F, G and H (Return Home Under Supervision Order), Re

On 20 May 2026, we heard an application by a local authority for permission to appeal, with appeal to follow, against orders made by HH Judge Willans at the conclusion of care proceedings concerning three girls, hereafter referred to as F, aged 14, G, now rising 5, and H, 3½. At the end of the hearing, we informed the parties that the application would be dismissed, for reasons to be given at a later date. This judgment sets out my reasons for joining in that decision.

The parents of the three girls are Grenadian citizens. G’s birth certificate records another man as her father, but DNA testing subsequently established that the third respondent is indeed her father.

The parents lived in Grenada with F until she was six. At that point, the mother came to England, leaving the child in the father’s care. When F was nine, the father brought her to live with the mother and her baby sister, G. Thereafter, the two girls, and subsequently H, lived with their mother, and saw the father occasionally when he visited from Grenada.

As the man wrongly registered as her father was a British citizen, G (unlike her parents and her siblings) also has citizenship. The mother was granted limited leave to remain in this country which expired in October 2025. M has applied for extended leave to remain and is awaiting a decision from the Home Office.

The relationship between the parents was volatile and characterised by domestic abuse. On several occasions, the mother made complaints about the father’s violence but subsequently withdrew the allegations. In 2022, the family came to the attention of social services as a result of concerns about domestic abuse, and about a deterioration in the mother’s mental health attributable to the abuse she had suffered. At one stage in 2024, when the mother was experiencing psychotic episodes, the children were accommodated for several weeks by the local authority for the area in London where the family was then living.

By the start of 2025, the family had moved to another part of London. In February, the family came to the attention of the local authority there after the mother’s sister called an ambulance because of renewed concerns about the mother’s mental health. She was admitted under section 2 of the Mental Health Act 1983 and diagnosed with acute psychosis triggered by domestic abuse. Initially, the children were looked after by their aunt, but in March 2025 they were accommodated in foster care. The local authority started care proceedings and interim care orders were made on 22 April.

In the course of the proceedings, a parenting assessment of both parents was carried out by an independent social worker. At that stage, the parents had not separated. The assessment, dated July 2025, made a number of recommendations, including that the mother should undergo domestic abuse work before any consideration could be given to the children being returned to her care. The mother was also assessed by a consultant psychiatrist who concluded that “the prognosis is good if she adheres to her care plans, takes medication which results in a stable mental state as pertains at the present.”

In the latter half of 2025, the parents separated. The mother undertook domestic abuse work with the Freedom Programme. The local authority social worker and the children’s guardian acknowledged that there were improvements in her presentation.

For the final hearing, the local authority filed a schedule of allegations on the basis of which it was asserted that the threshold criteria for making orders under s.31 of the Children Act 1989 were satisfied. In summary, it was alleged that the father had been violent, abusive and coercively controlling towards the mother on a number of particularised occasions and that the mother’s vulnerability to poor mental health put him in a position of trust and control.

In the event that the court found that the threshold criteria were satisfied, the local authority sought care orders for all three children. Their plan for F was for her to be placed in long-term foster care. For the two younger girls, they sought placement orders under section 21 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 with a view to placing them for adoption with a paternal aunt in Canada under the 1993 Hague Convention. The children’s parents opposed these plans and sought the return of the children to the mother’s care. The guardian supported the local authority’s applications for care orders, but to a different end. As summarised by the judge (judgment, paragraph 4), she considered that there should be a “clear route map” towards F returning to her mother’s care within around three months, accompanied by the discharge of the care order on such a return. With regard to the younger children, she considered that it was premature to proceed with a plan for adoption and she invited the court to dismiss the application for placement orders. Given concerns about delays associated with adoption under the Convention, it was her view that the mother’s ability to care for the children should be reviewed first, before proceeding with a plan for adoption.

The hearing before the judge took place over four days in February and March 2026. At the conclusion, judgment was reserved and handed down on 20 March. As the focus of the proposed appeal is on the judge’s treatment of the evidence and his reasoning, I shall summarise the judgment in a little detail.

The judge started by summarising “what this case is about”. He stated that he had considered all the evidence – the documents, the live evidence, and the written and oral submissions. He said that domestic abuse was “agreed as being the central feature in setting the professional judgment as to outcome”. He briefly summarised the relevant legal principles. He summarised the background, both before and during the proceedings.

Turning to the mother’s mental health, the judge recorded that it was not in dispute that as a result of her poor health she had at times not been able to meet the children’s needs. On the other hand, he noted that it was “clear and agreed” that she had experienced a settled period of mental health for most of the proceedings, was now “compliant with her medication”, was “approaching almost a year without a relapse” and had “engaged with her mental health team in the community”. Although this was no guarantee that there would not be a relapse, it was “a positive marker for future stability”. He added that it was “noteworthy” that this period of settled mental health had occurred “notwithstanding the likely stress of the proceedings and the fact of elements of parental dispute during the period”. This left the judge “in no doubt there is an association between stressors at home and instability in the first respondent’s mental health”.

On the issue of domestic abuse, the judge noted that the concerns included that the mother makes allegations which she then withdraws, and that the local authority contended that this reflected “elements of control” on the part of the father and/or lack of insight on the part of the mother. Later, the judge said that there was “no doubt” that domestic abuse had occurred. In assessing the extent of it, he took into account the fact that the father had sent the social worker a photograph of his beheading a goat with a machete. The judge said he was “in no doubt it was sent to threaten and intimidate”. He considered the evidence about an incident in which the father had put his hands round the mother’s neck. He accepted that “this was done in such a manner as to intimidate and scare her”, but added that his findings did “not extend to strangulation in the sense of pressure being exerted as understood by the word ‘strangle’”. He further found that “elements of control would have been an aspect of the relationship. I do not set this at a particularly high level but I find it was a feature of the relationship. I find a combination of his character and her vulnerability resulted in controlling outcomes”.

The judge then recorded what he described as “some positive developments” about the mother. These included that “she now has closer support from her sister who has moved in with her”; that her “housing issues have been addressed”; that the father was now out of the country, and that there was “good evidence of [the mother] being willing to engage with professional support both through the assessments within the proceedings, through programmes around domestic abuse and mental health and also with regards to medication”.

Turning to the option of placing the younger girls for adoption with the aunt in Canada, the judge accepted the guardian’s argument that the assessment process was in its early stages and expressed doubt as to the local authority’s case that it needed a placement order at this stage. He then considered relevant factors in the statutory welfare checklist. He noted that F “is old enough to express a relatively mature view on this and her position is clear” that she wished to return to her mother. He acknowledged that all three girls needed “to return to a setting of permanency and security”. Although the younger girls had a strong relationship with their elder sister, they had different needs. Whilst “it would be very harmful for the children to return to their mother only for historic events to be repeated”, it would also “be unjustified not to give them this opportunity without a sound basis for concluding history will likely repeat itself”. As to the proposal of placement in Canada, he observed that there was a “real danger” that it would come with challenges that would cause it to break down. The impact of that would be compounded because the girls would be separated from their parents and sister not only legally and emotionally “but also geographically”.

Under the heading “Balancing these points”, the judge reminded himself that his assessment involved “a comparative analysis of competing options”. He acknowledged that adoption was “likely to address the key worries in the case surrounding mental health and domestic abuse”. He added, however, that adoption was “not to be preferred because it offers a better home life for children than life with their parents …. The test for parenting is good enough care.” Although the proposed placement for the younger girls was with a family member, “the path to such placement is difficult to predict with any certainty”. The “downside” was that the aunt in Canada had not yet been assessed and had never met, let alone cared for, the children.

He continued:

“79.

Balanced against this I have a proposed placement with the first respondent. The downsides to this are the known history and so the risk of a future deterioration in mental health. I also have regard to the longstanding nature of the parental relationship and the risk of domestic abuse featuring in the future. The second respondent has indicated he is open to a programme of work but I doubt the same will be either available or engaged with from Grenada.

80.

The positives are easy to state and relate to the continuation of family life, a continuation of the warm relationship which exists between the siblings and with their parents and the maintenance of the children’s identity and relationship with each other.

81.

Ultimately the question for me is the extent or indeed willingness to tolerate a level of risk around domestic abuse. In considering questions of this sort, I must take a proportionate approach by considering the nature of the risk, the likelihood of it occurring, the impact on the children were it to occur and the mitigations that might exist or be put in place to guard against the risk. But this assessment does not determine the outcome as I also need then to have regard to the other relevant welfare consideration in deciding which realistic option best promotes the children’s welfare only approving an interference in family life if it is necessary and proportionate.”

In conclusion, the judge found that the incidents of abuse were “serious” but “not all pervasive”. He accepted that there remained a risk of further domestic abuse, but added that “it must not be overstated”. He said he was satisfied that the mother “has reflected and her position is genuine not amounting to lip service to the concerns”. He continued (paragraph 89):

“the mental health concern is less likely to arise in a context of an otherwise stable life. I do not consider, and no one before me argued, that the mental health concerns alone justified the outcome sought. I consider the first respondent has been open to engaging in helpful interventions and she has evidenced a genuine willingness to continue in this regard. Such work will tend to reduce the impact of future misbehaviour on the part of the second respondent. Finally, I do not overlook the second respondent’s geographical dislocation as a tempering feature.”

He concluded:

“91.

I consider the children can and should return to their mother and that supported by her sister and in stable housing she is likely to retain settled mental health and will be able to provide good enough parenting. I do not say without her sister she cannot do so but the presence of her sister is an obvious positive. I judge domestic abuse in its broad sense remains a concern and there is a need to provide support to reduce this risk as far as possible. But I consider it is already reduced and can be further reduced to a level beyond which it does not justify continuing family separation.

92.

The protections include (1) the experience of the proceedings; (2) independent housing; (3) family support; (4) ongoing engagement with medical care maintain stable mental health; (5) further supportive programmes; (6) the making of a supervision order for 2-years with a robust safety plan; (7) a focused non-molestation order for 2-years providing an exclusion order around the mother’s home; (8) a package of suitable contact for the father which will allow safe contact for the children.

93.

On my assessment the proposed plan for placement with the aunt is unrealistic and unjustified when compared to the option of placement with the first respondent.

94.

I agree the transition must be managed with care. I consider it should be done under a supervision plan linked to a section 20 accommodation (which the first respondent signalled her agreement to).”

In accordance with good practice, the judge (at paragraph 98) explained his reasons for not following the recommendations of the professionals:

“I have disagreed with the professionals as to the outcome for the younger children. This is because I have calibrated my outcome on findings made rather than allegations raised. Secondly, it is my duty to carry out the balancing exercise and I found the Canadian plan outside of the children’s timescales.”

He added that he intended to make “a focused non-molestation order” against the father, agreeing that his contact “should continue remotely” and that there would need to be a further risk assessment if he returned to this country. Finally, he said:

“I am making a 2-year supervision order unusually to reflect the level of support that will benefit the children. The applicant will need to prepare and serve a suitable support plan.”

At the end of the hearing, the judge made two orders – an “approved final order” and a non-molestation order (“NMO”) against the father. The approved final order included, under paragraph 9, an order that the three children “are placed under the supervision of [the local authority] until 4pm on 20 March 2028”, that is to say for two years. It also included, under paragraph 12, an order dismissing the local authority’s application for permission to appeal in respect of the two younger children, but, under paragraph 13, an order that implementation of the final order relating to the younger children be stayed for seven days. This latter provision was in accordance with the practice stipulated by this Court that an order should in appropriate circumstances be stayed for a short period to enable the unsuccessful party to seek permission to appeal from this Court. The consequence of the stay of the order in this case was that G and H remained subject to the existing interim care order. The NMO prohibited the father from trying to contact or communicate with the mother or going to any place where she was staying, visiting or working. The provision as to the duration of the order contained a typographical error stating that it “shall remain in force until 4pm on 11.59pm on 20 March 2028”.

The “approved final order” also contained an error. As noted above, it provided that the supervision order would remain in force for two years. But under paragraph 6(1) of Schedule 3 to the 1989 Act, subject to other provisions in the Act, “a supervision order shall cease to have effect at the end of the period of one year beginning with the date on which it was made”. Paragraphs 6(3) and (4) permit the court, on the application of the supervising local authority, to extend, or further extend, the supervision order, but the order may not be extended beyond the end of the period of three years beginning with the date on which it was made. A judge faced with the restriction in paragraph 6(1) sometimes indicates when making the order for one year that they anticipate that it may be extended under paragraph 6(3), but they cannot initially make the order for a longer period.

I know from experience that this is the sort of detail that a judge may inadvertently overlook. Here, however, there were two puzzling features. The first is that none of the parties pointed out the error to the judge. The second is that, in addition to the final order approved by the judge, the court office also issued a separate order, headed “Supervision order”, stating that “the Court orders [the local authority] supervises the children until 20 March 2027”. At the hearing before us, there was no explanation for the second order, which correctly limited the duration of the supervision order to one year. I speculated that the Family Public Law Portal, instructed to generate a supervision order, had done so automatically in accordance with how it had been programmed. Following the hearing before us, we were informed by the parties that, on inquiry with the court office, this was indeed what had happened. This throws up the not uninteresting question of the status of such an order generated by the digitised system which is right in law but contrary to what the judge has unlawfully ordered.

On 25 March 2026, the local authority filed a notice of appeal to this Court, advancing ten grounds of appeal. They also sought an extension of the stay until determination of the appeal. The grounds of appeal started with an overview in which the local authority’s contentions were summarised as follows:

On 27 March, Peter Jackson LJ refused the application to extend the stay. On 13 April, he ordered that the application for permission to appeal be listed for an oral hearing, with appeal to follow at the same hearing. The latter order included the following observations:

“The ten grounds of appeal appear to challenge the orders in respect of all three children. They are distilled in the local authority’s skeleton argument into two main arguments:

(1)

The 2-year supervision order was ultra vires and wrong.

(2)

The judgment is deficient in its analysis of the evidence, its welfare balancing exercise, and its reference to legal principle.

The unlawful duration of the supervision order should have been raised at the hearing so that the judge could consider how the order might be corrected: that opportunity will now be provided. It is not possible to assess the prospects of success of the second argument with any confidence because of the very limited material filed with the application, but the judgment is so sparing in its citation of evidence that it is preferable for that matter to be considered at an oral hearing than for consideration of the application on paper to be prolonged in circumstances where further delay is not in the children’s interests.

Taking both arguments into account, I am on balance persuaded that there is enough in the application to justify its adjournment to an oral hearing. The local authority will clarify whether it challenges the making of a lawful supervision order in respect of the eldest child.”

At the outset of the hearing before us, it was confirmed by Ms Madeleine Miller, (who appeared for the local authority on the appeal but not before at first instance) that F has now returned to her mother’s care and that, save as to the complaint about the duration of the supervision order, the proposed appeal related only to the two younger children. The local authority’s appeal was opposed by the parents and by the guardian. On her behalf, Ms Isabelle Watson (who appeared on appeal but not at first instance) argued that, notwithstanding what she described as its “unconventional even idiosyncratic construction and terminology”, the judgment as a whole was thorough, analytical and informed and guided by the appropriate legal principles.

Ms Miller submitted that the judgment was deficient in three respects – the analysis of the evidence, the welfare balancing exercise, and the reference to legal principle. It contained no separate analysis of the evidence given by the parents or the professional witnesses. Ms Miller submitted that the judge had failed to address sufficiently the fact that the mother, both before and during the proceedings, had made allegations of abuse which she had then retracted or minimised. The judge had only focused on some of the allegations of abuse and failed to take into account the overall picture. He had failed to refer to observations about the history of abuse in the parenting assessment and in the mother’s psychiatric assessment. He failed to recognise the seriousness of the alleged abuse and failed to explain how he reached the conclusion that the abuse was “not all pervasive” and that the risk “must not be overstated”. He failed to take into account the professional recommendations as to the work which the mother needed to undertake before any consideration could be given to the children returning to her care. The protective factors identified in the judgment failed to take into account the seriousness of the risk. Although the mother’s mental health had improved during the proceedings, there had been previous episodes of recovery then relapse. The judge failed to take the risk of relapse into account in his overall evaluation which was unduly optimistic. In that context, the error about the supervision order was more than a mere slip. It reflected an incoherence in the judge’s thinking about how a return home could be managed.

I do not accept the local authority’s criticisms of the judgment. In some respects, the style in which the judge has composed the judgment departs from what might be described as the “norm”. But in my view, it satisfies the core function of a judgment, as articulated by Lewison LJ in Fage UK Ltd v Chobani UK Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 5 at paragraph 115:

“The primary function of a first instance judge is to find facts and identify the crucial legal points and to advance reasons for deciding them in a particular way. He should give his reasons in sufficient detail to show the parties and, if need be, the Court of Appeal the principles on which he has acted and the reasons that have led him to his decision. They need not be elaborate. There is no duty on a judge, in giving his reasons, to deal with every argument presented by counsel in support of his case. His function is to reach conclusions and give reasons to support his view, not to spell out every matter as if summing up to a jury. Nor need he deal at any length with matters that are not disputed. It is sufficient if what he says shows the basis on which he has acted.”

In the context of proceedings relating to children, the locus classicus is now the judgment of Peter Jackson LJ in Re B (A Child) (Adequacy of Reasons) [2022] EWCA Civ 407 where, at paragraph 59, he observed that

“a good judgment will in its own way, at some point and as concisely as possible:

(1)

state the background facts

(2)

identify the issue(s) that must be decided

(3)

articulate the legal test(s) that must be applied

(4)

note the key features of the written and oral evidence, bearing in mind that a judgment is not a summing-up in which every possibly relevant piece of evidence must be mentioned

(5)

record each party's core case on the issues

(6)

make findings of fact about any disputed matters that are significant for the decision

(7)

evaluate the evidence as a whole, making clear why more or less weight is to be given to key features relied on by the parties

(8)

give the court's decision, explaining why one outcome has been selected in preference to other possible outcomes.”

Peter Jackson LJ continued:

“60.

The last two processes – evaluation and explanation – are the critical elements of any judgment. As the culmination of a process of reasoning, they tend to come at the end, but they are the engine that drives the decision, and as such they need the most attention. A judgment that is weighed down with superfluous citation of authority or lengthy recitation of inessential evidence at the expense of this essential reasoning may well be flawed. At the same time, a judgment that does not fairly set out a party's case and give adequate reasons for rejecting it is bound to be vulnerable.”

In expressing these views, Peter Jackson LJ, whilst emphasising the crucial importance of every judgment having a structure, was at pains to acknowledge that judgments “reflect the thinking of the individual judge and there is no room for dogma”. I would add that all judges develop their own style in writing judgments – some more “unconventional”, even “idiosyncratic” – and it is no business of this Court to be prescriptive about how they go about it, provided the end result meets the requirements set out above.

The judgment under consideration here had a strikingly clear structure. It was composed under a series of headings:

It is true that the section headed “What evidence have I considered?” only summarised the sources of the evidence. It did not, as some judgments do, include a summary of the evidence. But judgments have to be read as a whole, and in this case relevant evidence is cited at appropriate points throughout the judgment. Of course, as Ms Miller pointed out, there are parts of the evidence that are not cited. But that is exactly what one expects. No judgment should recite all of the evidence. Unless the contrary is clearly demonstrated, this Court will accept a judge’s statement that all of the evidence has been considered.

In this case, reading the judge’s careful and nuanced analysis of the key issues of domestic abuse and the mother’s mental health, and how they interrelate, I have no doubt that he had all the relevant evidence in mind. It is true that the judgment does not contain a separate section in which he addresses the parents’ evidence. But he refers to it at several key points in the judgment, notably in his conclusions when he observed that he was satisfied that the mother “has reflected and her position is genuine not amounting to lip service to the concerns”. It is also true that he made only a very limited reference to the parenting assessment, carried out at a stage before the parties had separated, but it is clear from the totality of the judgment that he had that evidence in mind. It is equally true that there is no direct reference in the judgment to the mother’s psychiatric assessment carried out during the proceedings. We were told, however, that no party sought to cross-examine the psychiatrist who as a result did not give oral evidence. As noted above, the judge recorded in the judgment that it was “clear and agreed” that the mother had experienced a settled period of mental health for most of the proceedings. There is no reason to think that the judge overlooked any part of the evidence about her health, or the domestic abuse inflicted by the father, or the impact of those factors, separately and together, on the care of the children. These were the central features of the case. They are comprehensively analysed in the judgment.

The local authority’s principal complaint is that the judge only focused on part of the evidence about historical domestic abuse, and therefore wrongly made limited findings which distorted his assessment of future risk. There is no merit in this argument. I do not accept the assertion made in the grounds of appeal that the judge’s analysis of the impact on the children of the domestic abuse of their mother and the future risk of harm failed to comply with Practice Direction 12J or previous case law. Reading the judgment as a whole, I find that the judge was fully aware of the history and took it into account in making his findings. Once again, Lewison LJ’s observations in Fage are applicable. At paragraph 114, he said:

“Appellate courts have been repeatedly warned, by recent cases at the highest level, not to interfere with findings of fact by trial judges, unless compelled to do so. This applies not only to findings of primary fact, but also to the evaluation of those facts and to inferences to be drawn from them.”

Here, the judge heard the evidence over four days. He was uniquely placed to evaluate the evidence, make findings, draw inferences, and reach a conclusion as to future risk. Contrary to the assertion in the grounds of appeal, he gave a clear explanation of his reasons for not following the recommendations of professionals. As Ms Meusz submitted on behalf of the mother, risk assessment and proportionality were plainly in the forefront of his mind. There is no basis on which this Court could properly interfere with his analysis.

This leaves the issue of the ultra vires supervision order. I do not accept the local authority’s submission that this error undermines the judge’s whole analysis. The children’s welfare will not be compromised by substituting a lawful one-year order for the two-year order inadvertently made by the judge. If, at the end of the year, the local authority considers that a further period of supervision is required, it can apply for an extension under schedule 3 paragraph 6(3).

On behalf of the guardian, Ms Watson invited us to grant permission on this issue alone, allow the appeal and substitute a one-year order. In my view that is unnecessary. Nor is it necessary on this occasion to address what I described above as the not uninteresting question of the status of an order generated by the digitised system which is right in law but contrary to what the judge has unlawfully ordered. All we need to do is direct the local authority to draw to the judge’s attention the discrepancy between the one-year supervision order issued by the family court office and the date inadvertently inserted in paragraph 9 of the approved final order. I have no doubt he will make the necessary amendment.

For those reasons, I concluded that the application for permission to appeal should be refused.

I agree.

I also agree.