R v Michael Isaacs

The applicant applies for an extension, by about four weeks, of the time limited for him to renew his applications, which were refused by the single judge, for an extension of the time limited for him to apply for leave to appeal and, if the extension of time is granted, for leave to appeal against his conviction on 14 February 1969 in the Central Criminal Court, when he pleaded guilty before Caulfield J to one count of conspiracy to commit acts of public mischief.

On that day Caulfield J sentenced the applicant to a fine of £5,000 and ordered him to pay £300 costs, to be paid within 18 months, in default of which he would serve 12 months' imprisonment. The applicant appealed against his sentence. On 13 October 1969 this court increased the time for payment of the fine to three years.

The facts of the case were described on that occasion by this court as follows:

“The company was one of a group of companies the business of which was run by Benson and Isaacs from about mid-1965 and continued, so far as the matters alleged against them are concerned, up to March 1967. The principal business of the companies was the work of tracing missing debtors on behalf of hire purchase companies and finance companies. The method adopted by the Applicants and the employees of the company involved the impersonation of public officials, general officers of the Inland Revenue, sometimes officers of the Ministry of Pensions, Police Officers and doctors with a view to eliciting information from members of the public or from the Inland Revenue Departments. The method involved the expenditure of time and trouble on the part of the public officers and, incidentally, induced some of them to breach the rules of their employment as to confidential information. One of the ways in which the Applicants assisted their business was to obtain a number of confidential Post Office directories.

Both Benson and Isaacs appear to have been equally involved. Benson was the director of only one of the companies concerned, but all major decisions seem to have been taken after consultation with him, and Isaacs was a director of the Applicant and other companies.

Isaacs was first interviewed about the methods employed within the group of companies in 1965 and warned against the illegality of impersonation of other persons. Benson, in connection with these matters, used the name of Clarke, Isaacs the name of Hamilton. The volume of business done was very considerable and for their services and conduct of their business a charge was made of some 2 guineas for a successful trace of a missing debtor and half a guinea for an unsuccessful attempt.”

The proposed ground of appeal is that conspiracy to cause a public mischief was not an offence known to the law, as it is said was decided in DPP v Withers [1975] AC 842. The applicant became aware of that decision in 1974 and asked his then legal representatives whether it provided a basis on which to apply for leave to appeal his conviction. They advised against any application for leave to appeal and no application was made.

Many years later, the applicant was prompted to apply for leave to appeal after his conviction was relied on by the Information Commissioners Office (“the ICO”) in proceedings commenced in 2018 in which the applicant was alleged to have acted in breach of the Data Protection Act. In particular his conviction was relied on in the context of confiscation proceedings.

Understandably, given the passage of time, trial counsel have been unable to assist. We have however been greatly assisted by a respondent's notice.

The delay in renewing the applicant's applications is said to have arisen because of a misunderstanding in that he thought that his solicitors would be renewing the applications. Had we thought that there was merit in the applications, we might have granted an extension of time. However, it is plain that there is no merit in the applications.

The applicant seeks an extension of time by over 50 years. In paragraph 23 of its judgment in R v AYS [2023] EWCA Crim 730 this court said as follows:

“… In an appropriate case the statutory time limit for commencing an appeal may be extended; but it is not an option which a convicted person may simply choose to postpone until the timing is more convenient for him. There is a strong public interest in the finality of proceedings, and good reason must be shown for any period in respect of which an applicant seeks an extension of time, and not just for the first few days or couple of weeks.”

In paragraph 15 of its judgment in R v Thorsby [2015] 1 WLR 2901, this court said as follows in the context of an appeal against sentence:

“… The practice of the court is generally to refuse a long extension of time unless injustice would be caused by refusal. It is improbable that a long extension of time would be granted on the ground that the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive, particularly when the applicant has already received competent advice to the effect that it was not. The court will be more likely closely to examine the merits of an out of time appeal when it is argued that some principle of law or legal requirement has been ignored or overlooked.”

In addition, in paragraph 18 of its judgment in R v Johnson [2017] 4 WLR 104 this court said:

“… a long line of authority clearly establishes that if a person was properly convicted on the law as it then stood, the court will not grant leave without it being demonstrated that a substantial injustice would otherwise be done. …”

In the present case no good reason has been shown for the delay since 1974. Moreover, we do not consider that any injustice, let alone any substantial injustice, will result from refusing the extension of time sought. We say this for two reasons. First, this is a case in which the applicant took advice in 1974 on the question whether or not to apply for leave to appeal on the ground which he now seeks to pursue. Having taken that advice, the applicant made a decision not to seek leave to appeal. It is not unjust for the applicant to have to bear the consequences of his own decision. Secondly, the proposed appeal has no prospect of success. As the single judge said:

“In Quartermain, unreported, The Times, 23 and 24 October 1974, the Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal on the grounds that no miscarriage of justice had actually occurred where the defendant had pleaded guilty to conspiracy to effect a public mischief but the particulars of the offence disclosed a conspiracy to defraud by deceiving a person responsible for a public duty into doing something which he would not have done but for the deceit.”

The present case is one in which any appeal would be dismissed for similar reasons. What the applicant did was illegal, as he had been warned in 1965. Although it was subsequently decided in R v Withers that the offence of conspiracy at common law did not include a head of conspiracy to commit public mischief, the underlying facts, which the applicant admitted by his guilty plea, still amounted to the offence of conspiracy at common law under the head of conspiracy to defraud.

We dismiss the application for an extension of the time limited for renewing the applications for an extension of time and for leave to appeal.