O, Re (Domestic Abuse: International Relocation)

This appeal concerns two brothers; I shall refer to them in this judgment as ‘C’ (now approaching ten years old), and ‘F’ (aged five). Their father is the Appellant (“the father”); their mother is the Respondent (“the mother”).

By order dated 17 January 2025, Recorder Samuels KC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, (“the Judge”) gave permission to the mother to remove the two boys permanently from this jurisdiction to live in the United Arab Emirates (“UAE”). The Judge’s detailed and reasoned judgment explaining his decision had been handed down one week earlier. By Appellant’s Notice dated 29 January 2025 the father appeals that order, with the permission of Moylan LJ. The Judge’s order granting the mother permission to remove the children permanently from this jurisdiction had been stayed pending the appeal hearing.

For the purposes of determining this appeal we have considered with care the Judge’s detailed judgment (8 January 2025), together with a large number of the documents which were available to him at trial. We were able to consider the Judge’s two previous judgments given in proceedings concerning these parties (July 2022 and February 2023), the second of which is published as Re O (Children) (Privilege against Self-Incrimination) [2023] EWFC 14 (B); [2023] 2 FCR 321 (‘Re O (Children)’).

Within the appeal, and by notice dated 13 June 2025, the father sought permission to adduce fresh evidence; we considered the documentation (a selection of correspondence and contact records) de bene esse, but did not consider that this material satisfied the test for admissibility into the appeal, nor did it in fact materially contribute to any of the arguments raised on the appeal.

At the conclusion of the appeal hearing, we informed the parties that the appeal would be dismissed.

This judgment sets out my reasons for dismissing the appeal.

The mother is a medical consultant working within the National Health Service; the father is a dentist in private practice. Both the mother and father are nationals of other countries (which I shall anonymise in order to protect the privacy of the family). The father has dual nationality in Country X and Y; the mother is a national of Country Z. They have extended family in their home countries, to which they are regular visitors. The mother has a brother in Abu Dhabi who is married with children. The parents have family elsewhere in the world. The mother undertook some of her medical studies abroad in the Czech Republic. The family regarded themselves (as recorded by the Judge) as an “international family”. Neither parent has any immediate family in England. Neither party owns property in England. The boys are nonetheless British nationals.

The parties met in early 2012 and lived together from late 2012 until early 2021; the children were born in 2015 and 2020. The parties have never married. During their relationship there was a period of time when the father was the main caregiver, while the mother undertook residential studies away from home for much of each week. Save in respect of that period, it seems clear that the parties largely shared the care of their children during the relationship. Following the parties’ separation, they agreed arrangements for the children, who spent time with their father for overnight mid-week and weekend stays, a UK-based holiday, and other visits. Otherwise the children lived with the mother.

The boys both attend local schools in England where they are said to be thriving; they are both physically healthy.

Following the parties’ separation the mother disclosed incidents of domestic abuse within the relationship, directed by the father towards herself. In March 2021, the father was cautioned by the police for sending the mother malicious communications (i.e., threatening messages). The mother sought a non-molestation injunction, and this application was resolved on the basis of the father’s undertakings. The mother further alleged incidents of physical chastisement by the father towards C.

In October 2021, the mother issued an application under section 8 of the Children Act 1989 (‘CA 1989’) for a Child Arrangements Order, and in light of the domestic abuse allegations, and the father’s denial of them, the court directed that there should be a fact-finding hearing; this was listed before the Judge in June 2022. He heard the evidence of both parents and of their respective mothers. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Judge delivered a judgment (“the 2022 judgment”, unpublished) in which he recorded a number of findings of fact pertaining to the domestic abuse. It is appropriate to summarise these here, as important context for the decision under review.

The Judge formed a positive view of the mother, observing that she was “doing her best to recollect many painful memories stretching over a significant period of time”. He formed an adverse view of the father who he described as “an unsatisfactory and evasive witness trying to tailor his evidence rather than simply giving a full and truthful account of what had happened”. He found that the father had physically assaulted the mother on numerous occasions, causing her a range of physical injuries. Following one assault, the mother suffered a permanent and deforming disability to the middle finger of one hand; this affected her ability to perform surgery, and she was required to change her technique. On another occasion the father kicked the mother so hard that “she has had problems with her right leg ever since”. The father tried at least twice to suffocate the mother with a pillow; on a further occasion he pushed her face so hard onto a bed that she was left with “a friction burn on [her] chin which was bleeding because some skin had come away”. The Judge described the mother’s “disgust” when recounting an incident in which the father spat in her face so many times that “her face and hair were covered with saliva”. In relation to this incident, the Judge continued:

“[The father] was holding [F] the whole time and [F] was crying and screaming. [C] was watching television with the volume turned up to drown out the conflict. … She said she would rather have been punched than spat at. It was the most humiliating thing that had ever happened in her life.”

The Judge described an atmosphere of “fear and anxiety” in the family home, where there was (in the Judge’s finding) “considerable violence inflicted by the father upon the mother in the course of their relationship putting both children at risk of physical and emotional harm”. He added that “this level and frequency of violence, and the screaming and shouting that accompanied it, would have had a significant harmful impact on any children who witnessed it or who were present in the property when it took place”. The Judge found that the father’s behaviour was coercive and controlling; the father threatened the mother that the children would be removed from her care.

The Judge further found that the father had physically chastised the older child, C, by smacking him (see §10 above); this was illustrative of “undoubted … poor parenting” and was “emotionally harmful” to C. The Judge further observed that the father: “…shows little … appreciation” of the effect of the repeated domestic abuse upon the children; he was “somewhat oblivious” to this and he has shown no “shame or remorse”. The Judge found that the mother did not take effective steps to protect the children from the father’s abuse.

A counterpoint to this history of chronic and serious domestic abuse was the Judge’s description of “much that is positive about the father’s parenting” of the children. The social worker who had supervised much of the father’s contact with the children in the relevant period had spoken “extremely positively” of this, saying that “[h]e has demonstrated lots of warmth and care. His relationship with the children has flourished and they appear to be entirely comfortable with him”. Indeed, C wished for longer time with his father. The Judge recorded the mother’s acknowledgement of the artificiality of a situation in which a professional was supervising contact; she had “expressed her hope that the children would be able to have a much fuller relationship with their father than the current arrangement permits”. The mother had told the Judge that the children: “…adore him, he is their god, they love him and they need to have a good relationship with him”. The Judge found that the father “undoubtedly has the potential to be a good parent to his children”, and added:

“… the mother’s warm description of his children’s love for him will, I hope, act as a catalyst for reflection and change. His children deserve not only to have a full relationship with each of their parents, but to be brought up in an environment free from violence or significant conflict and where each parent is able to respect and appreciate the positives of the other”.

The Judge concluded the 2022 judgment with this observation:

“The principal risks going forward centre on contact between the parties and the risk of arguments and, potentially, violence. However, there is also a potential risk of the father denigrating the mother to the children or of he or his family undermining her in their discussions with the children. I must also bear in mind the findings that I have made about the father’s loss of temper, that he has placed the children at risk of physical and emotional harm, and that he has physically chastised [C]. These are all risks that will need to be managed carefully and proportionately”.

Following the 2022 judgment, the Judge encouraged the father “to reflect upon [the judgment] and to ‘reset’”. The father completed two parenting programmes including a Separated Parents’ Information Programme; at a later hearing (February 2023) the father told the court that “he understands the need to be respectful to and about the mother and the impact of domestic abuse on children”, and at the more recent hearing in November 2024 told the Judge that “he accepts that he had fallen far short of being a loving and caring partner to the mother when they were … together”.

In late 2022, the father was charged with a number of criminal offences arising from the domestic abuse incidents occurring within the parents’ relationship which I have described above. Initially, he was due to stand trial (Crown Court) in late-2023. His trial date was deferred and has been subsequently deferred several times; it is now scheduled for September 2026. The father has been keen to postpone any final determination of applications concerning the children under the CA 1989 until the conclusion of the criminal process; he has repeatedly, and ultimately unsuccessfully, applied to adjourn these proceedings to that end.

In view of the criminal charges, the father declined to engage with the Family Court Advisers from Cafcass (Ms Norvixoxo and Ms Ritson) in discussing the court’s findings, claiming, in light of the decision of this court in Re P (Children) (Disclosure) [2022] EWCA Civ 495, privilege against self-incrimination. In February 2023, at the final welfare hearing, the Judge rejected the father’s application for an adjournment pending the criminal trial, expressing the view that the father’s case on self-incrimination was “overstated” (see Re O (Children) at [25]). The Judge observed that his privilege against self-incrimination did not prevent him from advancing his case in the normal way, including giving evidence himself and/or by challenging the evidence of others.

In February 2023, the Judge made final orders: namely, a section 8 CA 1989 ‘live with’ order in favour of the mother, and a ‘spend time with’ order in favour of the father. The father’s time with the children was for the time being to be unsupervised in the community, and supervised while at his home.

It is important to record, as part of the contextual history, that in July 2023 (shortly after the launch of the current relocation application) the mother was notified that the paternal family had issued legal proceedings against her in Country X. The Judge recorded that the father supports these proceedings. The paternal family allege that the mother has made defamatory statements within sworn evidence in family law proceedings (concerning the father’s brother and his former wife) in Country X. The mother is yet to stand trial in that country. I return to this at §37, and then §§58-59 below.

Following the final hearing in February 2023, the mother initiated discussions with the father’s solicitors about financial relief for the children under Schedule 1 CA 1989 (i.e., lump sums and periodical payments). The father’s solicitors advised her that the father could not contemplate making any financial provision for the children over and above his contribution of £1,000 pm until the conclusion of the criminal process.

On 12 May 2023, immediately following the final rebuff from the father’s solicitors on the issue of finances, the mother wrote to them informing them that she intended to issue an application for permission to relocate the children to live for five years in Dubai, where she had been offered a job. In doing so, she explained her position thus: “my financial situation is precarious and I cannot meet the monthly costs for our family. Our children need financial provision, they need financial stability”. She added:

“This new job will pay me enough annual income to provide for the children. My intention is to return to England in 5 years’ time, at the time when [C] is due to start secondary school in England. There are international schools for the boys in Dubai that teach the British curriculum”.

Thereafter, the mother’s application for relocation followed a conventional case management path. Cafcass was directed to prepare a report addressing the following issues:

In October 2023, the mother sought an order enforcing the February 2023 Child Arrangements Order, alleging that the father had been in breach. In January 2024, her application was summarily dismissed by HHJ Scarratt; permission to appeal against that dismissal was granted by Sir Andrew McFarlane P, and the appeal against that order was ultimately compromised on the basis that the mother’s factual allegations about the breach would be determined within the application for leave to remove.

The mother’s application was listed before the Judge for hearing on 25 November 2024 with a time estimate of four days. By that time, two reports had been lodged from Family Court Advisers (Cafcass), the first from Ms Norvixoxo (November 2023) and (following her redeployment within Cafcass prior to the final hearing) an addendum from Ms Ritson (May 2024). Both Family Court Advisers gave oral evidence; neither offered any specific recommendation on the application. Ms Norvixoxo considered the application to be genuine, well thought out and finely balanced; the merits went both ways. In her oral evidence, Ms Ritson offered overall support for the mother’s application, albeit she did not express this as a formal recommendation.

The parties had agreed prior to the November 2024 hearing that, if the mother’s application were to fail, the children would spend time with the father in England on alternate Sundays (for eight hours) and on alternate Wednesdays (after school), in each case professionally supervised. It was further agreed that, if this court were to retain jurisdiction, there should be an order under section 91(14) CA 1989 for a period of two years.

It is worth noting that, by the time of the final hearing, the parties had been in litigation concerning the children for over three years; the aggregate costs incurred were in the region of £400,000.

The judgment under review is lengthy and clearly structured. The Judge outlined the relevant law and undertook a detailed review of the lay evidence and expert evidence, before drawing the threads together in a concluding section headed ‘Analysis’.

I have focussed only on those aspects of the judgment which are relevant to the issues in this appeal.

The law: There is no suggestion in this appeal that the Judge materially misdirected himself as to the law. He reproduced a section of Williams J’s judgment in V v M and another [2020] EWHC 488 (Fam) at [43]-[50] (‘V v M’), which itself had distilled many relevant appellate authorities in this area. He went on to reference WS v KL [2020] EWHC 2448 (Gwynneth Knowles J) and GT v RJ [2018] EWFC 26 (Mostyn J). He noted the similarities between Re B [2015] EWCA Civ 1302 (Court of Appeal) (‘Re B’) and the instant case (relocation to Dubai by an unmarried parent); he referenced Re K (Removal from Jurisdiction) [1999] 2 FLR 1084 (Court of Appeal) (‘Re K [1999]’), in relation to the risk of breach of an order where the child is in a non-Hague Convention country.

In relation to domestic abuse, the Judge appropriately referred himself to PD12J of the Family Procedure Rules 2010: 'Child Arrangements and Contact Orders: Domestic Abuse and Harm' (‘PD12J FPR 2010’), and to Re H-N and Others (Children) (Domestic Abuse: Finding of Fact Hearings) [2021] EWCA Civ 448 (Court of Appeal) (‘Re H-N’).

Assessment of the parties: The Judge recorded his assessment of the parties, as he had in his previous judgments. Of the mother, he said this:

“I found the mother to be a clear, coherent, and truthful witness. She is a capable medical practitioner working extremely hard in a demanding job, alongside providing full time care to [C] and [F] who are undoubtedly thriving in her care”.

Of the father, the Judge observed:

“He has the ability to be a warm and loving parent, but he has a temper and, when that flares, he is incapable of preventing himself from lashing out physically. He is not always a truthful witness. He is unable to admit his own mistakes or take responsibility for his own actions. He shows a marked lack of empathy for the mother. … [his] lack of empathy towards the mother remained clear to me from his oral evidence during these proceedings. He genuinely believes himself to be a victim rather than perpetrator”.

Adding:

“Conveniently, in his self-analysis, the father pushes to one side that [the mother] is the victim of his significant physical abuse and coercive control as are his children” (Emphasis by underlining added).

Factual issues: The Judge determined the two outstanding issues of fact as requested by the mother (see §25 above). In this regard, the Judge made the following findings:

The Judge went on to find as a fact that the father had inappropriately blamed C for disclosing the information recorded at §34(ii) above to Cafcass: the Judge observed that the father “…takes no responsibility for his own actions and lays blame on others for the consequences of them”.

The Judge went on to make further factual findings in the judgment under review (see §§37-38 below).

He found that the paternal family was continuing to exercise a form of “coercive control of the mother” by pursuing proceedings against her in Country X for defamation, and that these proceedings were supported by the father. In this respect, the Judge found (in light of his own factual findings in 2022) that the father’s statements to the court in Country X were, in material respects, “false”, and that the mother’s evidence was (insofar as he was in a position to assess it from what he himself had seen/heard) “true”. The Judge observed that there was a “darker” element to the prolongation of the proceedings in Country X (as to which see §59 below).

The Judge separately found as a further fact that the father:

“… has not addressed any of the issues set out in [the 2022] judgment either directly to the mother (e.g. by way of apology), to any Cafcass officer or local authority social worker, or to this Court. As I have set out above, and below, his domestically abusive behaviour towards the mother and his behaviour towards the children has continued. He evidences no real appreciation or understanding of why his time with his children is supervised and presses constantly to extend his time with them and to reduce the restrictions” (Emphasis by underlining added).

Domestic abuse: More than two years had passed since the fact-finding hearing. It was accepted by the parties that even by the end of 2024, C was “very much affected… deeply affected” by the incidents which had occurred between his parents. The Judge concluded:

“… the level and frequency of the violence inflicted upon their mother would have had a significant impact on these children. On occasions they witnessed it. They were placed at direct risk of physical and emotional harm. The mother was rendered unavailable to comfort the children during those incidents. [C] had to comfort his brother. It created an atmosphere of fear and anxiety in the home. It risked inculcating in [C] and [F] a belief that arguments can be resolved through physical violence and that it was an acceptable consequence of those arguments that a woman can be hurt and that a man can impose his will against a woman through the use of physical force”.

As the highlighted extracts from the judgment above reveal (see the quotes at §38 above and §59 below), the Judge discussed the continuing impact of the domestic abuse on the mother and children:

“The father continues to perpetrate, or be complicit in the perpetration of, domestic abuse on the mother. He continues to blame her, as a victim, for his own predicament. He pushes the boundaries whenever he can” (Emphasis by underlining added).

Relocation plan: The Judge turned to the mother’s relocation plan. He described how it had initially been driven by financial considerations (“she has received very limited financial support from the father and recognises that she is unlikely to receive from him any capital sum to enable her to provide a home for their children”), but that the focus had shifted more recently to her need to “move on from the trauma and the deep seated effects of the years of domestic abuse”. The Judge cited an extract from the mother’s evidence in which she had said how she was now “better able to articulate the effects of the emotional and physical damage done to [her] and the children by the father during those years of domestic abuse”; she had described how she had not felt “brave enough” to articulate until recently how deeply affected she was by what had happened to her and the children.

The Judge reflected on this evidence in this way:

“I see nothing ‘unusual’ or ‘concerning’ in her reflection that part of her reason for wanting to move is to create some geographical and emotional distance from the location of her abuse and from the father and to provide some time and space to heal. The impact on her of the father’s abuse is still evident, raw indeed. She told me she cannot bear to look at her own finger because it reminds her of what the father did to her and the impact of this on her career. As set out below, the father’s family still have considerable influence over her life and the father himself constantly pushes the boundaries in terms of his time with the children”.

The Judge recorded that the mother was “flexible” about whether she moved to Dubai or Abu Dhabi, and would now look to Abu Dhabi “as her first choice”. The mother’s case (as recorded by the Judge) was that she would be in the UAE for five years, and would then review the situation.

The Judge found that the mother would be likely to secure employment of a kind, and at a level of status and remuneration, which was available to her when she first applied to the court for relocation in May 2023. He accepted her evidence that she would not relocate until she had such employment. He further accepted the mother’s evidence about schooling options, which served the “well-established expatriate community in both locations”. He expressed the view that there was limited practical difference for the children between relocation to Dubai or Abu Dhabi. He considered that the standard of living for the children in the UAE would be “good”.

The Judge accepted the father’s criticism that the mother’s plan lacked some coherence and detail, but absolved the mother in this way:

“… I have also acknowledged that the length and uncertainty of these proceedings has made it difficult for the mother to set out that plan in its current form with any detail. She has already had to allow one job offer to lapse. There is little point, I accept, in confirming precise details of potential schools and medical services, etc, when the timing and location of any relocation remains uncertain.”

In his final analysis, the Judge did not regard the current situation as a “well-functioning status quo”; in his concluding remarks, he plainly found substance in the mother’s plea for “geographical and emotional space and time to heal”.

The Judge surveyed the welfare checklist factors (section 1(3) CA 1989) acknowledging that the children wished to spend more time with their father, and that the children’s adjustment to life in the UAE would be “significant”, given “the cultural difference”, “different legal and moral codes and … a different religious framework”.

Father and contact: The Family Court Adviser’s evidence was that the father had been enjoying an “unusual” (i.e., high) level of contact in a case involving findings of domestic abuse of this seriousness. The Judge recorded that the frequency of contact:

“… has been achieved largely by agreement and driven, I find, by the mother’s recognition of the children’s love for their father and her fundamental wish to support an ongoing relationship between them, as long as it is safe to do so … Far from attempting to undermine his role in the children’s lives, she has been accommodating and supportive of it, recognising his importance to them”.

The parties had both accepted at the hearing that the father’s contact with the children would need to be supervised until at least after the criminal trial (currently expected to be in September 2026); it was only after that date that the father would regard himself as free to discuss the Judge’s adverse findings from the 2022 judgment and subsequent judgment with professionals, and “take steps to address the findings made by the court”. The Judge reviewed the outline of the mother’s contact proposal in the event of relocation, acknowledging that the contact would take place predominantly in the school holidays. It was recorded that the mother had found a professional UK-trained independent social worker to supervise the father’s time with the children should he visit the UAE. Although there would inevitably be a change in the contact arrangements, it was the Judge’s view that:

“… the current arrangement carries with it a continuing risk of significant harm to the children”.

The Judge accepted the mother’s evidence that she regarded the father as “important” and “significant” to the children; he further found the mother to have expressed a “heartfelt” and “truthful” intention to maintain the relationship between the father and the children in the event of relocation: “the mother recognises that these children have a bond with their father which needs to be maintained and nurtured”.

By contrast, the Judge found that the father “did not really accept the need for supervised contact”, adding that “at every opportunity in his written evidence he pressed the point that he is available as a co-parent. He is not. He shows no appreciation of why it is currently very difficult for the mother to co-parent with him”.

The Judge expressly indicated that he did not “underestimate” the impact of the proposed move on the father’s time with the children and identified the “risk of harm” to the children “in the potential severance of their relationship with their father”. However:

“The father does not really accept the need for limitation of and supervision of his time with the children. He blames the mother for refusing to engage in co-parenting without any appreciation of why that might be. He pushes the boundaries whenever the opportunity arises and in my judgement is likely to continue to do so… This father is not always a positive influence on his children. The existence of the proceedings in [Country X] represents leverage to coerce the mother into allowing him the more ‘normal’ relationship he refers to in his written evidence and strongly aspires to.”

The Judge identified that there may indeed be some advantage to the children in a reduction in the frequency of contact as it would allow them “space and time to begin to recover from the harmful impact of some of the father’s behaviour”. The Judge recognised that it would be important for clarity and certainty that he make an order for contact; he addressed this as follows:

“For reasons which I have considered to be understandable, the father has not really addressed his mind to what those arrangements might look like. There will need to be an opportunity for the finer details of the arrangements to be considered by the parties and, if necessary, determined by the court”.

And later:

“Consideration of the detailed child arrangements order to be put in place will need to be adjourned to allow the father to come to terms with my decision and either accept the mother’s proposals or put forward his own proposals”.

In light of this, the Judge made provision for a further hearing within a matter of weeks to consider the ‘final Child Arrangements Order’ (i.e., for the children to spend time with their father) to be put in place upon the children’s removal to the UAE. He gave permission to the parties to file further short evidence in this regard.

Expert Evidence: The Judge reviewed at some length the expert evidence of Alexandra Tribe; this evidence focused on the family law implications of a permanent removal of these children, significantly of unmarried parents, to the UAE. He recorded the evolving, but in material respects largely untested, reforms to family law and family law arbitration in the UAE, before concluding:

“In summary, Ms Tribe’s evidence is that enforcement in Dubai or Abu Dhabi of any English order cannot be relied upon. There is no primary welfare jurisdiction available in respect of these children in either Emirate because the parties have not been married. The most optimistic potential route would be to lodge an agreement by the consent of both parties in the [Abu Dhabi Civil Family Court]. However, there is a real risk that any such attempt would be unsuccessful, again because the parties have not been married. Even if it is successful the question of whether or how the court would enforce such an agreement is entirely untested. There might be some benefit to the parties agreeing to arbitrate any dispute in the UAE, in the hope that the arbitration scheme will be properly up and running by the time that any dispute emerges, and that any award will be enforced. However, again this is all very uncertain”.

Later the Judge observed:

“The short synopsis of her evidence is that neither the father nor the Court should rely upon there being any welfare or enforcement jurisdiction, at least for the immediate future. Ms Pomeroy is essentially right to say that the safest assumption is that should these children relocate to the UAE the father will probably not be able to assert his parental rights and responsibilities in those courts. He will, therefore, be left without a forum in which he can litigate against the mother about these children”.

The Judge indicated that he did not regard the expert evidence as “fatal” to the mother’s application (as had been submitted on behalf of the father) though it was “clearly … a factor that attracts considerable weight in the balancing exercise”. Significantly, he went on to find as follows:

“The mother’s evidence, which I accept, coupled with her actions during these proceedings, demonstrate her commitment to promoting an ongoing relationship between the children and their father. She accepts they adore him and will not thank her for preventing a relationship continuing. Both children know their father. Whilst I understand the father’s fear, I am confident this mother will continue to promote contact whether or not litigation is an option for the father. The risk of breach of those arrangements by the mother is very low in my judgement”.

Later, in the same vein, he commented:

“… the mother recognises that these children have a bond with their father which needs to be maintained and nurtured. These children know their father and will always know him”.

Notwithstanding the difficulties in recognition and enforcement of an English order in the UAE, and in accessing the jurisdiction of the courts in the UAE de novo, Ms Tribe recommended that any final order for relocation made in this jurisdiction should include a recital inviting the courts of the UAE to recognise the English child arrangements order, on the basis of reciprocity. I return to this at §114 below.

Proceedings in Country X: The Judge addressed the implications of the proceedings in Country X. He found the father to be “evasive and unsatisfactory” in answering questions about these proceedings, and expressed his disquiet that the “father appeared relatively unconcerned that a false picture about these proceedings has been portrayed to the prosecuting authority in Country X and to the court there and has remained uncorrected”, adding:

“He seemed largely untroubled that the mother of his children could be convicted of a criminal offence in [Country X] and convicted upon evidence some of which is plainly false”.

In his discussion about the proceedings in Country X, the Judge went further, in adding:

“There was, however, a darker side to the father’s evidence. He implied, indeed said, that steps could be taken to halt the … proceedings [in Country X]. He implied that this would require some wider agreement on other issues. I have no doubt that what he meant was for the mother to withdraw her support for the criminal process against him in England and allow his relationship with his children to be more ‘normal’. One of the conditions would be her withdrawal of her plan to relocate. There was a suggestion in his evidence of potential financial support from him and / or his family”.

“Ms Ritson rightly raises the question of whether the … proceedings [in Country X] are being pursued as a form of coercive control of the mother. In my judgement they are. They are being used as leverage by the paternal family to secure advantage within this jurisdiction”. (Emphasis by underlining added).

Cafcass: The Judge discussed the evidence from Cafcass. Ms Norvixoxo (report November 2023) had described the application as ‘finely balanced’; she had accepted the mother’s wish to relocate as “genuine”. She had further opined, as the Judge observed, that the relocation would have a “profound” impact on the children’s relationship with their father, though (perhaps surprisingly) she had struggled to see the necessity for ongoing supervision of the father’s contact.

Ms Ritson had previously reported in relation to this family in the proceedings which ended in February 2023; in her May 2024 report, she expressed a stronger view than her colleague on the need for continuing supervision of the father’s contact. The Judge helpfully summarised in his judgment Ms Ritson’s review of the section 1(3) CA 1989 checklist, noting the strong warning about delaying a determination: “decisions can and must be made without waiting for the outcome of the criminal proceedings”.

The Judge concluded his review of the Cafcass evidence by remarking on the fair way in which the Family Court Advisers had set out the factors for and against relocation. The Judge said that he had been particularly impressed by the evidence of Ms Ritson adding:

“Although Ms Ritson was careful to confirm that there is no recommendation in her report, she said that the views she has expressed tend to support relocation”.

The father has raised altogether five grounds of appeal. They are as follows:

Ms Perrins and Ms Pomeroy filed a detailed written argument skilfully addressing each of the grounds of appeal. In presenting their case at the hearing they did so under three main heads:

Ms Perrins argued that the relocation order was a disproportionate interference with the rights of the father and children to their ongoing relationship, particularly given the uncertainty of the arrangements for post-relocation contact, and the absence of a welfare-based jurisdiction in the UAE for the resolution of any post-relocation contact dispute. This argument rolled together the points which had been raised in writing in relation to Grounds 1, 4 and 5 (above).

She argued that international relocation decisions inevitably engage Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (‘ECHR’) and it was necessary for the Judge to address this specifically, and to consider the proportionality of the outcome. She drew our attention to Re F (A Child) (International Relocation Case) [2015] EWCA Civ 882 (‘Re F [2015]’) at [31], and Ryder LJ’s view that:

“… a step as significant as the relocation of a child to a foreign jurisdiction where the possibility of a fundamental interference with the relationship between one parent and a child is envisaged requires that the parents’ plans be scrutinised and evaluated by reference to the proportionality of the same”.

She took us further to the judgment of Black LJ in Re C (A Child) (Internal Relocation) (International Centre for Family Law, Policy and Practice intervening) [2015] EWCA Civ 1305; [2016] Fam 253 (‘Re C (Internal Relocation)’) (especially at [57]-[61]), which had confirmed the application of Article 8 in cases of this kind. She then referenced a number of recent first-instance decisions where judges have explicitly alluded to the Article 8 ECHR rights of the parties and the child within the context of the welfare review: among them were Re CB (International relocation: domestic abuse: child arrangements) [2017] EWFC 39, [2017] 3 FCR 273: Cobb J (‘Re CB’); V v M: Williams J; Re A (A Child) (Relocation) [2020] EWHC 2878 (Fam), [2021] 1 FLR 1385 (‘Re A (Relocation)’): Poole J; and A v B [2025] EWHC 764 (Fam) (‘A v B’): Harris J. In their written submissions, Ms Perrins and Ms Pomeroy had suggested that “it may be necessary to perform a discrete proportionality analysis albeit still factored into the ultimate welfare decision rather than as an entirely separate exercise”, but at the hearing could not readily identify a situation in which a discrete proportionality exercise would produce a different outcome from a conscientious welfare analysis.

Given the Judge’s findings of the importance of the relationship between the father and the children, Ms Perrins argued that the order for relocation was disproportionate; further she argued that the Judge’s decision to defer the final decision on the ‘time spent with’ child arrangements, while making the final relocation order, was flawed. This led her to address the lack of an effective jurisdiction to resolve any future disputes. She argued that it was not enough for the Judge to back his decision to allow the mother to move the children merely on his positive assessment of her, and/or that the parties had agreed an order under section 91(14) CA 1989 in the event that family had remained living in this jurisdiction. It was argued that the approach adopted in Re K [1999], and then re-cast by Patten LJ in Re A [2013] EWCA Civ 1115; [2014] 1 FLR 643 at [25] should have been followed:

“… applications for temporary removal to a non-Convention country will inevitably involve consideration of three related elements:

(a)

the magnitude of the risk of breach of the order if permission is given;

(b)

the magnitude of the consequence of breach if it occurs; and

(c)

the level of security that may be achieved by building in to the arrangements all of the available safeguards.

It is necessary for the judge considering such an application to ensure that all three elements are in focus at all times when making the ultimate welfare determination of whether or not to grant leave”.

Ms Perrins complained that the Judge had only considered (a) (in §68 above), but not (b) or (c) above, adding (and in this regard, referencing a passage of Black LJ’s judgment in Re M (Removal from Jurisdiction: Adjournment) [2010] EWCA Civ 888 [2011] 1 FLR 1943 at [30]) that “even in a case where the judge feels able to repose trust in the parent who will be taking the child on holiday” it was still incumbent on the Judge to consider “what can be done if the child is not actually returned”. Ms Perrins’ complaint is that the Judge did not consider what other safeguards may have been appropriate and/or available notwithstanding the obvious problem relating to the lack of access to a court. Further in this respect, we were taken again to the judgment of Harris J in A v B,in which Ms Perrins herself had, earlier this year, argued this very point (see A v B at [33]). Harris J had responded to the submission in this way (at [34]):

“The Court agrees that the three elements identified in [Re A] [2014] will be relevant to any consideration of whether permission to permanently relocate to a non-Hague Convention state should be given, in circumstances where there is a live question as to how the child’s relationship with the left behind parent will be impacted if any court ordered arrangements are breached. To that extent it is a useful aide memoire. However, in practice all of those elements will already fall for consideration when considering the impact of any proposed relocation on the child’s relationship with the left behind parent” (Emphasis by underlining added).

Secondly, Ms Perrins argued that the dominance given in the judgment to the domestic abuse findings had revealed the Judge’s “understandable sympathy” for the mother, but that this had unduly (and ultimately improperly) influenced his welfare decision, distracting him from a child-focused assessment. This picks up Ground 3(c) above.

Thirdly, Ms Perrins drew attention to the apparently shifting motivation of the mother in presenting her relocation plan; the proposed move (as initially presented) had been rooted in financial necessity, but this had been substituted by the mother’s stated wish to find refuge from the domestic abuse. Ms Perrins argued that this raised suspicion about the mother’s proposal and that her plans were ill thought through and “inchoate”; if the mother was given free rein to implement these vague plans after the hearing, the father would effectively be deprived of the opportunity to contribute – in the exercise of his parental responsibility – to important choices (such as school or medical care) made in respect of the children. She further argued that the mother’s stance on the promotion of time for the father with the children was not as benign as the Judge had considered. In this regard, Ms Perrins sought to adduce fresh evidence; it will be noted, see §4 above, that we refused this application. This picks up Ground 2 and 3(b) above.

In response to the appeal, the mother had filed and served a skeleton argument prepared by Mr Barry McAlinden, counsel who had represented her on a direct access basis at the hearing before the Judge. The mother appeared at the appeal hearing in person, supported by a McKenzie Friend.

Mr McAlinden emphasised the advantage of the trial Judge in assessing these parties and forming an assessment of risk; he had seen them give evidence over a number of hearings covering many months.

He submitted that the Judge’s “intrinsic assessment of proportionality, the assessment of the overall risks and consequences of a potential cessation of the children’s relationship with the father were conducted by the judge and are threaded through all of his reasoning taken together”, adding later that “it is not clear that a distinct assessment of proportionality is required … [t]he question is whether, in the round, the court has undertaken a welfare evaluation that has intrinsically considered proportionality”.

Mr McAlinden argued that the mother is “an honest, conscientious parent” making “reasonable and realistic plans to move forward with their life [i.e., hers and the children in her primary care], in a bid to gain respite from consequent trauma”. He observed that the mother was “highly committed” to ongoing contact between the father and the children notwithstanding the history of abuse. He reminded the court of the Family Court Adviser’s evidence that “unusual” levels of contact had been maintained in this case between the children and a father who had been found to be a perpetrator of serious domestic abuse; that these levels of contact had been maintained largely as a result of the mother’s agreement and support. Had a more standard and limited regime of contact been in place, consistent with the long history of serious abuse of the mother and C, the father would have been in a significantly weaker position to oppose the relocation.

It was submitted that the current situation was far from a “well-functioning status quo”, and, by reason of the father’s failure to “reflect and re-set”, it was likely to remain “fundamentally dysfunctional” for some time. In this regard, he relied on the Judge’s findings that the father had shown no insight into his behaviours.

Mr McAlinden referenced and relied extensively on the oral evidence of Ms Ritson (Cafcass) and reproduced the following passage from her evidence:

“I think that the mother needs the opportunity to be able to move forward … given what she has been through, she must be given permission to move forward. The hold has got to be released because what she’s experienced is highly traumatic” (Emphasis by underlining added).

Mr McAlinden responded in writing to each of the grounds of appeal in turn. In relation to the further hearing which had been provided for by the Judge (i.e., Ground 5) he observed that as the father had not provided his proposals for contact on the basis of permission for relocation being granted, the court had allowed him time to deal in detail with those issues; thus, the father could not take advantage of his own default (and the Judge’s acknowledgement of the need to deal with his proposals) as a basis for an appeal.

We did not call upon the mother to amplify these arguments at the hearing.

An application for permanent leave to remove, brought either under section 8 or section 13(1)(b) CA 1989, is a private law application in respect of which the indisputable “and only authentic” test is that set out in section 1(1) CA 1989; the child’s welfare is paramount, and the evaluation of where the child’s interests truly lie is to be determined (even if not statutorily required in a section 13(1)(b) application) having regard to the ‘welfare checklist’ in section 1(3) CA 1989: see Black LJ in K v K (International Relocation: Shared Care Arrangement) [2011] EWCA Civ 793 [2012] Fam 134 (‘K v K’) at [141], Munby LJ in Re F (Relocation) [2012] EWCA Civ 1364, [2013] 1 FLR 645at [37]/[61] (‘Re F [2012]’) and Ryder LJ in Re F [2015] at [3].

There is no presumption in favour of the applicant parent in a case which is governed by section 1 CA 1989. The circumstances in which these difficult decisions are made vary infinitely and the judge in each case must be free to weigh up the individual factors, and make whatever decision he or she considers to be in the best interests of the child (see, in particular, Moore-Bick LJ and Black LJ in K v K at [86] and [134] respectively).

While section 1(2A) CA 1989 (which requires the court to consider with care the involvement of both parents in the life of the child as a component of ‘furthering’ the child’s overall welfare), does not formally apply to an application under section 13 CA 1989, there is no doubt that its provision generally heightens the court’s scrutiny of the proposed arrangements on an application for permanent international relocation. Notably, and of relevance to the instant appeal, section 1(2A) CA 1989 expressly requires the court to consider whether a “contrary” picture is “shown”, which would indicate that involvement of each parent in the child’s life (in the manner proposed or at all) will not in fact “further the child’s welfare”.

The fundamentals of the approach outlined above were settled beyond question in the judgments of this court in K v K in2011. Over the following few years, the issue was discussed again and confirmed by this court in Re F [2012],Re F [2015], and then in Re C (Internal Relocation). For over a decade, there has been no, or no material, judicial annotation of this straightforward approach. As it happens, this approach now accords fully (in a way which it did not at the time of its creation) with the principles of the Washington Declaration on International Family Relocation (2010) to which the courts of England and Wales, through Thorpe LJ, subscribed fifteen years ago.

Borrowing the philosophy from other areas of child law (see for instance Re B-S (Children) (Adoption Order: Leave to Oppose) [2013] EWCA Civ 1146, [2014] 1 WLR 563, and Re G (Care Proceedings: Welfare Evaluation) [2013] EWCA Civ 965), it is now widely accepted to be important for a judge determining a relocation application to undertake “a global, holistic evaluation” of each of the options available for the child's future upbringing before deciding which of those options best meets the duty to afford paramount consideration to the child's welfare. In reality, this is “no more than shorthand for the overall, comprehensive analysis of a child’s welfare seen as a whole, having regard in particular to the circumstances set out in the relevant welfare checklist (CA 1989, s 1(3))” (see Ryder LJ in Re F [2015] at [30] and McFarlane LJ in Re F [2015] at [49]/[50]).

One area where there is less clarity is whether, and if so how, the court should apply a proportionality evaluation in the determination of an application for permanent international relocation. Earlier judgments of this court have suggested marginally different approaches. In Re F [2015] Ryder LJ stated that a step as significant as international relocation “requires that the parents’ plans be scrutinised and evaluated by reference to the proportionality of the same” (see [31]). He later referred to the “proportionality cross-check” (ibid. at [41]). That said, he separately observed in the same judgment (ibid. at [32]) that the ordinary balancing exercise:

“… will inevitably focus on the welfare analysis of each of the realistic options and may amount to no more than an acknowledgement that one option is better than the other and that the preferred option represents a proportionate interference in the Art 8 European Convention rights of those involved.” (Emphasis by underlining added).

In Re C (Internal relocation), Black LJ expressed the view that the welfare principles enshrined in domestic law (i.e., section 1(1) and 1(3) of the CA 1989) were entirely compatible with the Strasbourg jurisprudence, and observed that international or internal relocation cases were approached in a way which was “broadly in line with what is expected by the European court” ([60] ibid.). Thus, at [61] (ibid.), picking up Ryder LJ’s terminology (see §85 above), she rejected counsel’s submission that the welfare evaluation should then be “subjected to a cross-check by considering whether such interference with the Article 8 rights of the parties as it involves is proportionate.” She added (again at [61]):

“If the cross-check produced the same result as the welfare analysis, it would be unproblematic but not very useful except as reassurance. If it produced a different result, that result could only have an impact on the outcome of the case if the provisions of section 1 of the 1989 Act were to be ignored. I am afraid that there also seems to me to be a real danger of the parties and the court getting so tangled up in the strands of the two separate exercises that they lose sight of what really matters for the child. All in all, therefore, in my view, matters should be approached as an analysis of the best interests of the child, whether the relocation is internal or external. Given the potential for the impact of the decision on the parents to affect the child as well, this necessarily involves a careful examination of the parents’ wishes and their interests”.

In his judgment delivered in the same case (i.e., Re C (Internal Relocation)) Vos LJ at [84] reinforced the point, observing that the ‘left behind’ parent will always be able, in some measure, to pray in aid their Article 8 ECHR rights necessitating a consideration of the proportionality of any proposed interference with those rights; he added that “that consideration should be an essential part of the balancing exercise itself and should not be undertaken separately so as to disrupt a joined up decision-making process”.

Little, if any, assistance in this regard was offered in the submissions advanced before us by consideration of Re B (A Child)(Care Proceedings: Threshold Criteria) [2013] UKSC 33; [2013] 1 WLR 1911, and/or Re H-W (Children) [2022] UKSC 17; [2022] 1 WLR 3243. Both decisions considered the nature of the interference with the exercise of the right to respect for family life under Article 8 ECHR in the field of public law (i.e., the making of a care order under Part IV CA 1989 on a care plan for adoption).

I return to the proportionality argument in my discussion and conclusions below (see §97).

While the law relevant to international relocation has been relatively settled over the last decade, in the same period the law engaging issues of domestic abuse has been evolving at pace, responding to a heightened awareness (both in the Family Courts and more generally) of the harmful impact of domestic abuse within families, and the need to take effective steps to protect adult and child victims of abuse. Legislation has been introduced (i.e., the Domestic Abuse Act 2021 and the Serious Crime Act 2015); PD12J FPR 2010 and the FPR 2010 more generally have been revised to take proper account of greater learning and awareness in this area; and appellate courts have unambiguously highlighted the “devastating impact” of abuse on families in landmark decisions including but not limited to Re H-N (see [24]-[33] and [139]), Re K (Children) [2022] EWCA Civ 468; [2022] 1 WLR 3713at [41].

Despite the considerable number of private law cases involving domestic abuse in the courts of England and Wales (see, for instance, the 2021 figures outlined in Re H-N at [3] and [6]) there have been, it seems, relatively few reported judgments in this period featuring domestic abuse in the context of an application for permanent international relocation of children. In this regard we were taken to Re CB and to Re A (Relocation).

Where domestic abuse is a feature of an application for permanent international relocation of a child, PD12J FPR 2010 must be deployed in just the same way as in a domestic private law case, and so far as we can tell, it has been. The first stage, therefore, will be for the court to consider the nature of the allegations and the extent to which they are likely to be relevant in deciding whether to make the relocation order and if so in what terms (PD12J FPR 2010, para.5). In deciding whether to have a finding of fact hearing, the court should have in mind its purpose (PD12J, para.16), namely to provide a basis of assessment of risk and therefore the impact of the alleged abuse on the child or children. The court will consider the necessity of a fact-finding exercise (PD12J, para.17), particularly a discrete one. It is notable that the Judge in this case explicitly and correctly accepted that PD12J FPR 2010 has “relevance to wider issues such as, in this case, whether the court should grant permission to the mother to relocate”. For reasons which will be apparent from my rehearsal of the facts in this case above, PD12J para.37 (ibid.) was plainly of significance in determining whether the court should make the order sought:

“In every case where a finding or admission of domestic abuse is made, or where domestic abuse is otherwise established, the court should consider the conduct of both parents towards each other and towards the child and the impact of the same. In particular, the court should consider –

(a)

the effect of the domestic abuse on the child and on the arrangements for where the child is living;

(b)

the effect of the domestic abuse on the child and its effect on the child’s relationship with the parents;

(c)

whether the parent is motivated by a desire to promote the best interests of the child or is using the process to continue a form of domestic abuse against the other parent;

(d)

the likely behaviour during contact of the parent against whom findings are made and its effect on the child; and

(e)

the capacity of the parents to appreciate the effect of past domestic abuse and the potential for future domestic abuse”.

If domestic abuse is proved, the court will consider its orders in an international relocation case in just the same way as it would in a domestic private law case, namely to protect “the safety and wellbeing of the child and the parent with whom the child is living, and … not expose either of them to the risk of further harm” (PD12J, para.5). However, the judge will need to factor in additional characteristics of an international relocation case which will include (but not be limited to) the geographic distance between the perpetrator parent and the subject child, the availability of measures to protect the victims of domestic abuse, and a likely change of legal jurisdiction post-relocation.

Thus, in such a case, and when considering what will be the appropriate order in the best interests of the child, it seems to me that the court may well find it appropriate to consider (specifically in relation to ‘harm’ or ‘risk’ of harm in section 1(3)(e) CA 1989):

In the field of family justice, it is well-recognised that disputed applications for international relocation of children are among the most difficult; there is, more often than not, a straight binary choice – the children leave these shores to make a new life abroad with one parent (with the attendant impact on, for example, their relationships with family and others, their education and schooling, their identity, and their sense of belonging) or they do not; the effects of distance on family (and in particular parental) relationships raise the stakes considerably (see McFarlane LJ in Re B [2015]) at [49] and Peter Jackson LJ in F v L (Child Arrangements Order: Relocation) [2017] EWCA Civ 2121, [2018] 4 WLR 141, [2018] 2 FLR 608 at [46]).

The case before us on appeal was a particularly difficult, and finely-balanced, example of its kind.

Let me start, as Ms Perrins did, with proportionality. I have reviewed the caselaw in the previous section (see §§85-88), and drawn attention to the marginally different approaches taken by judges of this court. Having heard the argument in this appeal, I am of the view that the approach of Black LJ in Re C (Internal Relocation) is to be preferred; in determining an application such as this, a judge will always need to consider the proportionality of the outcome, but that this will naturally and instinctively occur when the judge performs the essential balancing exercise within the wider welfare review. As I have referenced above (see §86) Black LJ had expressed her satisfaction that the English law was compatible with “what is expected by the European court”; Harris J appeared to be of a like mind in A v B (see the extract of her judgment at [34] reproduced at §69 above). It is, in my judgment, not just unnecessary but also likely to be unhelpful for judges to undertake a separate proportionality evaluation or “cross-check”, for the reasons so clearly articulated by Black LJ (see §86 above). To borrow Vos LJ’s comment from the same case, the proportionality assessment and the welfare review need to be part of the “joined up decision-making process”.

In this case, the Judge was plainly concerned about the future relationship between the father and his children in the event that the boys moved to the UAE. He acknowledged the risk of harm to them “in the potential severance of their relationship with their father”. He accepted that the impact of the relocation would in this regard be ‘significant’; it represented the most potent of the factors contra-indicating relocation in the interests of the children. However, the Judge found that the children were being emotionally abused through the arrangements for contact, and in this regard the continuation of contact in its current form was not ‘furthering’ the children’s best interests (see section 1(2A) CA 1989 and §82 above). The Judge was separately troubled by the “artificiality” of the arrangements for the father and children to see each other only when professionally supervised which, if the family remained here, would remain in place until at least September 2026; this was a point he returned to repeatedly in his judgment. The Judge was of the view that it was not in the interests of the children for their lives to “remain in limbo” waiting until the conclusion of the criminal process. All of these factors properly informed his proportionality assessment.

In view of the prominence which the proportionality argument assumed in this appeal, I suggest that judges dealing with similar applications may be well advised to acknowledge that they have considered the Article 8 ECHR rights of the parties, and the proportionality of the outcome within the wider best interests review, so as to avoid a challenge to their reasoning. But a failure to do so will not of itself render the judgment vulnerable on appeal, provided that the proportionality evaluation is apparent from the judge’s analysis of the factors which are relevant to the child’s welfare. In this case, I am satisfied from a range of statements within the judgment (including but not limited to those discussed at §98 above) that the Judge was more than aware of the impact of relocation on the Article 8 ECHR rights of the father and children, and the proportionality of interfering with them by his grant of the mother’s application.

The father had presented a legitimate argument at first instance, reasonably repeated before us on appeal, that the mother’s plans for relocation had (by the time of the final hearing in November 2024) lacked the degree of specificity which is ordinarily required and provided in such an application. The Judge recognised the validity of the father’s argument and expressly took it into account (see §45 above); he accepted however that the coherence of the plan had inevitably been affected by the inordinate time it had taken for the application to reach final hearing (79 weeks), and not by lack of preparation or thought on the mother’s side (again see §45 above). The mother’s final plan had necessarily had to adapt to the changed circumstances – her job offer had lapsed, and there was a high level of uncertainty over timing for school entry, by way of examples. The Judge nonetheless sufficiently, in my judgment, identified and approved the core ingredients of the plan, and its overall validity in the children’s interests, concluding that it was “entirely realistic and achievable”, “considered”, and “as choate (sic) as it can be in the circumstances”.

The father had invited the Judge to draw adverse conclusions from the mother’s shifting case on her motivation for the proposed relocation. It was pointed out that the mother had no strong connection with the UAE, save that her brother and family lived there; she was not, as is often the case with applications of this kind, seeking to return home (i.e., to her native country, and/or extensive family support network), nor was she hoping to join a new partner/spouse living and working abroad. While the mother’s proposed move had initially been expressly founded upon alleged financial necessity, in her later filed evidence she had emphasised her wish to create space to heal from the domestic abuse, and in this regard to be nearer her brother. Reviewing the judgment as a whole, it is clear that the Judge had accepted that more than one consideration had indeed informed the mother’s motivation to relocate and that these considerations had fluctuated in significance over time. I accept the Judge’s view that there was nothing intrinsically wrong in the mother seeking:

“… to secure a better financial future for herself and her children and equally nothing wrong with her wish to create some geographical and emotional space from the perpetrator of abuse on her and time to heal, as she describes”.

I reject Ms Perrins’ suggestion that the mother’s reliance on domestic abuse had been advanced later in the process in order to shore up an inherently weak case based on financial necessity. It is widely accepted that victims of domestic abuse do not always recognise the abuse, and/or its impact, when they are living with it; many live in a state of denial even as it is happening. The Judge was entitled in these circumstances to accept the mother’s later filed evidence that by 2024 she felt better able to articulate the effects of the emotional and physical damage done to her and the children by the father (see §41 above). To my mind, this also rang true. Of course, relocation of the children to the UAE for either or both reasons (though perhaps particularly to achieve relief from ongoing domestic abuse), would be likely to benefit the children, directly or indirectly, and the Judge so found.

That there had been chronic and serious domestic abuse within this family was, by the time of the hearing before the Judge in November 2024, not in dispute. Clear findings had been made. The abuse was described as including “considerable violence, coercion and control and denigration of the mother”. The Judge had plainly formed a clear view of its harmful impact on the mother and children; his multiple findings of fact have not been, and are not, challenged. In 2022, the Judge had given a clear warning to the father (see §16 above) about the continuing risks to the children from his conduct; regrettably, some of those risks came to pass.

I do not accept Ms Perrins’ submission (see §64(ii) and §70 above) that the Judge was improperly swayed in acceding to this relocation application by a sense of ‘sympathy’ for the mother as a victim of abuse. In a case where domestic abuse is established, the court is required to afford appropriate weight to such findings and to conduct its risk assessment in accordance with PD 12J FPR 2010 (see [35] to [37] ibid.). The findings of abuse were plainly relevant to the relocation application as the Judge rightly observed (see §32 and §92 above). To recap:

Ms Perrins relied on my decision in Re CB in seeking to demonstrate in this appeal that in a domestic abuse case, there are likely to be cogent reasons for refusing the application. However, Re CB was quite different on its facts. Most significantly the father in Re CB had no real relationship with his infant child, and the mother was clear that if she was granted permission to relocate permanently, she would offer no direct contact to the father at least for the time being (see [59](iv)), and this would consign CB “never to having a relationship with her father” ([63] ibid.). In fact the application was adjourned for five months to see whether the father would engage constructively in a perpetrator programme and whether contact could be established before finally determining the application.

One of the most troubling aspects of this case, properly emphasised on behalf of the father before the Judge, and before us, is the lack of any or any effective jurisdiction going forward as a forum for determination of any future dispute concerning the children (see §65 above).

Before turning to the Judge’s judgment, and in order to provide wider context, I draw attention to two High Court decisions which were cited to us by Ms Perrins (in judgments handed down since the order under appeal) which shed a little more light on the issue. In A v B, the expert witness (N Allen KC) had offered a more upbeat assessment than Ms Tribe of the potential for access to a court in the UAE by an unmarried non-Muslim parent as follows:

“[17] … there has recently been a significant shift in the treatment of unmarried parents in Dubai and the issues will be consistently determined within a welfare/best interests framework, albeit interpreted within the social and cultural context of Dubai …

[100] … one of the key changes in the new legislation is the recognition of the rights of unmarried fathers. Unmarried fathers can now apply to the court for custody, with new legislation emphasising the importance of co-parenting and cooperation between parents, minimising conflict and working together”.

Harris J nonetheless concluded that “accessing the Dubai courts would be far from straightforward for either parent” (see A v B at [18]).

In the yet more recent decision of Peel J, G v B [2025] EWHC 122 (Fam), a third expert in UAE law (Ian Edge) had offered a cautiously positive view about the availability of a jurisdiction in Dubai to a non-Muslim, albeit recognising that the reformed laws are “new and untested” (see Peel J at [64]).

On the evidence available to the Judge, and notwithstanding the marginally more positive assessments in A v B and G v B (as I say, neither of which were available to the Judge), the argument raised before the Judge and before us, raises a real concern. The Judge described the effective absence of a jurisdiction as not ‘fatal’ to the mother’s case, but rightly regarded it as a point which attracted “considerable weight in the balancing exercise”. The Judge properly and fairly interpreted the evidence of Ms Tribe, and applied a wholly realistic view of its significance in this case.

All that said, the Judge was able and indeed entitled in my judgment to rely upon his positive assessment of the mother, and her genuine recognition of the value of the father in the children’s lives (see §15 and §§48-49 above). His positive assessment and the mother’s unambiguous commitment to support the father’s contact post-relocation are quite clearly set out in his judgment, and now publicly so in this; they stand as a record of the court’s expectations in this regard. This Judge has had an unrivalled opportunity to assess the mother and the father, and the contours of their family life, over three contested hearings. He had been able to develop that important and reliable “face-to-face, bench-to witness-box, acquaintanceship” with each of them (Re B [2013] UKSC 33; [2013] 1 WLR 1911). Usefully perhaps, the Judge had formed and recorded his firm impressions of the parties long before any issue arose about international relocation. While the father, and to some extent this Court, are concerned by the lack of any form of guarantee or assurance to secure the mother’s compliance with the child arrangements order, in all the circumstances the absence of such does not vitiate the Judge’s ultimate decision.

Ms Perrins’ reliance before the Judge, and before us, on the line of cases starting with Re K [1999] and Re A (see §68 above) is in my judgment largely misplaced. The threefold test coined by Patten LJ in Re A was directed specifically to applications for temporary relocation of children visiting a non-Hague Convention country, where there is a risk of abduction (i.e., retention abroad) (see Patten LJ at [2]), and where there would be an obvious detriment to the child if that risk were to materialise. In that type of case, the court has to be positively satisfied that the advantages to the child of them visiting such a country outweigh the risks to their welfare which the visit will entail (Patten LJ at [23]). That said, when the court is considering an application for permanent relocation it will always need to consider the prospect, and impact on the child, of its order(s) not being obeyed or enforced abroad, and in this sense the test in Re A is a useful ‘aide memoire’ (see Harris J in A v B at §69 above); the Judge expressly recorded that ‘aide memoire’ in his judgment, advertising that he knew the importance of considering not only the magnitude of the risk of breach of the contact order but also the magnitude of the consequence of breach.

The Judge was, in my judgment, not wrong to grant the mother’s application notwithstanding that he had not finalised the detail of the child arrangements for the father to spend time with the children. It is clear that at the hearing the mother had presented a proper (“realistic and achievable”) plan for contact, but that the father had been “simply unwilling” to address the issue “because of his fundamental opposition to the plan”. The Judge’s solution was, in my judgment, entirely reasonable in those circumstances.

Ultimately, I am satisfied that the Judge fulfilled the obligation on him to determine the mother’s application with the best interests of C and F as his paramount consideration. He gave himself the appropriate self-direction early in the judgment, and he followed it through in his analysis of the evidence. He kept in focus the competing features of each potential outcome; he was, in my judgment, alive to the factors which contra-indicated relocation and those which supported it. Having undertaken his broad review of the section 1(3) CA 1989 factors, he expressed himself with appropriate confidence and clarity about the outcome. He was patently under no delusion that relocation would represent a “significant change of circumstances” for these children, and the losses which they would suffer, would require them to undertake “significant” adjustment. He appropriately measured the evidence of parental conduct in this case and its impact on the children; this informed his assessment of ‘harm’ and ‘risk of (ongoing) harm’ to the children which reasonably featured large in his overall assessment, finding in terms that:

“… [t]he current arrangements are unable to protect [the children] fully from the father’s behaviour. They remain at risk of emotional and physical harm. I endorse Ms Ritson’s concern about a potentially devastating lifelong impact on these children” (Emphasis by underlining added).

The mother herself was, in the Judge’s finding, also acutely exposed to the father’s ongoing emotional abuse and control under the current arrangements; his conclusion that “[a]llowing her to relocate will have a positive impact on her and consequentially on the children” was essentially incontrovertible.

Therefore, and as earlier indicated, for the reasons which I have discussed above, I would dismiss this appeal.

In advising the parties as to the outcome of the appeal, we directed that the mother’s application should be restored before the Judge so that he may, as planned, consider the parties’ submissions in relation to the specific child arrangements concerning the father’s time with the children post-relocation (see §53 above). When the court issues its final order, it would in my judgment be appropriate for the court to include a recital in line with that suggested by Ms Tribe (reproduced in the Judge’s judgment) which invites the courts of the UAE to enforce (as necessary) the child arrangements order made in this jurisdiction, under the principle of reciprocity.

I agree.

I also agree.