R v Adam Anthony Fletcher

In this appeal against sentence, for which leave was granted by the single judge, Adam Anthony Fletcher appeals against the sentence imposed upon him in the Crown Court at Liverpool by His Honour Judge Cummings KC on 21^st September 2022.

The appellant (who is now aged 29 but was 28 at the date of the offence) was sentenced to Imprisonment for Life, with a minimum term of 22 years (less 269 days spent on remand). He was convicted after trial on 25^th July 2022 of Murder. The appellant contends that the sentence was either wrong in principle or excessive.

Two other offenders were convicted and sentenced for offences of assisting an offender which related to the appellant's offence. This appeal is not concerned with their cases.

On 18^th December 2021 a party was held in the Brambles Public House, Old Swan, Liverpool, which later moved on to a house in Princess Drive, Liverpool. A number of those who attended the public house joined the owner of the property, Nicola Morrison, in the continuing celebrations. Others were also invited. Amongst those were Paul Stenson, who was aged 30 and who later became the victim of the offence with which this appeal is concerned. He attended the party with his girlfriend. The appellant and his girlfriend also attended the party.

In the early hours of the following morning, whilst the party continued, Mr Stenson's partner was outside in the garden of the property, having a cigarette, when she was approached by a man she did not know. This was the appellant. She believed that the appellant was "coming on" to her, which made her uncomfortable. She reported the incident to Mr Stenson. A short time later she returned to see the appellant and Mr Stenson together, apparently in normal conversation which ended when the two men appeared to make up and hug. She was annoyed that Mr Stenson had apparently not believed her account and left the party.

According to a number of witnesses called at trial, the atmosphere changed quickly whilst the two men were in the kitchen of the property: there was an exchange of blows, with punches each to the other. The owner of the property required everyone to leave her home. At the same time the appellant asked Mr Stenson to continue the dispute outside. Both men left the kitchen, walked along the hallway and out to the front of the property. However, the appellant picked up a large knife in the kitchen as he did so. He did not raise the knife or make it obvious to others that he had taken it with him. One witness described the appellant as hiding the knife behind his back.

Once outside the property, Mr Stenson appeared to thrown a punch. The appellant produced the knife and, whilst putting an arm around Mr Stenson's back in order to draw him closer in, plunged the knife into his chest. He then ran away, taking the knife with him. Mr Stenson stumbled and shouted "I've been stabbed". He collapsed shortly afterwards.

Paramedics arrived after being called to the scene by witnesses. Mr Stenson was taken to hospital but was pronounced to have died by seven o'clock in the morning.

On post-mortem examination some relatively minor injuries to the face and head could be seen; they were consistent with the fight or scuffle which had taken place inside the house. A single stab wound to the left chest area, caused by a bladed weapon with a single cutting edge, was found. It had penetrated through the chest wall and transected the heart, before puncturing the lower lobe of the right lung. It had caused substantial internal bleeding and a rapid death. The pathologist expressed the opinion that the thrust was at lease of moderate force, and possibly more, to have caused such an injury.

The appellant was not arrested until 23^rd December 2021. When he was interviewed he declined to answer any questions. He provided a prepared statement in which he stated that he had been challenged by the deceased who had accused him of misbehaving towards his girlfriend. He said that the matter was settled and they shook hands, but shortly afterwards he was attacked by the deceased and others kicking him to the body whilst he was in the kitchen. He believed that he was threatened by being "poked up", which he took to being a reference to stabbing. He was worried that the deceased and his friends would do so and therefore he armed himself with a knife, which he took to show them in the hope that they would leave him alone. Outside he said that he was the subject of a further attack and acted in self-defence.

The appellant was convicted by the jury who rejected his defence.

The judge was required to impose a sentence of imprisonment for life and proceeded to determine the minimum term to be served in custody. He concluded that this offence of murder fell within the circumstances encompassed within paragraph 4 of Schedule 21 of the Sentencing Act 2020. Having done so, the starting point in assessing the minimum term of custody was 25 years, which he reduced to 22 years to reflect the relatively short time that the appellant had possessed the knife and the small distance he had carried it to the front of the property.

In fixing the minimum term at 22 years, the judge also took into account the relevant aggravating and mitigating factors.

On behalf of the appellant, Mr Finnigan KC, for whose submissions we are grateful, relies on three grounds:

In the course of argument, Mr Finnigan has advanced an alternative: that even if this sentence did fall within paragraph 4, it should have been reduced substantially from the starting point of 25 years.

On behalf of the prosecution Mr Pratt KC, again for whose submissions we are grateful, submits that the judge was entitled to conclude that this offence of murder fell within paragraph 4 of Schedule 21, whilst some adjustment downwards from the 25 year starting point was merited for the factors identified by the appellant. That was achieved by the judge.

In respect of the second ground, Mr Pratt submits that the judge was entitled to reach the conclusion that the appellant had picked up the knife as a weapon of surprise, having heard the evidence during trial.

So far as the third ground raises additional merited complaint, the judge had plainly taken into account the mitigating factors and had reduced by three years the starting point for the offence.

It is clear from the facts of this offence that the start of the violence began within the kitchen. Then, after being told to leave the property, both the appellant and the deceased, together with others, moved along the hallway and through the front door to the area in front of the house. Whilst that was not a substantial distance, it was a movement from inside to outside the property and into a public place.

Paragraph 4 of Schedule 21 to the Sentencing Act 2020 provides as follows:

The issue for the sentencing judge to determine, having heard the evidence during trial, is whether he could be sure that the appellant had been a person who "took a knife … to the scene intending to – (a) commit any offence, or (b) have it available to use as a weapon, and used that knife … in committing the murder".

This issue of fact was the subject of close analysis by this court in the following decisions: R v Kelly and Others [2011] EWCA Crim 1462, [2012] 1 Cr App R(S) 56; and R v Paul Dillon [2015] EWCA Crim 3. In Dillon this court made the following observations at [32]:

It is clear to us that this very experienced judge, who had heard the trial, had these principles well in mind when he concluded that the appellant had picked up the knife and walked from the kitchen to outside the property, where he carried out the offence of murder In our judgment there can be no criticism of that conclusion on the evidence revealed within the trial. The appropriate starting point in assessing the minimum term was, therefore, 25 years. That was not, of course, an end to the matter because the aggravating and mitigating factors both as to culpability and harm needed to be assessed so as to reach the final sentence.

Whilst it is argued on behalf of the appellant that the judge could not have been sure that the knife was carried by the appellant behind his back, because the judge did not express himself to be so sure, we do not find this to be an effective ground of appeal. In describing how the knife was carried by the appellant (as a young witness stated it was) behind his back, the judge stated:

The judge determined that there were two aggravating factors of seriousness: first, that the murder was in the presence of other people of varying ages, both inside and outside the property; and secondly, that the appellant had disposed of the knife after the murder. Whilst the appellant had readily accepted causing the deceased's death, it was important that the weapon was not available for examination.

In mitigation for the appellant, the judge plainly took into account that this was an offence which occurred relatively quickly after the argument had started with punching between the two men. The judge also made it clear that it was a mitigating factor that the distance between the kitchen and the outside of the property and the period of time that the appellant possessed the knife was short. Both of these factors reflected the spontaneity of the offence.

Ultimately, our decision must be based, therefore, upon whether the reduction in sentence in the minimum term from 25 years to 22 years was insufficient and thereby created an excessive sentence. We are not persuaded that it does. The reduction reflected the factors identified by the judge who had properly taken into account the appropriate principles and the evidence available. We do not find that there as any error of principle, nor that the sentence imposed was excessive.

Accordingly, we must dismiss this appeal.