in the right direction towards her home, but then turned off in a different direction. He pulled into a petrol station, and they then headed off towards the secluded location in Chapel Lane. This was a country lane near Lutterworth, a cul-de-sac with no street lighting.

The judge found that the victim was trapped from the outset of the journey. He accepted that as they drove away, there was laughter and the playing of music. This was because the victim was playing along, as she did not know what to do and wanted to avoid provoking the appellants. She was waiting for a moment when she could get herself to safety.

The judge found that when they reached Chapel Lane, the appellants got the victim out of the car and she was put to the ground. Her coat was taken off and her trousers were in the process of being lowered when she managed to get up, push away and run. In this regard the judge preferred the victim's evidence to the appellants' evidence, as he was entitled to do.

The victim's version of events was corroborated by another witness, a local farmer, who said that he heard the victim give an almighty and piercing scream that he will never forget. The victim's version of events is also corroborated by evidence of what happened afterwards. She ran as fast as she could, without jacket, shoes, handbag or mobile phone, all of which had been discarded in the middle of the road in Chapel Lane, and all but the handbag were recovered there the following day. The victim ran across fields and through hedges. This resulted in scratches and lacerations to her lower legs and feet. The victim eventually arrived on the hard shoulder of the M1. She was found there after a short while by a police officer. She was in a hysterical state. This was captured by body-worn video footage which was shown to the jury.

The whole incident between the start of the kidnap and the victim's escape in Chapel Lane lasted for approximately 30 minutes.

After the victim ran off, the three appellants drove back up the lane and back to Leicester. They did not bother to pick up the victim's phone or most of her other possessions. The evidence of the movements of the appellants' car shows that they went back to cruising around the centre of Leicester for a further while, before going home. The prosecution said – and the judge accepted – that the appellants had gone back to cruising around to look for women. The day after the offences two of the appellants, Manchala and Yellambai, went out to a sex worker's address, although they did not in the event make use of her services.

In our judgment, the judge was plainly right to conclude, on the basis of the evidence, that the only possible motive for the kidnap of the victim was a sexual motive. He accepted that he was unable to conclude that the appellants' motive, when the victim was picked up and first kidnapped, was rape. However, the judge was again plainly right to conclude on the evidence that when it became clear by the time that they reached Chapel Lane that the victim would not consent to the sexual activity for which the appellants were hoping, they formed the intention to rape her. This is what would have happened if she had not managed bravely to escape.

There is one further piece of evidence, not specifically referred to in the sentencing remarks, which reinforces the conclusion that there was a sexual motive and which contradicts the version of events presented to the court by the appellant Manchala. This is that Manchala's DNA was found on the victim's trouser fly area and bottoms, the back of her trousers and in her nail clippings.

The remaining grounds of appeal can conveniently be dealt with together. The second matter raised in the grounds of appeal is that, in any event, the sentence of ten years' imprisonment for kidnap was manifestly excessive. The appellants point out that the definitive Sentencing Council Guideline for Kidnap and False Imprisonment came into force on 1 April 2025, after the sentencing exercise. The appellants do not suggest that the judge was obliged to follow this guideline, as the appellants were sentenced before that date, but they submit that if the guidelines had been in force the sentences imposed on them would have been much lower.

On behalf of the appellants Manchala and Doppalapudi, it is submitted that their offending would have fallen into harm category 2 and culpability category B. This is on the basis that whilst one culpability A factor is present – the targeting of a particularly vulnerable victim – the lack of force used would place the offending into category C. It was submitted that these factor balance each other out, and so category 2B is the appropriate category. Under the guidelines, category 2B cases have a starting point of five years' custody, and a range of two to seven years.

So far as the appellant Yellambai is concerned, the submission was that his own offending would fall into category 2C of the current guidelines. It was submitted that the following features bring the case within category 2C: no force was used by Yellambai; this was a fraud kidnap; it was unsophisticated; it was of limited duration; there was a lack of interaction between Yellambai and the victim; Yellambai is of previous good character; and he has expressed remorse.

The appellants also submit that whether or not the new guideline is applicable or is of assistance, there are significant mitigating features in this case, namely: the lack of force used and the short duration of the kidnap (it lasted no more than 30 minutes).

On behalf of the appellant Yellambai in particular, it was also submitted that the judge should not have imposed the same sentence on each appellant on the basis that they were equally culpable. Yellambai relied upon R v Iqbal [2020] EWCA Crim 376, for the proposition that there is a sliding scale to be applied to each appellant involved in the kidnap.

Manchala is now aged 25; Yellambai is now aged 31; and Doppalapudi is now aged 28. We have already set out the findings of fact upon which the judge based his sentencing decisions. In mitigation, the judge took account took of the fact that the appellants each came from good homes in India. They were bright young men who were university graduates; they were each pursuing graduate studies in the United Kingdom. They had no social issues which might have contributed to the offending. They had no psychiatric issues and no dependency issues.

On the other hand, during the trial they had demonstrated no insight, let along remorse, for the effect of the ordeal upon the victim. The judge noted, however, that Yellambai had, through counsel, expressed contrition and remorse.

The judge decided that the sentence should be the same for all three appellants. He considered but rejected the idea of passing different sentences in light of their roles. They were all in it equally, as member of the team, playing their own part in it.

The judge did not make a finding of dangerousness in relation to any of the appellants.

We make clear at the outset that we do not intend to give general guidance in this judgment on sentencing in kidnap cases. This would be inappropriate for two reasons. The main reason is that there is now a definitive guideline that applies to sentences for kidnap and it should be to the guideline that sentencers and parties should refer when looking for guidance about sentences for kidnap.

The second reason is that the relevant Court of Appeal authorities, prior to the new guideline coming into force, make clear that sentencing decisions in kidnap cases are fact specific.

The definitive guideline for the offence of kidnap was not in force on the date when the appellants were sentenced, and therefore they did not apply to this sentencing exercise. Guidelines do not have retrospective effect: see R v Boakye [2012] EWCA Crim 838 at [17]. The sentence in this case must be assessed by reference to the law and sentencing practice at the time that it was imposed. The judge was not referred to any draft guidelines at the sentencing hearing.

At the time of the sentencing exercise there were several authorities on which this court had given guidance in relation to sentencing in kidnap cases. In Attorney General's Reference Nos 92 and 93 of 2014 [2014] EWCA Crim 2713; [2015] 1 Cr App R(S) 44, at [18] and [19], the court said:

In Attorney General's Reference Nos 102 and 103 of 2014 [2014] EWCA Crim 2922; [2015] 1 Cr App R(S) 55, the court said at [29]:

In our judgment, the sentence of ten years' imprisonment for each of the appellants was not manifestly excessive as things stood before the relevant guideline came into force. It is true that the kidnap was effected by fraud, not be force, and that no weapons were used; but it was, nonetheless, a very serious and unpleasant offence.

The three appellants set off very late at night, effectively hunting as a pack, to look for a suitable victim. They had been drinking whisky. They were looking for women who were very vulnerable. They found their victim: a woman who was rendered vulnerable by being alone and in drink. They duped her into thinking that she was getting into a taxi. There were three of them to one of her. They put her into the back of the car, from which she could not escape. They took her in the opposite direction from that which she wanted to go. When it became clear that she would not co-operate with their sexual desires, the appellants took her to a secluded location, intending to rape her, three to one. They took her out of the car and started to undress her, with this aim in mind. As we have said, it was only through the courage of the victim that she was able to escape. She had to leave her jacket, shoes, handbag and phone behind to go off into the fields in the pitch black. Having crossed an area of countryside, barefoot, she ended up on the side of the motorway, understandably in an extremely distressed state.

The victim impact statement graphically indicates the long-term toll that this experience has had on the victim and her family. The victim suffers from dark thoughts, is fearful of male members of the public and continues to have great anxiety which sometimes leaves her unable to get out of bed or to go to work.

When the victim managed to get away, the appellants' response was to go back to the centre of Leicester to look for another victim.

We do not agree that this was an unsophisticated kidnap. It was premeditated and the appellants acted together to bring it about. It is true that the ordeal lasted no more than 30 minutes, but that is still a long time for an experience such as this; and it would have lasted longer had the victim not managed to escape. The victim did not know for how long it would last.

It is also true that there is some mitigation in the form of previous good character, but it is limited. The appellants were not very young men. They were well educated and were studying for post-graduate degrees at Leicester University. They should have been well aware that what they were doing was very wrong. They showed little, if any, insight or remorse.

The appellants drew our attention to two authorities. In Attorney General's Reference 113 of 2015 [2016] EWCA Crim 38, a sentence of five years' custody was imposed for a kidnap, following an Attorney General's Reference. We derived no assistance from this authority, as the facts of that case, although it also involved kidnap for a sexual motive, were very far removed from the facts of the present case. In particular, in that case when the victim was sufficiently conscious to be able to protest, she was permitted to leave.

Similarly, R v Iqbal [2020] EWCA Crim 376, was a case that was decided on very different facts. Once again, it was an Attorney General's Reference, and it was a case in which the primary offence was held to be an assault. We derive no assistance from this authority either.

In light of all the circumstances, including the aggravating and mitigating factors, we take the view that the judge was fully entitled to impose sentences of ten years' imprisonment on each of the appellants.

We also take the view that the judge was right to impose the same sentence on each of the three appellants. This was a joint enterprise. Although it was the appellant Manchala who engaged in sexual activity in the back seat with the victim, it had been the other two appellants, Yellambai and Doppalapudi who had been primarily responsible for tricking the victim into getting into the car. Yellambai was the driver. As the judge said, they were all in it together. There was no evidence that one of them had pressured the others into taking part. There was no valid basis for the contention that Yellambai was less culpable than the others. His role as driver was pivotal to the offending.

For these reasons the appeals against sentence are dismissed.