Nadine Buzzard-Quashie v Chief Constable of Northamptonshire Police

This judgment is in respect of sanctions, the appellant Ms Buzzard-Quashie’s appeal having been allowed for reasons fully explained in this court’s judgment at [2025] EWCA Civ 1397.

We are not going to repeat the detailed factual background to the matter generally, which appears in that judgment at sections B and C from [13] to [42].

On the hearing of the substantive appeal on 22 October 2025, the court made certain orders as a result of the factual developments that had occurred shortly before that hearing, and also the apology that was read to the court by counsel for the Chief Constable. That required certain witness statements to be lodged with the court by 4.00pm on 5 November 2025, a date that had been discussed in exchanges between the members of the court and counsel. This date was clearly included in the order of this court that was made on 22 October 2025, which was sealed on 28 October 2025. The contents of those statements was also clearly identified.

The draft judgment was distributed to the parties in the usual way for typographical and clerical errors and corrections to be considered. In that draft, which was sent to them before the deadline included in the order, the following sentence appeared at [38]: “Compliance with those orders by the Chief Constable is not, for the avoidance of doubt, in any way optional”.

However, what occurred suggests that compliance does seem, in at least one respect, to have been understood by some to have been optional. The deadline for service of the witness statements was not complied with. A few minutes before the deadline, an email was sent to the appellant’s solicitors seeking an extension. No communication at all was sent to this court, which is the correct way to seek to vary an order of the Court of Appeal. A party to litigation cannot vary an order of this court by agreement. No application to vary the order was made at all. Both of the witness statements that were required, one from the Chief Constable himself, were late by some hours. The witness statement by Chief Superintendent Hillery dated 5 November 2025 (“Hillery 2”) detailing the steps taken in respect of each video clip was inadequate. The very important letter of apology from the Chief Constable, which had been provided by the Chief Constable to his solicitor at the time Mr Staples, was not sent to the court.

A letter was sent to the court dated 7 November 2025 by the solicitors for Ms Buzzard-Quashie outlining the various deficiencies and non-compliances with the order of the Court of Appeal. On 13 November 2025 the new solicitor acting for the Chief Constable, Mr Turner, the Head of Legal Services at East Midlands Police Legal Services, wrote to the court and stated that in respect of both statements by Chief Superintendent Hillery (the one referred to at [34] in the substantive judgment and Hillery 2 explained above) the Chief Constable was “not in a position to rely upon the two witness statements….I do not feel able to explain the reason for this (which is fundamental) but would wish to say that the [Chief Constable] and his lawyers fully appreciate, and profoundly regret, that this puts him in further breach of paragraph 5(iii) of the Court of Appeal’s order of 28 October 2025, and indeed in further breach of paragraph 3 of Deputy District Judge Leong’s original order of 25 April 2023.”

This court ordered that a hearing be held to determine sanctions, if any, as a result of the substantive judgment and the success of the appeal. It was decided that breaches of the order of 22 October 2025 would be considered at this hearing on 20 November 2025 and, if made out, would be taken into account when considering any sanction that should be imposed consequential upon the appeal succeeding, and the finding of contempt of court made against him as a result. The parties were notified of this both by email and also by an order dated 11 November 2025.

A skeleton argument was served by Ms Buzzard-Quashie’s counsel on 18 November 2025 for this hearing. On 19 November 2025, therefore the day before this hearing, a large volume of new material was produced on behalf of the Chief Constable. This comprised the second statement of the Chief Constable himself, which included an apology for what had happened both before and after the first hearing before the Court of Appeal on 22 October 2025; together with a witness statement of the Deputy Chief Constable of the police force, Mr Ashley Tuckley, which itself appended three further witness statements. These were from Mr Gray, the Police Staff Force Crime and Incident Registrar; Chief Inspector Britton, who is responsible for the operation of Custody; and Police Sgt Gill, the Chief Driving Instructor for the police force who dealt with dashcam footage. The first two were dated 19 November 2025. The statement by Chief Inspector Britton is dated 14 November 2025; and that of Police Sgt Gill is signed on 18 November 2025 but prepared on 14 November 2025. Those statements were not, and could not be, dealt with in the skeleton argument for Ms Buzzard-Quashie because they were served so late. However, they were addressed in oral submissions today. We also have the benefit of a skeleton argument for the Chief Constable too.

In outline terms only, these statements make the following clear:

At today’s hearing, the Chief Constable has appeared in person and apologised both to Ms Buzzard-Quashie, the County Court and the Court of Appeal. Mr Basu KC has explained to us that a large part of the impetus for this came during the week of 9 November 2025 as matters came to light, not all of which he was able to explain to us, both in terms of the inability to rely upon Hillery 2 and an inability to rely upon the witness statements of Ms Kightely-Jones.

There are a number of points to be made about what has happened. Firstly, part of the litany of breach of court order in this case already, which founded the finding of contempt of court which was admitted on 22 October 2025, was the failure to comply with important deadlines ordered by the County Court, alternatively to treat them as unimportant. It is extraordinary that this conduct continued thereafter, with an order of the Court of Appeal breached in the same way. Actions speak somewhat louder than words, and having made an apology by counsel on 22 October 2025 which accepted the importance of complying with court orders, the failure to comply with the Court of Appeal order after that is a serious matter.

Secondly, it appears even now – given the inability of the Chief Constable to rely upon Hillery 2 or the evidence of Ms Kightely-Jones - that there may be further matters yet to be properly examined. However, given the involvement of the IOPC which is explained at [9](6) above, it is not necessary to say anything further about that here.

Finally, the personal impact upon the successful appellant of yet another failure to obey the court has been profound, as explained by her in her statement of 24 October 2025. That statement explains the personal, emotional and financial cost to her of pursuing this matter as she has, and explains the significance of what has finally been disclosed to her. Given that all the circumstances of her arrest in September 2021 are the subject of other proceedings, we will not itemise everything here upon which she relies. However, without her tenacity and resilience, none of this would have seen the light of day. Further, absent the grant of permission to appeal by Lord Justice Lewison, who did so on points of law only, the false position on the facts taken by the police force over such a long period would never have come to light.

In the second witness statement served of the Chief Constable dated 19 November 2025, a full narrative is provided, and he has also accepted that his first statement was inadequate in certain respects. He accepts that there were five video clips that had never been provided to the appellant, even though they clearly existed, until 21 October 2025 (for two of them) or after the appeal hearing on 22 October 2025 (for three of them). These five clips are called McKitton 2 and McKitton 4; Rideout 1 and Rideout 2; and Virtue 2. Although two of them are of short duration, that does not mean they are unimportant. Further, some are long. McKitton 4 is almost 3 minutes in length; Rideout 2 is 6 minutes long; and Virtue 2 is 20 minutes in length.

At [3] in the substantive judgment, we referred to the April 23 Order made by DDJ Leong. At paragraph 20 of the second statement of the Chief Constable, he accepts that as at the date of that statement, he remained in breach of paragraph 3 of that order, which was reiterated by the Court of Appeal in its order made on 22 October 2025. He accepted that this was a continuing breach for which there was no excuse.

He also explained that he considered he had been let down by the solicitor acting for him in terms of compliance with the deadline for service of his statement on 5 November 2025. He has also appeared in person before us and apologised both to this Court, the County Court and also the appellant.

Mr Basu KC submits that were the court to be contemplating committing the Chief Constable for contempt, which is a technical way of imposing a term of imprisonment by way of sanction, this would be wrong in principle. He drew an analogy with Ministers of the Crown, and drew attention in particular to the dicta in M v Home Office [1994] UKHL 5 [1994] 1 AC 377 Lord Woolf said, at 425:

“In addition the object of the exercise is not so much to punish an individual as to vindicate the rule of law by a finding of contempt. This can be achieved equally by a declaratory finding of the court as to the contempt against the minister as representing the department. By making the finding against the minister in his official capacity the court will be indicating that it is the department for which the minister is responsible which has been guilty of contempt. The minister himself may or may not have been personally guilty of contempt.”

Lord Woolf continued at 427 that:

“While he was Home Secretary the order was one binding upon him personally and one for the compliance with which he as the head of the department was personally responsible. He was, therefore, under a strict liability to comply with the order. However, on the facts of this case I have little doubt that if the Court of Appeal had appreciated that they could make a finding against Mr. Baker in his official capacity this is what the court would have done. The conduct complained of in this case which justified the bringing of contempt proceedings was not that of Mr. Baker alone and he was acting on advice. His error was understandable and I accept that there is an element of unfairness in the finding against him personally.”

Whilst it is always potentially dangerous to use the word “never”, because one can never predict with certainty what combination of facts might come before the courts in future cases, I would venture that it would be a highly exceptional, and very unusual and difficult case where an official such as a Chief Constable might be imprisoned for contempt of courts for acts committed in an official capacity. I do not, however, accept the submission of Mr Basu that Chief Constables stand entirely in the same position as Ministers of the Crown in this respect. To arrive at a fully concluded view one would need to start with the Crown Proceedings Act 1947 and the dicta of M v Home Office on the one hand, dealing as that case did with a Minister of the Crown. A comparison would then need to be done with the status of a Chief Constable, starting perhaps with the County Police Act 1839 that created the office originally, and reaching the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 (“the 2011 Act”). The 2011 Act created Police and Crime Commissioners who appoint Chief Constables, replacing what were police authorities. Section 2(2) and Schedule 2 paragraph 2 of the 2011 Act are relevant. This court has not heard full detailed argument on the point and this is not necessary in this case in any event.

Mr Basu also drew attention to a number of first-instance cases in which the finding of contempt was held to be sufficient punishment of itself to demonstrate disapproval. In particular he drew an analogy with the approach of Munby J (as he then was) in R (Bempoa) v London Borough of Southwark [2002] EWHC 153 (Admin). In that case, the defendant local authority had evicted a tenant a mere six days after giving the court an undertaking that it would not do so. What then occurred was even worse; when the authority solicitor who had given the undertaking discovered what had happened, they advised the housing department to reinstate the tenant, yet that department refused. The judge concluded at [53] that the gravity of the contempt could be adequately marked by the delivery of the judgment in public and imposed no sanction.

I disagree that the analogy is apposite. A Chief Constable is in a wholly different position to a housing department of a local authority, given their role in upholding the rule of law. Further, the factual scenario at the heart of this case concerns an arrest which by, definition, infringes the liberty of the citizen. Yet further, the finding of contempt in this case was effectively made on 22 October 2025 when it was accepted by the Chief Constable, quite correctly, that the appeal could not be contested on the facts. That did not lead to the necessary sea change in approach to compliance with orders of the court.

However, returning to the legal issues for consideration regarding whether there is a parallel to be drawn between Chief Constables and Ministers of the Crown. I do not consider that analysis necessary here. This is because I do not consider it would be correct in principle in this case to commit the Chief Constable. Were a private individual to have breached court orders in the way that has occurred in this case, I would undoubtedly consider that to justify a term of imprisonment upon the contemnor. That is not, however, justified in this case. The Chief Constable stands as a defendant in his official capacity and he is vicariously responsible for those in his police force and legal department. The vast majority of what has occurred has been done by those who act on his behalf, not by him in his personal capacity. On these facts, I consider the ultimate sanction of imprisonment for contempt of court to be both unavailable as a matter of principle, but also unnecessary.

I do, however, consider that, in addition to the finding of contempt that has already been made, the extent of the breaches of two orders of the court, firstly the County Court and also the Court of Appeal, do require sanction in addition to the mere finding of contempt. I take into account all the relevant aggravating and mitigating factors. In particular in respect of the former, this has continued over such a very long period, both before and after the first hearing in the Court of Appeal; and also, directly inaccurate and incorrect statements have been made repeatedly by a number of personnel over that long period. I also take into account that police forces are publicly funded and that any fine will inevitably take funds away from front line policing activities. However, the imposition of a further sanction is undoubtedly called for, in order to reflect the seriousness of this matter.

Therefore, in all the circumstances of this troubling case, I consider that a fine should be imposed upon the Chief Constable of £50,000. That sum properly reflects the gravity of the situation, whilst taking account of the fact that the funds for it will have to be provided out of the existing budget of the Northamptonshire Police Force.

I agree.

I also agree.