City of London Corporation v John Bussandra

Ms Liz Davies KC, who appeared for Mr Bussandra with Mr Adrian Marshall Williams, argued that Mr Perdios adopted too narrow a definition of conduct which should not be viewed as “deliberate” for the purposes of section 191 of the 1996 Act. The correct approach, she submitted, involves considering whether the relevant act or omission was caused by a mental health problem. If such a problem played a significant role, the act or omission is not be regarded as deliberate. In the present case, the Review Decision neither adopted that test nor even followed the guidance given in the Code. Although language echoing the Code is to be found in the Review Decision (in particular, in paragraphs 11 and 26), it is apparent that Mr Perdios in fact applied a more demanding test.

In contrast, Mr Matt Hutchings KC, who appeared for the City with Mr Riccardo Calzavara and Mr Jackson Sirica, contended that, where it is suggested that an act or omission was not deliberate by reason of a mental health issue, the law relating to mental capacity will supply the answer. In that connection, Mr Hutchings cited Chitty on Contracts, 35^th ed., at paragraphs 12-001 and 12-089. Paragraph 12-001 reads:

“The incapacity of one or more of the contracting parties may defeat an otherwise valid contract. Prima facie, however, the law presumes that everyone has a capacity to contract; so that, where exemption from liability to fulfil an obligation is claimed by reason of want of capacity, this fact must be strictly established on the part of the person who claims the exemption. In English law, three classes of individuals are subject to some degree of personal contractual incapacity. These are minors, persons lacking the requisite mental capacity and drunken persons. Abnormal weakness of mind short of such mental incapacity as prevents a person from having the ability to understand the nature of the transaction, or immaturity of reason in one who has attained full age, or the mere absence of skill upon the subject of the particular contract, affords in itself no ground for relief at law or in equity, although in certain cases, undue influence or unconscionable dealing by the other party or (perhaps) inequality of bargaining power may permit the transaction to be set aside as inequitable. Moreover, illiteracy and unfamiliarity with the English language are not to be equated with disabilities like mental incapacity or drunkenness. According to Millett LJ in Barclays Bank Plc v Schwartz, although all four conditions are disabilities which may prevent the sufferer from possessing a full understanding of a transaction into which he enters:

‘… mental incapacity and drunkenness [may] not only deprive the sufferer of understanding the transaction, but also deprive him of the awareness that he [does] not understand it’,

which is not the case as regards an illiterate person or a person unfamiliar with English. Again, however, such a person may in an appropriate case claim that the transaction be set aside as a harsh and unconscionable bargain.”

Paragraph 12-089 states:

“At common law, the understanding and competence required to uphold the validity of a transaction depend on the nature of the transaction. There is no fixed standard of mental capacity which is requisite for all transactions. What is required in relation to each particular matter or piece of business transacted, is that the party in question should have the capacity to understand the general nature of what he is doing.”

If the question whether Mr Bussandra acted “deliberately” is approached on that basis, the test which Mr Perdios adopted was, if anything, unduly favourable to Mr Bussandra. Even supposing, however, that a mental health problem is capable of negativing “deliberateness” without amounting to lack of capacity, Mr Perdios cannot be said to have applied a test that was adverse to Mr Bussandra, Mr Hutchings contended. To the contrary, Mr Perdios followed the Code.

The Code addresses intentional homelessness in chapter 9. That chapter includes (and included at the date of the Review Decision) this:

“9.16

For homelessness to be intentional, the act or omission that led to the loss of accommodation must have been deliberate, and applicants must always be given the opportunity to explain such behaviour. An act or omission should not generally be treated as deliberate, even where deliberately carried out, if it is forced upon the applicant through no fault of their own. Moreover, an act or omission made in good faith where someone is genuinely ignorant of a relevant fact must not be treated as deliberate ….

9.17

Generally, an act or omission should not be considered deliberate where, for example:

(a)

the act or omission was non-payment of rent or mortgage costs which arose from financial difficulties which were beyond the applicant’s control, or were the result of Housing Benefit or Universal Credit delays;

(b)

the housing authority has reason to believe the applicant is incapable of managing their affairs, for example, by reason of age, mental illness or disability;

(c)

the act or omission was the result of limited mental capacity; or a temporary aberration or aberrations caused by mental illness, frailty, or an assessed substance misuse problem;

(d)

the act or omission was made when the applicant was under duress;

(e)

imprudence or lack of foresight on the part of an applicant led to homelessness but the act or omission was in good faith.

…

9.20

Examples of acts or omissions which may be regarded as deliberate (unless any of the circumstances set out in paragraph 9.17 apply) include the following, where someone:

(a)

chooses to sell their home in circumstances where they are under no risk of losing it;

(b)

has lost their home because of willful and persistent refusal to pay rent or mortgage payments;

(c)

could be said to have significantly neglected their affairs having disregarded sound advice from qualified people;

(d)

voluntarily surrenders adequate accommodation in this country or abroad which it would have been reasonable for them to continue to occupy;

(e)

is evicted because of their anti-social behaviour, nuisance to neighbours or harassment;

(f)

is evicted because of violence or threats of violence or abuse by them towards another person;

(g)

leaves a job with tied accommodation and the circumstances indicate that it would have been reasonable for them to continue in the employment and reasonable to continue to occupy the accommodation.”

Wording in materially identical terms to those of section 191(1) and (2) of the 1996 Act was first to be found in section 17(1) and (3) of the Housing (Homeless Persons) Act 1977 (“the 1977 Act”). In Robinson v Torbay Borough Council [1982] 1 All ER 726, His Honour Judge Goodall, sitting as a Judge of the High Court, had to consider whether the word “deliberately”, as used in section 17 of the 1977 Act applied “simply to the act or omission which has the result of homelessness, even though that result is not appreciated” or connoted “an intention to become homeless or at any rate an appreciation by the person in question that homelessness will result from his action”: see 730. Judge Goodall came to the “clear conclusion that the word ‘deliberately’ governs only the act or omission”, observing that it seemed to him “difficult to apply [subsection (3)] to the concept that ‘deliberate’ (and the adverb ‘deliberately’ in sub-ss (1) and (2)) governs homelessness”.

The Court of Appeal endorsed that view in Devenport v Salford City Council (1983) 8 HLR 54 (“Devenport”). Fox LJ said at 63:

“There is no requirement that the person deliberately became homeless. Only that he deliberately did, or omitted to do something in consequence of which he ceased to occupy etc.”

For his part, Waller LJ said at 68:

“It was argued before us that ‘deliberately’ in [section 17(1)] included an element of intention to cause homelessness …. I am satisfied from a consideration of the whole of the section and sub-sections 1, 2 and 3 that ‘deliberately’ is used in the ordinary sense of the word and is not to be narrowly construed. In particular the provisions of sub-section 3 indicate that ‘deliberately’ means ‘after a consideration of all the relevant facts’. I agree with Judge Goodall, sitting as a deputy High Court judge in Robinson v Torbay Borough Council … , when he says in relation to sub-section 3:

‘It seems to me difficult to apply that sub-section to the concept that deliberate and the adverb deliberately governs homelessness.’”

By the time R v Wandsworth London Borough Council ex p Hawthorne [1994] 1 WLR 1442 (“Hawthorne”) was decided, the equivalent of section 191(1) of the 1996 Act was to be found in section 60(1) of the Housing Act 1985. The question in Hawthorne was whether a mother who had been evicted for non-payment of rent had become homeless intentionally. The local housing authority concluded that she had, but its decision was quashed at first instance and the Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal. Nourse LJ, with whom Hirst and Waite LJJ agreed, said at 1447:

“Both here and below Mr. Straker, for the council, has submitted that a person does or fails to do something ‘deliberately’ if he makes a considered choice between two courses of action or inaction, either of which he is able to take. Thus, if he makes a considered decision to apply the only money he has in his pocket in maintaining his children instead of paying it to his landlord, he deliberately fails to pay the rent.

Like the judge, I reject these submissions. Mr. Straker’s construction, while it might be correct in other contexts, cannot be correct here. The purpose of Part III of the Act of 1985 is to house the homeless. Admittedly it is not part of that purpose to house those whose homelessness has been brought upon them by their own fault. But equally it is no part of it to refuse housing to those whose homelessness has been brought upon them without fault on their part, for example by disability, sickness, poverty or even a simple inability to make ends meet. Whether, in a case of nonpayment of rent, there is a sufficient nexus between the cause relied on and the failure to pay to establish that it was not deliberate will be for the housing authority to consider and decide upon. But, as the judge said, consider it they must.”

In Ugiagbe v Southwark London Borough Council [2009] EWCA Civ 31, [2009] PTSR 1465, Lloyd LJ, with whom Sedley and Jacob LJJ expressed agreement, said this about section 191 of the 1996 Act in paragraph 6:

“Subsection (1) is, in itself, clear, simple and absolute. Apart from the fact that the act or omission must be deliberate, nothing in it allows the state of mind of the person in question to be considered as to, for example, whether the consequence of homelessness was foreseen. Subsection (2) qualifies it in one respect, by excluding an act or omission on the part of someone who was unaware of ‘[a] relevant fact’: the relevance must, presumably, be to the doing of the act or omission. However, this is subject to the safeguard that the act or omission must have been ‘in good faith’.”

Pieretti v Enfield London Borough Council [2010] EWCA Civ 1104, [2011] PTSR 565 (“Pieretti”) concerned an applicant who had been diagnosed as suffering from a depressive illness and had withheld rent out of a concern that the landlord would refuse to return his deposit. An appeal against a decision that the applicant had become homeless intentionally succeeded on the basis that the review officer had failed to comply with section 49A of the Disability Discrimination Act 1995. In the course, however, of his judgment, Wilson LJ, with whom Mummery and Longmore LJJ agreed, said (albeit obiter) at paragraph 36 that there was “a real possibility that the applicant’s acts and omissions in relation to the payment of rent were affected by mental impairment relevant to whether they were ‘in good faith’ within the meaning of section 191(2) of the 1996 Act or, for some other reason, not ‘deliberate’ within the meaning of section 191(1)” (emphasis added).

R (Laines Roman) v Southwark London Borough Council [2022] EWHC 1232 (Admin), [2022] PTSR 1591 raised an issue as to the interpretation of “deliberate act” as used in a local housing authority’s housing allocation scheme. After discussing case law relating to the homelessness provisions, including Hawthorne, Lang J said in paragraph 89:

“In my judgment, the principles in the case law set out above ought to apply to this scheme. I conclude that the correct interpretation of the ‘deliberate act’ provision in section 6.2 of the scheme is that an act is only deliberate if the applicant intended to do it, in the sense that they had a real choice between two or more viable options and voluntarily elected to do the act.”

It is apparent from the authorities that the word “deliberately”, as used in section 191(1) of the 1996 Act, refers only to the relevant act or omission and that section 191(1) can apply without the person wishing to become homeless or even foreseeing that as a possibility. The cases further indicate that “deliberately” should be given its “ordinary” meaning and is not to be construed “narrowly” (i.e. in a way which would lean towards applicants).

So far as the “ordinary” meaning of “deliberately” is concerned, the Oxford English Dictionary explains that the word “now chiefly” means “on purpose rather than by accident; intentionally”. As Mr Hutchings observed, it may be a fool’s errand to try to produce a comprehensive list of circumstances in which an act or omission may not be considered “deliberate”. They doubtless include “accident” and, more importantly, outright lack of mental capacity must also negate deliberateness. They may potentially include, too, other grounds on which a contract could be rendered void or voidable (duress, say).

I do not think, however, that mental health problems can be relevant only where that would be the case in a contractual context. In Pieretti, Wilson LJ considered there to be a “real possibility” that the applicant’s depressive illness had rendered his conduct “not ‘deliberate’” although there was no question of his lacking capacity. Hawthorne, too, shows that matters which could not invalidate a contract may nevertheless prevent an act or omission from having been done “deliberately”. In Hawthorne,Nourse LJ explained that it was no part of the purpose of the homelessness legislation to refuse housing to those whose homelessness “has been brought upon them without fault on their part, for example by disability, sickness, poverty or even a simple inability to make ends meet”. A person who, suffering from “inability to make ends meet”, chooses to use limited money to buy food rather than to pay rent may thus escape a finding of intentional homelessness.

The Code also indicates that mental health problems short of incapacity can negate deliberateness. Paragraph 9.16 of the Code speaks in more general terms of conduct being “forced upon the applicant through no fault of their own”. The examples given in paragraph 9.17 include not only being “incapable of managing their affairs … by reason of … mental illness” but “limited mental capacity; or a temporary aberration or aberrations caused by mental illness, frailty, or an assessed substance misuse problem”. The Code is not proceeding on the basis that conduct will be “deliberate” unless, elsewhere in the law, it would be deemed to negate capacity or intention. In particular, the Code plainly contemplates that mental issues (including, expressly, “limited” mental capacity) can mean that conduct was not “deliberate”.

In this connection, Mr Hutchings took us to Wathen-Fayed v Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government [2025] UKSC 32, [2025] 1 WLR 3693. In that case, Lord Hamblen, with whom Lords Reed, Leggatt and Stephens and Lady Simler agreed, said in paragraph 59 that “statutory guidance has no particular legal status” and “is of persuasive authority, as an academic textbook or article would be”. Lord Hamblen cited approvingly the following passage from paragraph 24.17 of Bennion, Bailey and Norbury on Statutory Interpretation, 8^th ed.:

“guidance is not a source of law and cannot alter the true legal meaning of a statute. In the context of statutory construction guidance ‘has no special legal status’. The judiciary, not the executive, determine the meaning of legislation. Guidance that tries to explain what the legislation means will be given no more weight than the quality of any reasoning contained in it deserves. If it is wrong, the courts will not hesitate in saying so.”

On the other hand, Bennion, Bailey and Norbury also explains in paragraph 24.17:

“It is clear that a public authority to whom statutory guidance is addressed must consider it as part of its decision-making process. But guidance does not have the binding effect of legislation and a public authority is free to depart from guidance if there are sufficient reasons to do so in a particular case. The degree of deference or weight to be given to statutory guidance will necessarily depend on the proper construction of the statutory scheme and the particular facts. In certain contexts, the courts have gone so far as to find that cogent or compelling reasons were required to justify a public authority’s decision to depart from statutory guidance.”

Further, the Supreme Court has in recent years attached significance to the Code in Nzolameso v Westminster City Council [2015] UKSC 22, [2015] PTSR 549, Haile v Waltham Forest London Borough Council [2015] UKSC 34, [2015] AC 1471 and Samuels v Birmingham City Council [2019] UKSC 28, [2019] PTSR 1229.

Plainly, the Code is not to be treated as a statute and cannot supplant the 1996 Act. Further, the terms in which the Code is expressed are not such as would be appropriate in a statute and can sometimes be open to considerable interpretation. Subject, however, to what is said in the Code being consistent with the 1996 Act, it seems to me that it can provide important guidance on how local housing authorities should carry out their functions and, in particular, on how review officers should approach reviews. After all, local housing authorities are required to have regard to the Code by the 1996 Act.

In all the circumstances, I have not been persuaded that, for mental illness to render an act or omission non-deliberate, the person must have lacked mental capacity. Neither, however, do I accept Ms Davies’ submission that it suffices that a mental health problem played a significant role in the relevant act or omission. Neither the case law nor the Code seems to me to lend any real support to that view and, as a matter of language, it appears to me that the fact that a mental health problem played a significant role in a decision need not mean that it was not taken “deliberately”. As Mr Hutchings pointed out, were Ms Davies’ contention well-founded anyone who chose not to pay rent or to hand back keys while suffering from mild depression could argue that mental health problems played a significant role and so that the decision was not deliberate. I do not think that conclusion would accord with the “ordinary meaning” of “deliberately”, the Code or the thrust of section 191 of the 1996 Act.

Turning to the present case, it follows from what I have said above that, in my view, Mr Perdios cannot be criticised for not adopting the test of deliberateness favoured by Ms Davies. Nor, as it seems to me, could it have been wrong for Mr Perdios to proceed by reference to the guidance given in the Code.

As Ms Davies recognised, Mr Perdios used language apparently inspired by the Code when identifying the question he had to answer in paragraph 11 of the Review Decision and when stating his conclusion in paragraph 26. Echoes of the Code can also be discerned in paragraphs 15, 17, 19 and 20.

Ms Davies pointed out, however, that the Review Decision contains various references to being unable to rationalise and think clearly. In paragraph 14, Mr Perdios disagreed with the suggestion that Mr Bussandra was “suffering from a major depressive episode and [was] unable to rationalise and think clearly”. Paragraphs 16 and 17 both contain the phrase “a major depressive episode in which you were unable rationalise and think clearly” and paragraph 18 refers to “suffering from ‘a major depressive episode and being unable to rationalise and think clearly’”. In a similar vein, paragraphs 15 and 22 refer to ability to make “rational decisions”.

I would agree with Ms Davies that, had Mr Perdios asked himself simply whether Mr Bussandra had been “unable to rationalise and think clearly” and to make “rational decisions”, he would have applied the wrong test. In the context, however, it is evident, I think, that Mr Perdios used such language in responding to Ms Pisaneschi’s evidence, not because he took it to represent the applicable test. Ms Pisaneschi had more than once expressed the view that Mr Bussandra was likely to have been experiencing “a major depressive episode” and that he “may not have been able to rationalise and think clearly”. Mr Perdios will have had that in mind when he said in paragraph 14 that he did not agree with Ms Pisaneschi that Mr Bussandra was “suffering from a major depressive episode and [was] unable to rationalise and think clearly” and he used similar wording (often in inverted commas) as he explained why.

Nor can it be said that Mr Perdios rejected, or overlooked, Mr Bussandra’s mental health problems. In fact, he specifically accepted that Mr Bussandra had mental health issues with an impact on his day-to-day activities and that he had a disability.

Mr Perdios’ conclusion was not that Mr Bussandra did not have mental health problems, but that the decision to give up the Brighton flat was not due to either mental illness or “temporary aberrations caused by mental illness”. The matters which Mr Perdios took into account included Mr Bussandra’s wish to return to London even before the theft of his bank cards, Mr Bussandra’s ability to travel and to do the things that an ordinary person can be expected to do, his finding that Mr Bussandra did not receive abuse or threats from his neighbours and the various medical materials. In the end, Mr Perdios was satisfied that this was “a simple case in which [Mr Bussandra] merely regretted moving to Brighton and then sought to move back to London”.

It is hard to see how, consistently with that conclusion, Mr Perdios could have been satisfied that Mr Bussandra had not given up the Brighton flat “deliberately”. In any event, differing from Judge Roberts, I do not think that Mr Perdios can be seen to have applied any test other than that which he professed himself to be applying, based on the Code.

I would therefore uphold this ground of appeal by the City.

Ms Davies stressed that the complaint giving rise to this issue is of failure to give adequate reasons. Mr Bussandra is mounting a reasons challenge, she explained, not contending that it was unreasonable for Mr Perdios not to accept views expressed by Ms Pisaneschi.

Mr Bussandra’s position was summarised as follows in a skeleton argument:

“Ms Pisaneschi’s evidence and opinions was not determinative, but, if the review decision-maker was to depart from it, he needed to explain why. The judge was right therefore to find that the reviewer’s reasons were inadequate and the decision should be quashed.”

One of the cases which Ms Davies cited in support of her submissions was Guiste v Lambeth London Borough Council [2019] EWCA Civ 1758, [2020] HLR 12. In that case, a review decision was quashed because the review officer had not adequately explained why she was disagreeing with a doctor. Henderson LJ, with whom Rose LJ and Theis J agreed, said in paragraph 64:

“This evidence, from a distinguished consultant psychiatrist, and directed to the key legal point in issue, could not in my view be disregarded, and if the review officer was going to depart from it, I think it was necessary for her to provide a rational explanation of why she was doing so. The difficulty which I have is that, even on a benevolent reading, I am unable to find any such rational explanation in the Review Decision.”

Ms Davies submitted that, in the present case, Mr Perdios did not give adequate and intelligible reasons for disagreeing with Ms Pisaneschi. More specifically, she said that it is not obvious that Mr Perdios treated Ms Pisaneschi with the degree of respect that her qualifications merited; that he appreciated that she was treating Mr Bussandra and had been seeing him weekly since April 2023; or that he had understood the significance of the theft of the bank cards in pushing Mr Bussandra over the edge. Ms Davies pointed out, moreover, that Ms Pisaneschi had not simply assumed that what Mr Bussandra told her was accurate.

In the context of this issue, however, the question is not whether Mr Perdios’ conclusions were correct but whether he gave sufficient reasons for them. In my view, he clearly did.

While Mr Perdios did not elaborate on Ms Pisaneschi’s qualifications in the Review Decision, he referred to the fact that she was an “Advanced Clinical Practitioner”, did not denigrate her expertise and did not dispute that Mr Bussandra suffered from mental health issues. As he said, he did not agree with Ms Pisaneschi that Mr Bussandra was “suffering from a major depressive episode and … unable to rationalise and think clearly”, but he devoted several pages of the Review Decision to explaining why. He discussed in some detail Dr Waheed’s report, the letters written by Dr Cattell and Dr Mannan, the significance of Mr Bussandra’s bank statements and his evident ability to articulate his wants to different organisations.

Of course, Mr Bussandra disputes Mr Perdios’ conclusions, but it seems to me that he explained his thinking adequately. The Review Decision “enable[s] the reader to understand why the matter was decided as it was” (to use the words of Lord Brown in South Bucks).

That conclusion is reinforced by the fact that, as explained in Holmes-Moorhouse, a “benevolent approach” is to be adopted to the interpretation of review decisions. Further, the reasons “need refer only to the main issues in the dispute, not to every material consideration” and the scope for drawing an inference that a decision-maker did not fully understand the materiality of a matter is limited in the way explained in South Bucks and Bolton.

In my view, therefore, this ground of challenge to the Review Decision fails. In this respect, too, I differ from Judge Roberts.

The PSED requires a public authority to have due regard to, among other things, the need to advance equality of opportunity between persons who share a relevant “protected characteristic” and persons who do not share it. “Relevant protected characteristics” include “disability”, and “disability” involves having a physical or mental impairment which has a substantial and long-term adverse effect on a person’s ability to carry out day-to-day activities: see sections 149(7) and 6(1) of the 2010 Act .

It is well-established that the PSED applies to local housing authorities when performing their functions under Part VII of the 1996 Act (which comprises sections 175 to 218). In Hotak v Southwark London Borough Council [2015] UKSC 30, [2016] AC 811 (“Hotak”), where one of the questions was whether a Mr Kanu was “vulnerable” within the meaning of section 189(1)(c) of the 1996 Act, Lord Neuberger said in paragraph 78 that the PSED required a review officer:

“to focus very sharply on (i) whether the applicant is under a disability (or has another relevant protected characteristic), (ii) the extent of such disability, (iii) the likely effect of the disability, when taken together with any other features, on the applicant if and when homeless, and (iv) whether the applicant is as a result ‘vulnerable’”.

Comparable approaches have been adopted in relation to suitability (Haque v Hackney London Borough Council [2017] EWCA Civ 4, [2017] PTSR 769) and the reasonableness of continuing to occupy accommodation (Lomax v Gosport Borough Council [2018] EWCA Civ 1846, [2019] PTSR 167 (“Lomax”)).

A review officer need not have mentioned the PSED in his decision to have satisfied it. In Hotak, Lord Neuberger said in paragraph 79 that “a conscientious reviewing officer who was investigating and reporting on a potentially vulnerable applicant, and who was unaware of the fact that the equality duty was engaged, could, despite his ignorance, very often comply with that duty”. In McMahon v Watford Borough Council [2020] EWCA Civ 497, [2020] HLR 29 (“McMahon”), another vulnerability case, Lewison LJ said in paragraph 68:

“What matters is the substance of the assessment not its form. Provided that a reviewing officer appreciates the actual mental or physical problems from which the applicant suffers, the task will have been properly performed. … [T]he task of the reviewing officer is not to label; it is to understand.”

On the other hand, the fact that a review decision has referred to the PSED is of itself of relatively little significance. In Hotak, Lord Neuberger said in paragraph 82 that he did “not place significant weight on the fact that [the review officer] specifically mentioned the equality duty”. In Lomax, Lewison LJ did “not consider that the review decision is saved by the reviewing officer’s … discussion of the PSED”: see paragraph 52. In a similar vein, Lewison LJ said in Kannan v Newham London Borough Council [2019] EWCA Civ 57, [2019] HLR 22, at paragraph 24, that “mere recitation of Lord Neuberger’s formula … is no substitute for actually doing the job”. In McMahon, Lewison LJ said in paragraph 68:

“Just as a failure to mention the PSED or a failure to tabulate each feature of it will not necessarily vitiate a vulnerability assessment, so a mere recitation of the PSED will not save such an assessment if it has failed in substance to address the relevant questions.”

In the present case, Ms Davies argued that Mr Perdios did not apply the requisite “sharp focus” either when considering whether Mr Bussandra had “deliberately” left the Brighton flat or when deciding whether it had been reasonable for Mr Bussandra to continue to occupy it. However, I have not been persuaded.

Mr Perdios said both in paragraph 27 of the Review Decision and on its penultimate page that he had had regard to the principles of the 2010 Act. That may not count for much, but the passages in question do confirm not only that Mr Perdios was aware of the PSED but that he considered Mr Bussandra to be “disabled”. Further, Mr Perdios acknowledged that Mr Bussandra had “a longstanding history of depression and anxiety with obsessive compulsive traits” and that he had also been diagnosed with PTSD.

Mr Perdios addressed the implications of these matters at length when deciding whether Mr Bussandra had given up the Brighton flat “deliberately”. He also considered them in depth, over two pages of the Review Decision, when assessing whether it had been reasonable for Mr Bussandra to continue to occupy the flat. Under the heading “Medical Conditions”, Mr Perdios said, among other things, that he could not accept that Mr Bussandra needed to return to London in order to receive care and support that he could not have in Brighton (paragraph 38), that “what [Mr Bussandra was] suffering from in Brighton [was] not necessarily different to what [he had] suffered in London” (paragraph 39), that the services that Mr Bussandra now had in London “were available to [him] in Brighton” (paragraph 39), that “it was reasonable for [Mr Bussandra] to continue to occupy [his] accommodation in terms of the treatment and support available” (paragraph 39), that “what [Mr Bussandra] had in Brighton was a stable home that allowed [him] to engage with support services in a much better way than [he had] done over the last eight years” (paragraph 40), that Mr Bussandra’s pre-existing health conditions could serve to elevate the heightened anxiety that anyone moving to another area can feel (paragraph 40) and that the fact that the theft of the bank cards would have made Mr Bussandra unhappy did not mean that “staying in Brighton was having a significant impact on [his] mental health to the extent that it made it unreasonable for [him] to continue to occupy the accommodation” (paragraph 42).

In the circumstances, it seems to me that this ground of challenge to the Review Decision fails. In my view, Mr Perdios complied with the PSED. Judge Roberts considered that Mr Perdios had “paid no more than lip service to the Public Sector Equality Duty”: see paragraph 124 of his judgment. With respect, I do not agree.

I would allow the appeal from Judge Roberts’ decision. I have not been persuaded by any of the grounds on which Mr Bussandra has challenged the Review Decision.