Nadine Buzzard-Quashie v Chief Constable of Northamptonshire

This judgment is in the following parts:

Introduction

This case concerns an attempt by the Appellant, Ms Buzzard-Quashie, to hold the police force of Northamptonshire (“the police”) to account for the circumstances that unfolded on 3 September 2021 when she was arrested and taken into custody. Charges were brought against her but rapidly dropped, and she complained to the police about that arrest by telephone call made to them three days after it had occurred. In that telephone call, and again throughout the period from September 2021 to the date of the hearing of this appeal, she has sought to obtain all the video footage recorded at the time on the police officers’ body-worn cameras (“BWV”). That is a period in excess of four years during which her efforts in this respect have been remarkable, given the circumstances.

Ms Buzzard-Quashie was not provided with the video footage of her arrest and detention upon her request and indeed, the police refused to produce it. She lodged a complaint with the Information Commissioner’s Office (“ICO”) and this led to an order by him dated 1 April 2022 that all the video of her arrest (including the BWV) be produced. There was then some piecemeal production, but generally the explanation by the police was either that there was no such footage, or what there had been, had been destroyed. Eventually – the details of her consistent efforts in this respect are explained further from [15] onwards below - she obtained a court order on 25 April 2023 (“the April 23 Order”) that all of the footage (including BWV) be produced, together with an explanation for any that was no longer available. That order was not complied with, either in respect of production of the footage or in respect of the second part of it, namely the witness statement of explanation that was required.

Ms Buzzard-Quashie therefore applied to commit the Chief Constable of Northamptonshire Police (“the Chief Constable”) for contempt of court. Given that this arose in civil proceedings, this was an application for civil, rather than criminal, contempt, although as explained below, civil contempt can be punished by imprisonment. Her application was heard by Her Honour Judge Genn (“the judge”) at Central London County Court on 15 March 2024. Judgment was delivered on 11 April 2024. Witness evidence was lodged with the court on behalf of the Chief Constable which stated, in express terms, that all the BWV that was in existence had already been produced to her. The judge refused to find the Chief Constable in contempt of court, her application failed and costs were ordered against her. She was at that point acting in person.

In outline terms only at this stage, Ms Buzzard-Quashie failed before HHJ Genn both on the facts and on the law. On the facts, the judge applied the necessary standard but found that all the BWV in existence had been disclosed to Ms Buzzard-Quashie, having heard evidence to that effect on behalf of the police. On the law she found that the Chief Constable was not personally responsible for acts performed by members of the police force which he heads; that there was no intention on his part to interfere with the administration of justice, which she found was a necessary pre-requisite for any finding of contempt; and she also found that, in any event, as there was no penal notice on the April 23 Order, since this was a pre-requisite for a finding of contempt, this too prevented a finding being made by the court.

I have studied both the extensive correspondence between the parties and the transcript of the hearings in the County Court with some care. It must be recorded that Ms Buzzard-Quashie has throughout this extended saga conducted herself in a measured and dignified manner. She has also demonstrated remarkable resilience. Having failed in her application in the County Court, and having had costs ordered against her, she sought to appeal to this court.

She obtained pro bono representation from Ms Elves at that stage, and she obtained permission to appeal, which was granted by Lewison LJ. She now appears represented pro bono both by Ms Elves and Mr Leonard KC; the Chief Constable is now represented by Mr Gold, who did not appear before HHJ Genn. This assistance from counsel has been of considerable value. Indeed, were it not for the resilience of Ms Buzzard-Quashie, but also the pro bono diligence of Ms Elves, together with the perseverance of Mr Gold, the video footage whose existence had been denied by the Chief Constable on so many occasions was finally discovered just a few days before the hearing before us. This means that all the statements made to the court on behalf of the police force prior to mid-October 2025 were false.

This led to a late application on behalf of Ms Buzzard-Quashie to amend her grounds of appeal. This application was, sensibly, not opposed by Mr Gold for the Chief Constable, nor could it have been. Mr Gold also conceded the appeal, and accepted on behalf of the Chief Constable that the evidence before the County Court (for the hearing before HHJ Genn) adduced on his behalf, and the material lodged with the Court of Appeal opposing the grant of permission to appeal, and the skeleton argument contesting the appeal, was factually wrong. Mr Gold also read a pre-agreed statement by the Chief Constable to the court in which an apology was proffered to Ms Buzzard-Quashie.

This means that, on the facts, the findings by HHJ Genn could no longer stand. There is more to this case than that, however, grateful though Ms Buzzard-Quashie must be finally to have been vindicated in this respect. This is because the findings on the law by the judge below raise important points of wide application. The parties were told that the appeal would be allowed at the immediate conclusion of the hearing on 22 October 2025, and they were also told that our detailed reasons would follow. These are those reasons.

Video footage taken by police officers and police forces plays an important part in terms of accountability, transparency and recording what has in fact occurred on any particular occasion. This protects both police officers in the legitimate performance of their duties, and citizens in their interactions with the police. What has occurred in this case concerning the retention, production, refusal to produce and possible deletion of such video footage is a matter of significant concern.

For completeness I record that the current Chief Constable has been in that post since October 2023. Some of what has occurred in this case did so under the previous incumbent who was appointed to that position in August 2018, and who was dismissed from his post earlier this year.

Finally by way of introduction, because this is a matter of some considerable importance, the factual background leading to the hearing before HHJ Genn, and the very recent developments in the days leading to the hearing before us, are recited in more detail than would ordinarily be the case in an appellate judgment. This is because considering those facts in detail is necessary in order to come to a considered conclusion as to the seriousness of what has transpired.

Factual Background

Ms Buzzard-Quashie was arrested on 3 September 2021. Her account of her arrest, which she made in a phone call to a police officer called Sgt Nealon on 6 September 2021, was that she was physically assaulted by the officers who arrested her, she was physically thrown to the ground and had her face pushed into stinging nettles. Three officers were involved in the arrest. Ms Buzzard-Quashie recorded that telephone call, and the transcript shows that Sgt Nealon accessed some video of her arrest from BWV during the call. He effectively narrated to her over the phone what he said he could see as he watched it, discussing her arrest with her. The importance of this call is that it clearly demonstrates that there was some video, both custody suite footage, and BWV, in existence at that date showing what had happened to her. Ms Buzzard-Quashie asked as early as during that telephone call for it to be preserved, then she sought to obtain it. No prosecution occurred as a result of her arrest, charges being not proceeded with by the CPS at her first appearance at the Magistrates’ Court.

Ms Buzzard-Quashie maintains that she was wrongfully arrested and maliciously prosecuted. She also said that personal property had been taken from her at the time of her arrest and not returned to her. She sought, from 6 September 2021 onwards in the call to which I have referred, retention, and then disclosure to her, of the video footage of her arrest. These are both matters to which she either is, or undoubtedly due to the decision by the ICO and then the terms of the April 23 Order became, legally entitled.

Initially she sought to obtain this directly herself from the police force. She found this a frustrating experience. The responses that she received included her being told that the police Professional Standards Department were involved. After they had refused both her legitimate data access and subject matter requests, she approached the ICO. She raised a data protection complaint. The ICO contacted the police force and, having considered their response to her complaint, issued a decision dated 1 April 2022. That ICO decision was in her favour and stated, inter alia:

“The ICO has now written to Northamptonshire Police to inform it of the assessment that we have made for your complaint and to explain that we now require it to revisit the way it handled your request and provide you with a comprehensive disclosure of the personal data to which you would be entitled as soon as possible.” (emphasis present in original)

The ICO is an executive non-departmental public body which upholds information rights in the public interest, promoting openness by public bodies and data privacy for individuals. It is the UK regulator for such matters. However, this clear decision by the ICO still did not lead to all the BWV being produced. Ms Buzzard-Quashie was very clear that officers who arrested her were wearing body-cameras; she remembered conversations that she had with the officers which simply did not appear on the isolated clips provided to her; and she was of the view that footage had been deleted or altered. Quite simply, the isolated video clips that were provided did not satisfy her.

She therefore issued proceedings in the Brentford County Court on 30 August 2022 against the Chief Constable as defendant, claiming a breach of statutory duty under the Data Protection Act 2018. In her particulars of claim dated 10 August 2022 she sought, at paragraph 18 of that document, an order from the court “enforcing the Defendant to provide her with all missing footage and at the very least the footage she has evidenced the Defendant has [in] its possession”. Those proceedings were contested; the statement of truth on the defence served on the Chief Constable was signed by Mr Staples, an in-house solicitor for the police force.

It was within the framework of these proceedings that she obtained the April 23 Order from Deputy District Judge Leong at a hearing on 25 April 2023. At that hearing she withdrew the money part of her claim in those proceedings; it is clear that financial recovery was and is not her primary motivation. The order made by the court was in the following terms:

“1.

Judgment be entered in favour of the Claimant.

2.

The Defendant shall within 28 days disclose all and any video footage taken on police cameras relevant to the arrest and detention of the Claimant on 3 September 2021.

3.

If any such video evidence is not available or disclosable, a statement from an officer of a rank no lower than Inspector must accompany the disclosure stating why such video footage is no longer available or disclosable.

4.

The Defendant pay the Claimant’s costs summarily assessed in the sum of £555.00, within 28 days from the date of this order”.

There are some aspects of this order that merit repetition. It was an order granting judgment in her favour in the County Court proceedings. This was referred to at a later court hearing as “the judgment” and the judge on that occasion corrected counsel and stated that it was not a judgment, but an interlocutory order. He was incorrect to do so. It plainly is a judgment order. Paragraph 1 of the order expressly states that. It also gave her all that she sought in the proceedings, once she had withdrawn her money claim. In those proceedings she had sought disclosure of the video footage, and an explanation of why any video was said to be no longer available or disclosable. That explanation had to be given by a particular deadline, and there is no ambiguity about how the explanation was to be given, or by whom. It was to be within 28 days and contained in a witness statement by “an officer of a rank no lower than Inspector”.

It also required the Chief Constable to pay Ms Buzzard-Quashie £555 in costs.

In terms of the deadline for compliance, the order was made at the hearing before DDJ Leong. This means that the 28 days for compliance ran from 25 April 2023, and would have expired on 23 May 2023. The order was not actually sealed until 16 May 2023; therefore, being as charitable to the Chief Constable as possible, the latest possible date for compliance would have been 13 June 2023 (if the 28 days were to run from the date of sealing and not the date the order was made).

However, such niceties as to deadline are not relevant for this reason. The Chief Constable did not comply with any element of this order. He did not pay her costs; and no witness statement at all was produced, by either of the possible dates (23 May 2023 or 13 June 2023). A DVD was sent to her on 19 May 2023 but in a format that meant she could not access it. It contained five more clips of video. No further footage was produced.

In a sense, one can imagine that Ms Buzzard-Quashie may have felt herself running out of options to obtain that to which she was no doubt entitled. Both the ICO, and by that stage the court, had ordered that this material be produced, yet this had still not happened. On 2 June 2023 she issued an application for contempt against the Chief Constable, alleging non-compliance with the April 23 Order. This was set down for a hearing on 13 November 2023. She anticipated that this was to be a hearing of her contempt application, but it was listed for a costs and case management conference before HHJ Judge Freeland KC. Shortly before that hearing, a witness statement in draft was produced for the Chief Constable. This was not by a police officer of any rank, let alone an inspector or above. It was by a civilian employee, Ms Kightely-Jones, who described herself as a Data Protection Officer. The signed statement by her is dated 11 November 2023, so about five or six months later than the date ordered.

In the hearing before HHJ Judge Freeland KC, clearly recorded in the transcript, the judge gave Ms Buzzard-Quashie a warning of the risks to her in costs of continuing with a contempt application. This warning to her was then followed by this exchange:

“The Judge (to counsel for the Chief Constable): Is it your position that you have disclosed all video footage on police cameras relevant to the claimant’s arrest on 3 September?

Counsel: Yes.”

Ms Buzzard-Quashie was of the view that this statement was not true, and that there was remaining footage which had not been disclosed. She was also of the view that the April 23 Order had not been complied with, in terms of date, content or identity of deponent. She therefore continued with her contempt application. The judge made directions which included that the Chief Constable serve his evidence by 15 January 2024. That deadline was not complied with either. Thereafter the Chief Constable applied for relief from sanctions and sought to rely upon the late witness statement of Mr Simon Staples, the same solicitor within the police legal department who had signed the statement of truth in the defence. This statement was dated 12 March 2024, so almost two months after the date it ought to have been served.

That application was heard by HHJ Genn on 15 March 2024. At the beginning of the contempt application the judge allowed the statement of Mr Staples in, accepting that it was “extremely late”, and commending Ms Buzzard-Quashie for her co-operative and constructive approach generally.

The best summary of Ms Buzzard-Quashie’s position as at the date of that hearing can be taken from her skeleton argument for the hearing which said this:

“3.

The Claimant submits that the Defendant made no attempt to comply with [the April 23 Order] until the eve of the last hearing in the contempt matter (some six months after the date for compliance) and holds the view that the Defendant still remains in breach of the Order at today’s date.

4.

The Defendant’s evidence submitted for this hearing demonstrates that there is missing footage under the [Subject Access Request] with no clear explanation as to why the footage is missing or deleted.

5.

There is still no statement from an Officer with a rank of at least an inspector to this date to explain why this footage has not been made available to the Claimant.

6.

The Defendant’s conduct throughout this matter has been appalling. The solicitor for the Defendant has ignored the majority of the Claimant’s communications, refused to engage in meaningful discussions or ADR and been obstructive in even simple matters such as compiling a bundle for the hearing. The Claimant has attempted to settle the matter by writing to the Defendant’s principal solicitor on numerous occasions and each time the Defendant has failed to acknowledge or respond to any such communication.”

This was not a position that the Chief Constable accepted or admitted; indeed, the totality of evidence served on his behalf for the contempt hearing was that a full search had already been performed; all the footage had been produced; no other footage existed; and he was not in contempt.

HHJ Genn allowed Ms Buzzard-Quashie to cross-examine Mr Staples on his witness statement, which had contained some significant errors. As a single example, he had stated that she had not been charged in relation to the 3 September 2021 arrest. This was to explain why video footage had, he said, been deleted. He accepted at the hearing that this was wrong; she in fact had been charged, although the case was not proceeded with once it reached the Magistrates’ Court.

The contents of the judgment by HHJ Genn are dealt with in detail in section E below. However, in summary the judge found that Ms Buzzard-Quashie had not succeeded in establishing to the criminal standard that the Chief Constable was in contempt; and that there were a number of what she called “impediments” to the application which meant that “it cannot succeed”. These were as follows:

Ms Buzzard-Quashie therefore failed in her application, and was also ordered to pay costs. She sought permission to appeal from the judge at the time, who refused that application. She therefore applied to the Court of Appeal for permission to appeal. The thrust of her grounds was that the judge had failed to distinguish between what was needed to make a finding of contempt, and what sanction should be imposed.

Ms Buzzard-Quashie found some difficulty in lodging the documents necessary to appeal because she could not obtain an approved transcript. She sought directions from the Civil Appeals Office by lodging form N244 seeking to have the Chief Constable agree to the use of the unapproved transcript of the judgment of HHJ Genn. That resulted in an order by Master Meacher that the Chief Constable either agree or object to the unapproved transcript within 7 days of being provided with it. It was provided to the Chief Constable on 11 October 2024, but the deadline imposed by Master Meacher was not complied with by 18 October 2024 as required. The unapproved transcript was approved on behalf of the Chief Constable on 23 October 2024.

Her application for permission to appeal was opposed by the Chief Constable. Notwithstanding that, Lewison LJ granted permission on 14 January 2025.

Thereafter, the Chief Constable sought to have fresh evidence admitted by way of another witness statement, this time by Chief Superintendent Hillery. This was refused by Lewison LJ on 3 June 2025 as the contents went to additional grounds which the respondent had sought to advance, which Lewison LJ had refused. Relevantly for present purposes, however, that statement purported to explain why footage was said not to be available – it was said by the Chief Superintendent to have been “automatically deleted”. That same point had already been made by Ms Kightley-Jones in a statement of 12 December 2024 which stated in express terms that all the video which survived had been disclosed. Ms Buzzard-Quashie has never accepted that these statements were true.

Developments just before the appeal hearing

Shortly before the hearing before us the Chief Constable sought to adduce two further witness statements of Mr Staples, one dated 10 October 2025 and the second dated 15 October 2025. The two statements were to like effect. They showed that the position taken by the Chief Constable throughout the whole period, both up to and from the April 23 Order onwards, including the statement by Chief Superintendent Hillery, was factually wrong. Mr Staples explained that after permission to appeal had been granted those representing Ms Buzzard-Quashie had sought audit logs for the officers involved in the arrest, which would show when their footage was uploaded and how. As a result of that exercise “this identified that the Respondent’s previous statement that all relevant footage was disclosed was wrong. As Ms Kightley-Jones explains, a further two new files were located for one officer (PC Rideout) but these files had been saved against an incorrect occurrence and would not have been identified by a standard search”. In other words, two video files which have been called (by the parties) Rideout 1 and Rideout 2, were in existence and had never been provided to Ms Buzzard-Quashie. PC Rideout was one of the three arresting officers.

If by “standard search” (the term used by Mr Staples) one were to mean a search only against incident number, that might be true – at least some clips had been, it is said, saved but using the wrong incident number. Regardless of whether limiting a search in that way is “standard", however, the court was told that by searching against the actual arresting officers’ names (which might be thought to be an obvious way of searching for such video, if not “standard” for this police force) yet further footage had come to light in the few days before the appeal was to be heard. Ms Elves for Ms Buzzard-Quashie then spent some considerable time going through the audit logs; and had identified from that material to her opposite number Mr Gold, the existence of footage that had still, some four years after her arrest and first request, not been disclosed, and the existence of which had been denied many times. This video was from PC Virtue. This was therefore the third video file the existence of which was finally admitted by the Chief Constable.

Mr Gold, quite rightly, had become very closely involved in observing Ms Kightley-Jones as she searched again. It appeared, as of the morning of the hearing, there might be even more video than the three clips called Rideout 1, Rideout 2 and Virtue 2. This means that, ultimately, Ms Buzzard-Quashie was entirely vindicated on the facts. Her refusal to accept that she had been given everything was entirely justified.

It must also be observed that, very late in the day and only in the very final days before a contested appeal in the Court of Appeal, the type of search and explanation ordered by the court so long ago was finally being done. An email was sent to the Court of Appeal Office after close of business 21 October 2025 in which the Chief Constable stated that “for the purposes of this action alone and proceedings only admitted the contempt”, and Mr Gold read an apology from the Chief Constable to Ms Buzzard-Quashie and to the court. Various orders were made relating to witness statements of explanation and apology, as well as further investigations. Compliance with those orders by the Chief Constable is not, for the avoidance of doubt, in any way optional.

What follows at [40] is best described as only a selection of misleading and untrue statements that have been made to the court on behalf of the Chief Constable, both to the County Court in relation to compliance with the April 23 Order, and also to the Court of Appeal in relation to the application for permission to appeal and the appeal itself. To list every single statement made on behalf of the Chief Constable that has proved to be inaccurate over this lengthy period would lengthen this judgment considerably. There is a total of nine witness statements, ten if the last one in the series, the second one of Mr Staples, is included.

The following pieces of witness evidence or information given to the court were not true:

Chief Superintendent Hillery stated in his witness statement of 24 March 2025 at paragraph 12, lodged with the Court of Appeal, that “there is no further information that can be given as to why all BWV recordings were not initially retained. It may have been because they were not uploaded……All that can be said with certainty is that the videos are no longer available and irrecoverable. This information is taken from the documents I have reviewed.” (emphasis added)

Finally before turning to the law in this area, given these factual developments, it was clear that Ms Buzzard-Quashie would succeed in her appeal. Contrary to the submissions made to HHJ Genn by his counsel, the Chief Constable had not only failed to comply with the April 23 Order in both substance and form, but had advanced a wholly erroneous factual case before that court, and before this court as well. It was explained to the parties that the court’s intention was to deal with the legal issues raised by the appeal in any event; both parties were content to rest on their written submissions in this respect.

Legal Framework

Contempt of court is that area of the law which protects the administration of justice. It is a wide field, and has different aspects to it. Some areas of this field are governed by statute, such as the Contempt of Court Act 1981, which established what is called the “strict liability” rule. This is defined in section 1 of that Act as meaning the rule of law whereby conduct may be treated as a contempt of court as tending to interfere with the course of justice in particular legal proceedings regardless of intent to do so. It applies only to publications. Other areas of the law of contempt are not governed by statute, but rather arise under the court’s inherent jurisdiction and are therefore part of the common law. Inherent jurisdiction is a term that refers to the powers of a court arising from the court itself, rather than being conferred upon it by statute.

In this case, the area of the law of contempt which is engaged is two-fold. One is compliance with orders of the court; the second is the requirement that parties, if submitting evidence that is stated to be true or telling the judge something by way of fact, are required to do so truthfully. The court’s ability to deal with each of these arises under its inherent jurisdiction. The court can draw upon its inherent powers as necessary whenever it is just or equitable to do so in order to fulfil its role as a court of law, particularly to ensure the administration of justice.

At the end of contempt proceedings, the court will make a finding about whether the defendant has, or has not, committed contempt. A finding that a person has committed contempt will sometimes be expressed by stating that the person has “committed a contempt”, been “found in contempt” or been “held in contempt”. The phrase “guilty of contempt” is also sometimes used. These phrases are essentially interchangeable. The court has the power to imprison the contemnor, with the maximum sentence being two years’ imprisonment, or to fine them.

The process by which the law of contempt has developed over the years has been piecemeal and not systematic. There are confusing and difficult distinctions between civil and criminal contempt, for example. In July 2024 the Law Commission published Contempt of Court: Consultation Paper (2024 CP262) making provisional proposals for reform. It should be emphasised that regardless of that, this judgment concerns the law from 2023 (the date when the April 23 Order was made) to date, and not the law as it might become if this field is reformed.

CPR Rule 81 deals with applications and proceedings in relation to contempt of court. In particular for these purposes. CPR Rule 81.4(2) sets out what a contempt application must contain. The court directed at the hearing of 22 October 2025 that, in so far as there may be further consequences for the Chief Constable in terms of his contempt (now admitted), this judgment would essentially stand as the Rule 81.4(1) document, rather than written evidence supported by affidavit or affirmation. This is because any contempt before the Court of Appeal is a matter which is being dealt with by this court of its own motion. There is a summary of the brief facts for the purposes of Rule 81.4(2)(a) at [100] below. A further hearing is necessary, and this is because under CPR 81.4(2)(l) to (n) the Chief Constable is entitled to time to prepare, and respond, to the findings in this judgment, and also because under CPR 81.4(2)(q) any apology is an important element of what, if any, sanction the court might impose.

As Warby LJ (with whom Lewison and Edis LJJ agreed) explained in Cuciurean v (1) Secretary of State for Transport (2) High Speed Two (HS2) Ltd [2021] EWCA Civ 357 at [10]:

“[10] ….. the essence of the wrong is disobedience to an order. Disobedience to an order made in civil proceedings is known as "civil contempt". The contempt proceedings are brought in the civil not the criminal courts. The procedure is regulated by common law and Part 81 of the Civil Procedure Rules. The proceedings are not brought by the state, through the Attorney General or otherwise, in the public interest. They are normally brought by the beneficiary of the order that is said to have been disobeyed, whose main if not sole purpose will be to uphold and ensure compliance with the order. In summary, this is "contempt which is not itself a crime": R v O'Brien [2014] UKSC 23 [2014] AC 1246 [42] (Lord Toulson). Hence the use of language such as "liability" and "sanction" rather than "conviction" and "sentence".

[11] Sometimes, it may be possible to secure compliance by procedural means, such as striking out a case; but that will not always be possible. And the court also has an interest in deterring disobedience to its orders and upholding the rule of law. To advance these purposes the court has power in an appropriate case to impose a fine, or a custodial order. Custody in cases of contempt is known as committal. It is not the same as a prison sentence – there are several ways in which those committed for contempt are treated differently from convicted criminals sentenced to a term of imprisonment. But it is probably for this reason that civil contempt is sometimes called sui generis. In no other context can proceedings classified as "civil" lead to a custodial sanction or even a fine (punitive damages are not the same thing). It is certainly for this reason that the law has imported some elements of criminal procedure.”

These proceedings were an attempt by Ms Buzzard-Quashie to secure compliance with the April 23 Order and she sought a finding of contempt against the Chief Constable, meaning this is part of the civil contempt jurisdiction. Given judgment had been entered in the County Court proceedings in her favour in the same order, it is difficult to see what, if any, other levers she had at her disposal to force the Chief Constable to comply with that order of the court. She already had a decision by the ICO in her favour. Neither that ICO decision, nor the April 23 Order, led to the video being disclosed to her, or to a proper search being done for all the video. If a proper search had been done Rideout 1, Rideout 2 and Virtue 2 (and perhaps more waiting to be discovered) would have been disclosed to her.

The judgment under appeal

HHJ Genn did not produce a reserved written judgment and as I observed above, the transcript was not approved. However, pertinent parts of the unapproved transcript, which was agreed by the parties, are as follows. The judge did not have the benefit of counsel for both sides, but as I have observed, Ms Buzzard-Quashie has conducted herself to a high standard throughout these protracted proceedings. I reproduce paragraphs of the judgment here for convenience:

“20.

I highlight, in particular, issues in relation to the attachment or otherwise of a penal notice to an order and the effect of breach of orders and a significant amount of authority about what happens in circumstances where there are what otherwise might be considered regular court orders which are breached as opposed to injunctions or freezing orders or matters of that nature. I reminded myself in particular of the helpful and still leading authority of FW Farnsworth Limited v Lacy and Others [2013] EWHC 3487 Ch, a decision of Proudman J, particularly paragraphs 20 and 21 of that judgment the important and seminal words in relation to the matters that need to be established as far as committal proceedings are concerned. In particular, the fact that these proceedings are designed to impose penalties to punish conduct that is considered in defiance of court orders. They are designed to serve a coercive function by holding out a threat of future punishment and as a means of securing protection.

22.

In addition, I had regard to other cases, all of which were referred both by Mr Lester and also by Ms Buzzard-Quashie: Cuadrilla Bowland v Lawrie, reminding the court that proof of the relevant facts, that the person had knowingly disobeyed the order, is an essential criteria and that, unless this fact is established, it would not be appropriate to impose any penalty for breach, and reminding the court that the relevant factual allegations have to be proved to the requisite criminal standard of proof so that the court is sure rather than the usual civil standard which is the balance of probabilities, that which is more likely than not. It is, accordingly, the most significant of the potential sanctions in the court’s armoury and is one which has to be used with care, hence the need to establish the factual matrix to the criminal standard.

….

31.

The Defendant’s primary position was that the court simply could not make findings of contempt, first, because the application was against the Chief Constable and not an application against the Defendant’s solicitors or other official within the police force, and it was not suggested the Chief Constable himself had had direct involvement with any decisions in relation to what should or should not have been disclosed or what was or was not provided to the Claimant. …..…..Moreover, the Deputy District Judge’s order was ambiguous and convoluted and that what the court had to focus on was whether any act or omission was deliberate or wilful or contumelious and that what the court had to find was that there was a deliberate breach of the Deputy District Judge’s order.

….

54.

All of those matters should have been a cause of some concern in terms of compliance with the Deputy District Judge’s order. In my judgment, it was clear what was required and there has been a poor explanation for the lack of understanding or misinterpretation. Having listened to the questions that were put to Mr Staples and his answers, it is clear that there were errors that were made both in Ms Knightley-Jones’s statement and in his own. Indeed, the very fact that from Mr Staples was obliged to make a statement and that relief from sanction was sought for it to be admitted was because of concerns that were identified in an already very late served statement, but the picture was not clear enough from what had already been produced.

….

61.

I can well-understand the Claimant’s frustration and her wish to see some real consequences. However, in my judgment, there are a number of impediments to this application which, regrettably, signal that it cannot succeed. First, I deal with the issue of the penal notice. Even if I had been minded to commit, in my judgment, I would have had no power to do so in the absence of the relevant order - that is the penal notice attached. I have considered very carefully the very detailed submissions made on behalf of the Claimant and the authorities that she relies on in relation to the court’s ability to waive that requirement under CPR 81.4. She says there would be no injustice or prejudice to the Defendant because, in terms, he was warned.

62.

I have considered that carefully. However, I also have to balance that against the fact that it is an important and necessary ingredient because it does signal the likely consequences of failure to comply. It is an integral part of an order if it is the case that punishment or sanction seeks to be imposed. It matters not, in my judgment, that there is a legal team, although they should have considered very carefully their obligations to comply with court orders and to comply appropriately in any event. But the very fact of there being a legal team does not signal that there would not be injustice or prejudice should that integral part of Rule 81 be waived. In all the circumstances of this case, and having listened very carefully particularly to what Ms Buzzard-Quashie has to say and her deep frustration, given the amount of time this appears to have been still not adequately resolved, I do not consider that it would be just or appropriate or proportionate to waive that integral part of CPR Part 81.

63.

Even if I had determined that there should be a waiver of such an integral part of the process, I have some real concerns about whether or not, in fact, this application having been brought against the Chief Constable, the Chief Constable can himself be committed given the limits of involvement. I pause there to note that this was and is an in-house legal department. It is a department which on a reading might be said to be under the control of the Chief Constable in a way in which perhaps external solicitors might not be.

…..

66.

As I have said repeatedly, I can well-understand the Claimant’s heightened suspicion that the failings have gone well beyond apparent inefficiency or even lack of care, but that is not the test either. I have to be satisfied that so that I am sure that there has been wilful or deliberate conduct in the way in which the Deputy District Judge’s order was responded to and that there has been approach which is more than even incompetence. Applying the test in Farnsworth, I need to identify conduct in defiance of the court’s order. In my judgment, this is not a case where there has been a failure to act as required by the order or, if there has been a failure, that I can be satisfied so that I can find that there was deliberate rather than merely inadvertent or even incompetent compliance.

67.

In my judgment, although very unsatisfactory, I cannot identify evidence that would form the basis for a finding of deliberate or wilful conduct, even conduct from which I could properly draw inference that there had been an intention to breach the order even to the extent of only being considered relevant to penalty. Conduct in relation to the disclosure exercise has, in my judgment, been poor, but there is a significant distance to be crossed between establishing that something is poor or suboptimal and conduct that is wilful.

68.

In my judgment, the Claimant has not established that the failings meet the requisite test and, therefore, I am bound to dismiss the application. That does still leave the question of what I consider to be the continuing inadequacy. It is most unfortunate that this route was ever taken in my judgment rather than a disclosure exercise taking place in the context of alleged unlawful arrests and detention. That may be what is soon coming, but that is not these proceedings. These proceedings are effectively at an end because that was the determination of Deputy District Judge Leong and that order has not been appealed.

69.

The real issue is that the Claimant maintains and I am not entirely confident that she has been able to access that which has been sent to her thus far. I am satisfied that, in so far as there is material available, it is likely that all that is available has now been disclosed. I do not consider that it is satisfactory in any shape or form to suggest that if one looks at five statements altogether one gets answer that that is compliance with the order of Deputy District Judge Leong. It is quite clear what was intended.

70.

In my judgment, it was a statement from someone of a senior rank who was qualified to comment to identify on what searches were undertaken, why there is no material if there is no material, or why if there is material that is available it cannot be disclosed for all the reasons that people understand, where there may be covert operations going on as the case may be. But a statement that identified clearly the searches that were undertaken, what had been found, why things were deleted, when they were deleted, if there is a master tape why that has not been disclosed, if it cannot be disclosed for what reason and, finally, to put this matter to bed. That, in my judgment, has not been done but, for the reasons that I have already given, I do not consider that that was wilful, deliberate or contumelious but it has been, in my judgment, woefully inadequate”. (emphasis added)

Taking this collectively, it is therefore clear – encouraged by counsel for the Chief Constable who submitted to her, as recorded at [66] of her judgment above, that there had to be a deliberate or wilful decision not to obey the order, and with a litigant in person before her – that although the judge realised the April 23 Order was clear, unambiguous and had not been complied with, she did not consider that she had the power to find the Chief Constable in contempt.

The Grounds of Appeal

These were amended, and then further amended when it became clear that there was further video that had not been disclosed. This final amendment added a ground relating to errors of fact by the judge. The appellant’s notice referred to the April 23 Order as DDJ Leong’s Disclosure Order.

This is an appellate court, and appeals on the judge's fact finding in a first-instance judgment will not generally be entertained by the Court of Appeal save in limited and well-defined circumstances; Perry v Raleys Solicitors[2019] UKSC 5 andFage UK Limited & Another v Chobani UK Limited & Another [2014] EWCA Civ 5. To be fair to those acting for Ms Buzzard-Quashie, this ground relating to errors of fact was only added once it became clear that there was indeed such other material and that the judge was clearly wrong on the facts. Her error was inadvertent in that she relied upon the factually incorrect material with which she was provided by the Chief Constable, taking it to be true. On this ground alone, the appeal would succeed, notwithstanding the correct concession by Mr Gold that the appeal simply could not be opposed. It is not necessary to say anything further about Ground 6 other than it is made out in Ms Buzzard-Quashie’s favour.

The other five grounds all relate to the law as the judge held it to be. Ground 4 is really an overarching or catch-all ground, of which Grounds 1 to 3 were sub-sets. Ground 5 relates to costs.

Contempt of Court

I shall group the issues that arise under the first four grounds as follows.

There is no requirement in any of the authorities that breach of a court order must be “wilful, deliberate or contumelious” in order for that breach to render the subject of the order liable in contempt. Such an approach connotes – or at the very least suggests - specific intention to commit a contempt or interfere with the administration of justice is required. That is not the law.

In Cuciurean v Secretary of State for Transport [2021] EWCA Civ 357 at [58], Warby LJ reviewed the authorities on this specific point. He helpfully clarified the ingredients of a civil contempt as follows:

“These authorities indicate that… (2) the Court’s civil contempt jurisdiction is engaged if the claimant proves to the criminal standard that the order in question was served, and that the defendant performed at least one deliberate act that, as a matter of fact, was non-compliant with the order; (3) there is no further requirement of mens rea, though the respondent’s state of knowledge may be important in deciding what if any action to take in respect of the contempt.”

Warby LJ plainly used the phrase “further mens rea” as meaning the intention to commit contempt, and not the intention to breach the order. In other words, specific intention to commit contempt is relevant to sanction, but is not required in order to make a finding of contempt. This is a significant distinction. A finding of contempt, absent any sanction, is still a powerful finding. An apology from a contemnor can, depending upon the factual circumstances, be extremely important when one comes to consider sanction, such that none is imposed. But it is the finding of contempt that is important too. This is even more so when the object of that finding is not a private individual or litigant, but a public body or as here, a Chief Constable.

In M v Home Office [1994] UKHL 5 [1994] 1 AC 377 Lord Woolf said, at 425:

“While contempt proceedings . . . against a government department or a minister in an official capacity would not be either personal or punitive (it would clearly not be appropriate to fine or sequestrate the assets of the Crown or a government department or an officer of the Crown acting in his official capacity), this does not mean that a finding of contempt against a government department or minister would be pointless. The very fact of making such a finding would vindicate the requirements of justice. In addition an order for costs could be made to underline the significance of a contempt.” (emphasis added)

In my judgment, the same rationale applies to a Chief Constable in relation to any court order. Here, a finding of contempt made against the Chief Constable would vindicate the requirements of justice. It should also be noted that this was, effectively, what Ms Buzzard-Quashie was seeking in her application in the County Court. In her contempt application she asked “the court to find the Defendant in contempt, in accordance with CPR part 81…… The Claimant seeks such sanctions against the Defendant as the court sees fit to impose, plus reimbursement of all legal costs and court fees in relation to this application.” That is a world away from deliberately seeking to have the Chief Constable committed to prison for contempt; or even specifically seeking a fine. She was very clear that she sought a finding of contempt, with the sanction to be “as the court sees fit”. However, even if she had sought a more extreme or specific sanction, that point would only fall for consideration once the court had determined, to the criminal standard, that each of the three elements I explain at [65] below were satisfied.

In İşbilen v Turk [2024] EWCA Civ 568 (“Turk”) the failure was one of non-compliance with a disclosure order. The party who had breached the order accepted that he had indeed failed to disclose information required by the order such that he was in breach of it. However, he sought to rely upon an argument that something more than this was required before a finding of contempt could be properly made against him. Lewison LJ rejected this, stating at [41] and [42]:

“[41] In Varma v Atkinson [2020] EWCA Civ 1602, [2021] Ch 180 Rose LJ put it this way at [54]:

“… once knowledge of the order is proved, and once it is proved that the contemnor knew that he was doing or omitting to do certain things, then it is not necessary for the contemnor to know that his actions put him in breach of the order; it is enough that as a matter of fact and law, they do so put him in breach. In Pioneer, Lord Nolan (with whom Lord Mustill, Lord Slynn of Hadley and Lord Jauncey of Tullichettle agreed) quoted from the opinion of Lord Wilberforce in Heatons Transport (St Helens):

“The view of Warrington J [in Stancomb] has thus acquired high authority. It is also the reasonable view, because the party in whose favour an order has been made is entitled to have it enforced, and also the effective administration of justice normally requires some penalty for disobedience to an order of a court if the disobedience is more than casual or accidental and unintentional.””

[42] It is plain from the quoted passage in Heatons Transport that whether disobedience was more than casual or accidental is relevant to the question of penalty for disobedience, not to the breach. This is borne out by Fairclough v Manchester Ship Canal Co [1897] WN 7. Lord Russell CJ said:

“We desire to make it clear that in such cases no casual or accidental and unintentional disobedience of an Order would justify either a commitment or sequestration. Where the Court is satisfied that the conduct was not intentional or reckless, but merely casual and accidental and committed under circumstances which negatived any suggestion of contumacy, while it might visit the offending party with costs and might order an inquiry as to damages, he would not take the extreme course of ordering either of commitment or of sequestration.”

(emphasis added)

Those passages, by Lord Russell in Fairclough in 1897, by Rose LJ (as she then was) in Varma in 2020, which were re-stated with approval by Lewison LJ in Turk in 2024, make this point perfectly clear. Intention to commit contempt, or intention specifically to disobey an order, is relevant to the sanction for contempt. It is not a precondition to a finding of contempt. This has been the common law for a very long time.

An example that shows the application of this in practice is R (ex parte Bempoa) v London Borough of Southwark [2002] EWHC 153 (Admin) in which Munby J (as he then was) considered an application for contempt by Ms Bempoa against Southwark Council. The Council had unlawfully evicted her. This was in breach of an undertaking given to the court by the Council within the framework of judicial review proceedings, that undertaking having been given a mere six days before the eviction took place. Dealing with the argument put forward by the Council that this had occurred due to “administrative oversight" he stated the following:

“[46] I am satisfied that the initial contempt, the unlawful eviction of Ms Bempoa from the Premises, was neither wilful nor malicious. I am, on the other hand, satisfied by which I mean satisfied to the criminal standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt that it was the result of something much worse and much more blameworthy than mere "administrative oversight". It was the product of a system so obviously defective, and of an approach to the court's orders so slipshod and lackadaisical, as in my judgment to constitute heedless indifference and recklessness.”

He found the Council in contempt of court but did, however, consider the reason for the unlawful eviction when considering sanction. It is plain that the intention required is simply the intention to do the act or omission that constituted the breach of the order, not any intention to interfere with the administration of justice or to commit contempt.

In Caudrilla Bowman Ltd v Persons Unknown [2020] EWCA Civ 9 this court heard an appeal by three protesters who had been found guilty of contempt for disobeying an injunction preventing trespass and interference with the business activities of the claimant, the deeply unpopular activity known as fracking. A moratorium was announced on that activity in November 2019 by the Government, but at the time of the protests fracking was lawful. In giving the judgment of the court, Leggatt LJ, as he then was (with whom Underhill VP CACivD and David Richards LJ, as he then was, agreed) said the following:

“[25] It was common ground at that hearing that a person is guilty of contempt of court by disobeying a court order that prohibits particular conduct only if it is proved to the criminal standard of proof (that is, beyond reasonable doubt) that the person: (i) having received notice of the order did an act prohibited by it; (ii) intended to do the act; and (iii) had knowledge of all the facts which would make doing the act a breach of the order.”

I would only add for the purposes of this case that (i) should be read as “either did an act prohibited by it, or failed to do an act required by it”.

There are important and obvious policy considerations that underpin this. It removes from the scope of any considerations of contempt exactly what the alleged contemnor had in their own separate mind in terms of intention at the time of their acts or omissions. It distils the consideration for the court to the following issues, clearly set out by Leggatt LJ above. (i) Did the alleged contemnor, having notice of the order, do what was prohibited or fail to do that which was required? (ii) Did they intend this? (ii) Did they know that this act or omission would be a breach of the order? Here, each of those three elements, as of the date of the hearing in 2024 before HHJ Genn, was or should have been established against the Chief Constable. The question of potential ambiguity, which might be present in some cases, is part of the third element. However, there is no question of that here. The April 23 Order was extremely clear in terms of what was required from the Chief Constable.

At [62] to [65] of the judgment in Caudrilla intention is considered, but it is clear that this is only because the injunction in respect of which the three protestors in that case were in breach included three activities that were prohibited, set out in paragraph 4 of the injunction at [14] of the judgment. They were, in summary, blocking the entrance to the site; blocking or obstructing the highway by slow-walking in front of vehicles; and climbing or attaching themselves to vehicles. The final words of paragraph 4 of the injunction itself stated these activities were prohibited “in each case with the intention of causing inconvenience or delay to the claimants…..” Therefore the intention of the protesters was relevant to whether they were in breach by the terms of the injunction.

It might be that an incorrect reading by HHJ Genn of the relevant passages in Caudrilla that consider intention led her to the erroneous conclusion that intention to breach the order was required as an element of contempt itself. That is not correct, and it is not the ratio of Caudrilla. That is as set out at [25] of the judgment and quoted at [65] above.

Subjective understanding of the order by the alleged contemnor is not relevant either. The starting point is whether the order has been breached. In the present case, it is clear beyond peradventure that the April 23 Order was wholly ignored for many months; when eventually some limited attempt was made to comply with it, the maker of the witness statement was neither a police officer, nor (by definition) were they of at least the rank of inspector as ordered. Added to this, the substantive element of paragraph 3 of the April 23 Order – requiring a proper search for, and disclosure of, the relevant video footage – was not complied with at all. That exercise only appears to have started in recent weeks, with the pressure of a pending hearing before this court apparently, and finally, focusing the mind.

In ADM International SARL v Grain House International SA [2024] EWCA Civ 33 (“ADM International”) at [79] Popplewell LJ confirmed that subjective understanding of the order that was breached was not relevant to the question of whether there has been a contempt. He stated:

“However the true principle, in my view, is that where the court decides what the order means, and upon that construction the defendant’s conduct breaches the order, the defendant is in contempt. That is the principled consequence of the relevant ingredients of civil contempt, as summarised in Masri, and in particular that the defendant need not intend to breach the order; all that need be established is that the defendant intended to carry out the conduct in question and that such conduct amounts to a breach of the order, objectively construed. Subjective understanding or intention in relation to the meaning of the order is logically irrelevant to the existence of a civil contempt because there is no requirement of an intention to breach it.” (emphasis added)

This is consistent with the approach of the court generally. A clear example of the court rejecting the submission that a public body believed it was complying with an order, when in fact it was breaching it, is given in JS (by her litigation friend KS) v Cardiff City Council [2022] EWHC 707 (Admin). The claimant in that case was a young man with diagnoses of autistic spectrum disorder, severe communication and learning difficulties, attention deficit and hyperactivity disorder and anxiety disorder. He had been attending Elidyr Communities Trust (“the Trust”), a residential college providing education for young adults with learning difficulties, and sought judicial review against the Council who were funding the social care element of his placement. His placement at the Trust was about to come to an end and the Council had not performed any of the necessary assessments in order to determine what would happen to him next. He obtained a consent order as part of this first judicial review claim being withdrawn; the Council then breached the undertakings in that consent order. He then sought judicial review again, and this time obtained an injunction. That injunction was then breached by the Council. He then obtained an order which inter alia required an affidavit from a senior Director of the Council explaining the breach. That order was not complied with either, and instead of an affidavit from a senior Director, a witness statement was lodged, late, on the very day of the hearing and from a social worker.

Pausing only to observe that the series of failures, missed deadlines and flouting of the order in that case has echoes in the present one, in finding the Council to be in contempt of court Steyn J stated the following:

“[88] It follows from my finding that the Council had failed to comply with the order to complete future placement planning by 4pm on 7 January 2022 that the obligation in paragraph 6(a) to file and serve an affidavit of the Director was triggered. No such affidavit was served, within time or at all, as is common ground. It is clear beyond all question that the Council has failed to comply with paragraph 6(a).

[89] I reject the Council's contention that there was no breach because the Council believed it had complied with paragraph 5. Any belief on the part of the Council that the obligation in paragraph 6(a) had not been triggered goes only to penalty, not to the question whether the Council has committed a contempt of court.” (emphasis added)

Returning to the present case, and even putting to one side the significant failure to adhere to the date by which the witness statement should have been served, here the Chief Constable or those acting on his behalf plainly intended that the witness statement be made by the civilian employee, and not a police officer of the relevant rank. That conduct plainly constituted a breach of the April 23 Order.

I turn finally on this issue to the finding by HHJ Genn that the breach of the order was not, as she put it, contumelious. That is a word no longer in wide usage in society generally, but which is used in many of the authorities. It means amongst synonyms contumacious, wilfully disobedient and insolent. The notion of contempt of court is, understandably, often described in terms such as this. Some of those older expressions, such as “scandalising the court”, have been abolished as a separate class of contempt (Footnote: ¹). Some remnants of that earlier language, such as contumelious, once widely used in the common law, remain; although it may be that it is only lawyers and judges who now understand these words. For the avoidance of doubt, breach of a court order does not have to satisfy the description of being contumelious, deliberately insolent, wilful, rebellious, rude, recalcitrant or defiant in order to justify a finding of contempt.

For what it is worth, and given the developments on the facts and my approach to the legal issues this may not matter, I consider that the breach of the April 23 Order could properly be described as contumelious. Certainly it was wilfully disobedient. There was no attempt to comply with the deadline ordered by the court, which was missed by about six months; there was no attempt to have the statement made by a police officer, whether of the relevant senior rank or otherwise; existing video was not disclosed; and there was – as is now seen by the very recent factual developments – an insufficient investigation to explain, obtain and disclose all existing video footage. Admittedly the latter of those were not known to the judge, but the first two were. I therefore disagree with the judge below as to her characterisation of the breach. That disagreement, however, is not determinative of the legal issues on this appeal.

The Chief Constable is the legal personality of the police force of which he or she is the Chief Constable. The Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 (“the 2011 Act”) created Police and Crime Commissioners or PCCs, replacing what were police authorities. PCCs have the power to appoint and dismiss Chief Constables. The 2011 Act states in section 2(3) that:

“(3)A police force, and the civilian staff of a police force, are under the direction and control of the chief constable of the force.”

Schedule 2, paragraph 2 of the 2011 Act states that “a Chief Constable is a corporation sole.” There is therefore no distinction to be drawn between the Chief Constable himself, and those under his direction and control as chief constable of the police force. This means that acts and omissions of the police force under his control are his responsibility. He was sued in these proceedings as the Chief Constable in relation to the events that happened to Ms Buzzard-Quashie, plainly in his official capacity. He was the correct defendant, and the order was made in relation to the exercise of his official function. There was no justification, or reason for the judge embarking upon an analysis of what he personally did, or not do, himself in relation to the breach of the order.

In M v Home Office [1994] UKHL 5 [1994] 1 AC 377 the House of Lords considered how contempt applications could be brought against a variety of legal personalities, including crown officers and corporations sole. One of the issues in that case, described by Lord Woolf as “matters of constitutional importance”, was whether the Home Secretary could be held in contempt of court. An injunction had been issued by Garland J at first instance in relation to an asylum seeker, with which the Home Office had failed to comply. It was submitted on behalf of the Home Office and on behalf of Mr. Kenneth Baker MP (who was the Home Secretary) “that neither the Crown in general, nor a Department of State, nor a Minister of the Crown, acting in his capacity as such, are amenable to proceedings in contempt”.

In dealing with that issue in that case Lord Woolf stated at 426:

“Normally it will be more appropriate to make the order against the office which a minister holds where the order which has been breached had been made against that office since members of the department considered will almost certainly be involved and investigation as to the part played by individuals is likely to be at least extremely difficult, if not impossible, unless privilege is waived (as commendably happened in this case). In addition, the object of the exercise is not so much to punish an individual as to vindicate the rule of law by a finding of contempt. This can be achieved equally by a declaratory finding of the court as to the contempt against the minster as representing the department. By making the finding against the minister in his official capacity the court will be indicating that it is the department for which the minister us responsible which has been guilty of contempt.” (emphasis added)

Furthermore, the House of Lords held that the Minister in his official capacity could properly be held in contempt. It therefore substituted the finding of contempt made against the Minister’s Department at first instance by Garland J, for a finding that the Minister was the proper object of a finding of contempt. This makes it very clear that a Chief Constable can be the proper object of a finding of contempt in relation to failures by his or her police force to comply with orders of the court.

I find the reasoning and analysis in that decision of high authority not only compelling, but directly analogous to the position of any chief constable for acts or omissions of their police force. M v Home Office pre-dates the 2011 Act but I do not consider that makes any appreciable difference. It makes clear what the position is relating to Ministers of the Crown and their departments. It is unnecessary to embark upon a detailed historical analysis of the position of a Chief Constable, or the developments since the County Police Act 1839 that created county police forces. Each was headed by a chief constable appointed by the local justices of the peace; they are now appointed by the relevant PCC as I have explained.

In my judgment, any county police force (because neither the Metropolitan nor the City of London police has a chief constable) is properly sued in the person of the Chief Constable, and it is he or she who is responsible for the acts and omissions of the members of their police force. The judge below erred in law in concluding otherwise.

There is a first-instance decision of Julian Knowles J to the contrary, Paul Bush v Chief Constable of Northamptonshire [2024] EWHC 690 (KB). However, in that case, the claimant was acting as a litigant in person and as recorded at [9], counsel for the Chief Constable made no submissions on this particular point. The judge was certainly not referred to the 2011 Act as it does not appear in the judgment. The judge found at [10] to [16] in that case that “as a preliminary issue” the Chief Constable could not be liable for acts by his police officers, and the application for contempt against him failed in any event for that reason. In my judgment that case is wrongly decided, and the correct approach is set out at [82] above.

I wish to emphasise that there are not two different tiers or classifications of court orders, namely those with a penal notice, and those without. If there were, this would mean that the former must be obeyed because the court would have powers regarding non-compliance, but it would lack those powers for the latter. If that were the case, compliance with the latter could potentially become of the “nice but not essential” type. That is the logical consequence of the submissions made to HHJ Genn on behalf of the Chief Constable at the County Court. The absence of a penal notice was relied upon as effectively rendering the Chief Constable immune from any contempt proceedings for failure to comply with the April 23 Order.

Penal notices are standard in some types of order, such as for Freezing Orders. In other cases, they may be used by the court after a breach, or series of breaches, makes it necessary that such a notice is required. The normal form of a penal notice will be as follows:

“If you […..] disobey this order you may be held to be in contempt of Court and may be imprisoned, fined or have your assets seized.

Any other person who knows of this order and does anything which helps or permits the Respondent to breach the terms of this order may also be held to be in contempt and may be imprisoned, fined or have their assets seized.”

In Serious Organised Crime Agency v Hymans and others [2011] EWHC 3599 (QB) Kenneth Parker J considered a series of serious breaches by one Mr O’Docherty of orders obtained against him by SOCA relating to preservation of the proceeds of crime, Mr O’Docherty being said to have been centrally involved in a large scale illegal drug importation operation. SOCA sought to have Mr Hymans committed to prison as a result of his breach of the orders which were a contempt. No penal notice had been attached to the variation orders in that case, which were the ones upon which SOCA sought to rely in the committal application. The judge stated at [12] that the lack of penal notice was not fatal to the application to commit, as the respondent in the case clearly knew the consequences of the breach of the order, and it would not be in the interests of justice to allow him to escape those consequences simply because no penal notice had been endorsed on the face of the order.

I agree with the dicta in that case. If someone can be committed to prison for contempt of court in respect of breach of an order without a penal notice – and it is clear that the court has a discretion to do this, admittedly used in rare circumstances – then it cannot logically be a bar to a finding of contempt for breach of an order if there were no penal notice attached. There is no such procedural or substantive bar. The penal notice is relevant to sanction, not to any finding of contempt being made.

This is reflected in the Civil Procedure Rules themselves. CPR Rule 81.9(1) provides that a judgment or order to do or not to do an act may not be enforced under Rule 81.4 (that is to say by committal) unless a warning (that is to say a penal notice) is prominently displayed on the front of the order. For completeness, breaches of undertaking contained in a judgment or order may be enforced under Rule 81.4 notwithstanding the absence of a penal notice. But Rule 81.4 plainly relates to committal for contempt, not to findings of contempt at all.

The Chief Constable by his counsel before HHJ Genn sought to rely upon FW Farnsworth Ltd v Lacy [2013] EWHC 3487 (Ch), where Proudman J debated the requirement of a penal notice. However, when read fully, in that case there was an admitted contempt, and the only issue before the court was sanction, or to use the language of the judgment, committal. The passages are not applicable to the test that the court should apply when considering whether a party is in contempt of court in the first place. Whether the party should be committed – which means sent to prison – only comes after a finding that the party is in contempt.

There are two stages to contempt proceedings. The first is the finding by the court that the person is in contempt of court. The second is what sanction, if any, is to be imposed upon them. A penal notice, in my judgment, is relevant to the second stage. It is not a necessary prerequisite or condition precedent to imprisoning someone for contempt that there be a penal notice, and there may be some unusual cases where it is fair and just (SOCA v Hyman is an example) to imprison someone for breach of an order even in the absence of a penal notice. But the existence of a penal notice is certainly not a prerequisite to a finding of contempt, which arises at the first stage.

In MSA v London Borough of Croydon [2009] EWHC 2474 (Admin) 1 WLR 1658 Collins J considered the practice of the Administrative Court in respect of penal notices on orders, which in that case the judge was asked to add to the order. He observed at [2]

“It is not and has never been the practice of the Crown Office or of the Administrative Court to include a penal notice in its orders, whether in the form of injunctions or mandatory or prohibitory orders.”

He continued at [4]:

“[4]…..Corporations may be aggregate or sole. An example given of a corporation aggregate is a local authority and it is to be noted that some Secretaries of State are corporations sole. While the latter are also individuals who are named as defendants by virtue of their office, they may have personal involvement in ensuring obedience to the courts’ order. Thus prima facie a local authority and I suspect any defendant against whom an order to take or to abstain from taking any action is made by the Administrative Court is covered by the language of R.S.C. 0.45 r7.

5.

So far as I am aware, the point has never been taken by a defendant against whom contempt proceedings have been taken that the order was defective. Admittedly, it is very rare for orders not to be obeyed and (subject to one very recent case involving a Chief Constable) it is unknown for there to be a refusal to obey. It is only if administrative incompetence creates a failure to obey an order that problems can arise and it has been known for the court to summon those who are responsible to show cause why action should not be taken against them. Certainly orders for costs have been made against public bodies who have failed through poor management to obey, but such orders are not dependent on the existence of a penal notice.” (emphasis added)

Having considered the ratio of M v Home Office, he concluded at [8]:

“It follows that no penal notice is necessary in orders against any such Government Department or Officer of the Crown within any such department (usually a Secretary of State or minister). Nevertheless, as M v Home Office made clear, a finding of contempt could be made if there was a failure to obey an order against the Crown.”

I agree with that analysis of M v Home Office and the reasoning of Collins J in MSA v London Borough of Croydon. Orders made against public bodies – and for the avoidance of doubt I include police forces within that – are expected to be obeyed. A finding of contempt can be made against a Secretary of State, a minister or a Chief Constable if there has been a failure to obey an order of the court, and it is not necessary for there to have been a penal notice on such an order for such a finding to be made.

It can also be seen that were it otherwise, there would indeed become two levels of court order. This conclusion therefore is consistent with the public interest that orders of the court are made to be complied with. There are safeguards that prevent courts routinely finding those who fail to comply with orders guilty of contempt. These safeguards are in addition to the natural reluctance of the courts routinely to deploy what is an important and necessary part of the administration of justice. Those safeguards have been addressed above. They include matters having to be proved to the criminal standard. Yet to require a penal notice as a precondition is wrong in law, and the judge was wrong to have reached that conclusion.

In my judgment, the judge below erred on the law in the way I have explained above and I would allow the appeal on each of grounds 1, 2, 3 and 4. I would simply repeat, out of fairness to the judge, that she did not have the benefit of counsel on both sides, but also specifically was led into error by the legal submissions of counsel whom she did have before her. This was not Mr Gold, who only came to this case more recently.

I then turn finally to Ground 5. Of all the justified frustration and lack of confidence that Ms Buzzard-Quashie might rightly have felt at the justice system generally in this case, the part that must have been of particular distress to her may have been the costs order that was made against her. The rule of law means that the law applies to everyone. The court had ordered the Chief Constable to do certain specific things. She had obtained the April 23 Order in her favour at the judgment stage of her County Court proceedings, and the Chief Constable and those who report to him had simply ignored some very important elements of it. This is plainly so, even putting entirely to one side the factual inaccuracies and failures relating to the actual production of the video footage. She has suspected all along that she was not being given all the footage to which she was entitled. Even though the court ordered this be disclosed to her in April 23, she did not receive the witness statement of explanation until the very eve of the first hearing before HHJ Freeland KC in her contempt application. The production of further exculpatory witness evidence by the Chief Constable in the witness statement of Mr Staples, again produced just before the hearing held by HHJ Genn in 2024, was relied upon heavily by the judge, and Ms Buzzard-Quashie did not have proper time to deal with it. HHJ Genn found that the April 23 Order had not been complied with. Yet after all this, Ms Buzzard-Quashie was still ordered to pay a significant amount in costs to the party that had both ignored and also breached the previous order of the court.

Regardless of my view of the merits of Grounds 1 to 4, and Ground 6, I would have allowed Ground 5 in any event. In my judgment, it was wrong in principle in the circumstances of this case for Ms Buzzard-Quashie to have been ordered to pay the Chief Constable’s costs. This is not directly relevant now, however, because Ground 5 stands with the other Grounds given they have succeeded. The costs order made against her by HHJ Genn must be reversed too.

Conclusions.

As part of his apology given in court on 22 October 2022, the Chief Constable by his counsel informed the court that he was referring this matter to the Independent Office of Police Conduct or IOPC. This is the police complaints watchdog for England and Wales, and is a body entirely independent of the police. I consider that reference to them should also be part of the order made by this court on the appeal. Given the IOPC ,ay now investigate the matter, it is not necessary to say anything further on that subject.

I would allow the appeal on all six grounds. The effect of this is a finding of contempt against the Chief Constable in the County Court, something which was admitted before this court at the hearing of the appeal. The question of contempt before this court, and any sanction for the admitted contempt before the County Court, must wait until the next round of the process, given the terms of CPR Part 81.4 and the general requirements of fairness. I summarise here the brief facts which form the basis of contempt of court by the Chief Constable:

I repeat my thanks for the assistance of all counsel (and Janes Solicitors, also acting pro bono for Ms Buzzard Quashie) in this matter, but in particular Ms Elves. Not only has she been appearing pro bono, as has Mr Leonard KC, but her diligence and thoroughness in interrogating the 1,200 pages of audit logs has been instrumental in the factual developments identified in Section C of the judgment above.

I agree that this appeal should be allowed, for all the reasons set out by my Lord, Lord Justice Fraser. The significant contributions of Ms Elves and Mr Gold to this outcome were freely acknowledged by Mr Leonard KC, and I am only too happy to add my own commendation of their hard work and perseverance.

I too would allow the appeal on all six grounds, for the reasons set out by Lord Justice Fraser. I also add my thanks to counsel and note Ms Buzzard Quashie’ perseverance and dignity in the face of the Northamptonshire police’s failure to produce the video footage of her arrest some four years ago.