Betim Onuzi v Secretary of State for the Home Department

This appeal raises the question of the circumstances in which a naturalised British citizen may be deprived of that citizenship on the ground that it was obtained fraudulently.

The Appellant entered the UK illegally on 28 November 1999 and claimed asylum. He claimed to be Betim Jonuzi, born on 22 February 1976, from Kosovo. In fact, he is Betim Onuzi, born on 23 February 1976, from Albania. He made an asylum application alleging that he had left Kosovo because of the war and that he had been persecuted by Serb police and military groups because of his ethnicity.

A letter from the Home Office dated 13 February 2001 to an unknown recipient (addressed to ‘Dear Sir or Madam’) indicated that he had been informed by social services in September 2000 that he had been granted Exceptional Leave to Remain (“ELR”) until 16 August 2004. The Home Office clarified that this incorrect record was transmitted to social services in error and the Home Office’s internal system indicated that there was no evidence of a grant of ELR on his file. Although a field in the Home Office’s GCID system was checked to show that the Appellant had been refused asylum and granted ELR, there is no other evidence to show that he was ever notified of a decision to grant ELR by the Home Office or was issued with papers actually granting him ELR.

His case came before a Special Adjudicator who concluded on 24 May 2001 that following the Secretary of State (“SSHD”)’s administrative error, the SSHD was estopped from denying that the Appellant had been granted ELR for four years up to 16 August 2004. It remains unclear on what basis the case came before the Special Adjudicator or why he considered he had jurisdiction to make such a decision in all the circumstances. It appears that no formal decision was made to grant ELR.

On 9 July 2004, the Appellant made an application for indefinite leave to remain (“ILR”), also in the false identity. He signed a declaration that the information given in the form was complete and true to the best of his knowledge, and that he would inform the Home Office if there was a material change in circumstances. The form set out in bold type, on the signature page, that it was an offence to make a false statement or representation or to obtain or to seek to obtain leave to remain in the UK by means which include deception.

A Home Office official noted in internal minutes in respect of that application on 10 March 2006 that:

“This has not been handled well. We have never recovered from the original error. I doubt that this case is even for ELR as the decision was withdrawn on 30 Jan 04 with an expectation that consideration would be given to granting the balance of exceptional leave. Nevertheless enough time has been wasted, so we should reach a decision.

The original application was made on 28 November 1999. I do not think it appropriate to return to the Asylum Group in view of the failure to grant exceptional leave. Had it been implemented then MM would have been in a position to consider the grant of ILR. Looking at this mistake ridden case I agree that we should grant ILR. I cannot see any fairer conclusion.”

The Appellant was accordingly granted ILR in a letter dated 17 May 2006. He applied to naturalise as a British citizen on 25 April 2007, again, in the false identity put forward in his original asylum claim.

Section 3 of the application form was entitled ‘Good Character Requirement’. At the top of the section it stated that ‘you need to give information which will help the Home Secretary to decide whether he can be satisfied that you are of good character.’ Specific questions were asked about criminal convictions and activities relating to international crimes. At paragraph 3.11 of the application form the Appellant was asked: ‘Have you engaged in any other activities which might be relevant to the question of whether you are a person of good character?’ to which he ticked the box stating ‘no’.

Section 6 of the form required the Appellant to make a series of formal declarations. The section began by giving a warning that knowingly giving false information in the form is a criminal offence. At paragraph 6.1 the appellant was asked to confirm that the information given in the application was correct. At paragraph 6.5 he confirmed that he understood that a certificate of citizenship may be withdrawn if it is found to have been obtained by fraud, false representation or the concealment of any material fact. At 6.6 the Appellant was given an opportunity to make representations as to why discretion should be exercised if he did not meet all the statutory requirements. He did not complete that section.

Following investigations conducted in 2020, it was discovered that the Appellant was a national of Albania and was not from Kosovo as claimed. When invited to make representations, he admitted that he had lied about his real identity because he did not want to be returned to Albania. In a statement, the Appellant expressed remorse for what he had done and asked for discretion to be exercised not to deprive him of citizenship status because he had lived in the UK for over 20 years and had a wife and three British citizen children here.

By letter dated 4 November 2020 the Appellant was informed that he was being deprived of British citizenship pursuant to s 40(3) of the British Nationality Act 1981. Paragraphs 17 and 20 of the letter stated:

“17.

The decision to grant you asylum was made on the basis that the Home Office had wrongly issued ELR so had given you a reasonable expectation. If it was known at the time that your asylum claim was fabricated and ELR was issued in a fraudulent identity, it is likely you would have not been refused ILR. The mistake of granting ELR would have been outweighed by the ILR decision maker by the fact that the initial application was fraudulent, so the Home Office would not have made a mistake of granting ELR by administrate error if you would not have set-out to deceive the Home Office allowing you to remain in the United Kingdom. You persisted with the deception over 20 years and continued to submit fraudulent applications, you only admitted the truth after evidence of the fraud had been put to you. It is reasonable to assume that you would have continued to deceive if you had not been caught. The fraud is a clear attempt to undermine the UK immigration system and obtain status to which you were not entitled and would not have been granted had the truth been known.

…

20.

Your residence in the UK was built on deception. Had it been known that you were a national of Albania and not Kosovo as falsely claimed then your removal could have been pursued. Using your fraudulently asylum grant you persisted with the deception, but had the truth been known it is likely that you would have been refused settlement, meaning you could not have met the mandatory requirement to possess settled status for the purpose of naturalisation. You persisted with the deception in your naturalisation application and ticked the box to indicate that you had not done anything to suggest you was not of good character. Had you told the truth in your naturalisation application it is highly likely you would have been refused citizenship on character grounds, therefore the deception was material in that you should not have had been ILR (and would have been refused on that basis alone), nor would you have been deemed to be of good character given your deception over 20 years. The fraud is a clear attempt to undermine the UK immigration system and obtain status to which you were not entitled and would not have been granted had the truth been known. Given your conduct, deprivation is considered to be both a balanced and proportionate response.”

The Appellant exercised his right of appeal. An oral hearing was held before First-tier Tribunal Judge (“FTTJ”) S. Taylor at which Mr Bahja represented the Appellant. FTTJ Taylor allowed the appeal in a decision sent on 15 July 2022. The judge accepted that the Appellant had made false representations about his asylum claim and found that this was one of the grounds upon which the Respondent could deprive the Appellant of citizenship status.

The judge went on to say that ‘a further test in an appeal of this nature is materiality’. He considered the decision in Sleiman (deprivation of citizenship; conduct) [2017] UKUT 00367 (IAC) and paragraph 55.7 of the Home Office’s Nationality Instructions to caseworkers. He noted that paragraph 55.7.3 stated that if the fraud, false representation or concealment of a material fact did not have a direct bearing on the grant of citizenship, it will not be appropriate to take deprivation action. He added that: “paragraph 55.7.4 provides that where a person acquires ILR under a concession, the fact that the respondent can demonstrate that he had previously lied in an asylum claim may be irrelevant.”

The judge outlined what he considered to be ‘the key evidence of causation’, which was the file note dated 10 March 2006. The judge went on to make the following findings:

“12.

Applying the guidance in the case of Sleiman and in particular the Nationality Guidance at paragraph 55.7.4, I am satisfied that the appellant was granted ILR, and subsequently British citizenship, mainly on the basis of the delays and maladministration in his case, rather than the specifics of his nationality. The 2006 minutes, which explain the appellant’s grant of ILR, make no mention of the appellant’s nationality and identity, and refer only to the appellant have (sic) completed four years of his ELR, as well as the delays and mistakes in the processing of his application. On the basis of the material evidence of the internal minutes, there is no suggestion that the respondent was induced to grant the appellant ILR, which was the forerunner of his citizenship, due to his false nationality and identity. I find no evidence that the deception motivated the appellant’s grant of citizenship. Applying paragraph 55.74, the appellant was granted ILR, and subsequently British citizenship, on the basis of a concession due to the delays and mistakes, so the previous deception may be considered to be irrelevant.’”

In the alternative, the judge went on to consider whether the decision to deprive the appellant of citizenship status would breach his right to respect for private and family life under Article 8 of the ECHR. He noted that the Appellant had not prepared a witness statement and did not give evidence. Nevertheless, he found in the Appellant’s favour on the basis of family life in the UK over a 22 year period, holding that “while materiality is the main reason for allowing this appeal, the appellant’s established family life stands as a secondary reason for allowing the appeal.”

The SSHD applied for permission to appeal. This was initially refused by a judge of the FTT but granted by UTJ Gleeson on 20 November 2022. A hearing accordingly took place on 8 August 2023 before a two-judge panel of the UT (UTJ Canavan and Deputy UTJ Symes) at which Mr Onuzi was legally represented. The UT’s reserved decision was issued on 29 November 2023. After a careful analysis of the law relating to deprivation of citizenship; the policy guidance on the subject in force at the time of the deprivation decision; and the relevant case law, in particular the decisions of the UT in Sleiman and of this court in Shyti v SSHD [2023] EWCA Civ 770; [2023] Imm. A.R. 1563, the UT identified at [45] what they described as “the broad principles arising from the statutory scheme and the relevant case law”:

“(i)

Each case is fact sensitive. In the absence of a statutory definition of ‘good character’, the starting point is for the Secretary of State to decide, subject to general principles of administrative law, whether a person is of good character for the purpose of granting citizenship under section 6(1) and Schedule 1 BNA 1981.

(ii)

Any negative behaviour that might cast doubt on whether a person is of good character is likely to be directly material to the assessment of the statutory requirement, whether it played a role in the application for naturalisation itself or took place before the application.

(iii)

In the majority of cases where negative behaviour that might cast doubt on whether a person is of good character has been dishonestly concealed from the Secretary of State, the fact that the negative behaviour might not have been directly relevant to an earlier grant of leave is unlikely to make any material difference to the assessment under section 40(3) BNA 1981. It is for the Secretary of State to decide, subject to general principles of administrative law, whether the negative behaviour might have made a material difference to the assessment of good character under section 6(1) BNA 1981 had the information been known at the time.

(iv)

The omission of a fact that might have cast doubt on whether a person is of good character when they applied for naturalisation is likely to be material to the question of whether a person ‘obtained’ citizenship by the dishonest concealment of a material fact for the purpose of section 40(3) BNA 1981.

(v)

The concept of a chain of causation being broken is only likely to be relevant in cases where there was full disclosure and the Secretary of State exercised discretion to grant leave to remain or naturalisation while in full possession of the facts.

(vi)

The decision in Sleiman was based on limited argument and should be read in the full context of the statutory scheme and other relevant case law.”

The error of law decision of the UT panel concluded as follows:-

“46.

The appellant maintained the deception that he was an asylum seeker from Kosovo in the initial asylum application, the application for further leave to remain, and the application for naturalisation. At no point during that process did he disclose to the respondent that he knowingly made a false application for asylum (as opposed to an application that was simply unsuccessful).

47.

In relation to the first ground, we conclude that the judge’s reliance on Sleiman was misplaced for the reasons explained above. The fact that the respondent exercised discretion to grant the appellant leave to remain following a series of mistakes did not break a chain of causation when the full facts were not known at the time. The judge failed to consider whether it was open to the respondent to find that the exercise of discretion to grant ILR might have been different had the full facts been known. The judge failed to consider whether it was open to the respondent to find that naturalisation was ‘obtained by means of’ a dishonest concealment of a fact that was likely to be material to the assessment of the good character requirement when the appellant applied for naturalisation in 2007.

48.

In relation to the second ground, we conclude that, despite a self-direction to the balancing exercise required under Article 8, the decision is devoid of any assessment of the weight to be given to the public interest considerations relating to deprivation of citizenship.

49.

For the reasons given above, we conclude that the First-tier Tribunal decision involved the making of an error of law. The whole decision is set aside. The normal course of action would be for the Upper Tribunal to remake the decision even if it involves making findings of fact. We see no reason to depart from that course. The decision will be remade at a resumed hearing in the Upper Tribunal.”

The resumed hearing took place before Deputy UTJ Symes on 7 February 2024. On this occasion Mr Onuzi represented himself, but provided a document, drafted by his solicitors, headed “Submission on resumed hearing”. This argued that his case should be assessed against the “real world” backdrop, which here was an administrative error leading to ILR. The rationale for the grant of ILR had been “the delays and mistakes already made on this case” which led the relevant caseworker to propose “on balance that the Appellant should be granted ILR”. In the light of this rationale, it was submitted that it was “unnecessary for the UT to consider whether it was open to the respondent to find that the exercise of discretion to grant ILR might have been different had the full facts been known”.

DUTJ Symes held:-

“15.

The Appellant was not granted ILR pursuant to any general concession, nor under one relating to family membership. The grant was based on his own individual circumstances, which included his representations as to his nationality and identity, in the context of a significant dose of Home Office maladministration. One can envisage cases under the family ILR policy just cited where one family member obtains ILR based on the family’s general circumstances, not their own, where a decision maker might reasonably conclude that that individual’s previous dishonesty, in the language of paragraph 55.7.4, “may be irrelevant”. For example, they might have been a minor at the time or to have been under some mental impairment meaning that they could not reasonably be held responsible for a dishonesty perpetrated in their favour [sic]. Indeed this seems to be just the scenario that was envisaged by Chapter 55, once one reads it in the context of the family ILR policy, whereby leave was granted in line with that grant to all dependants who met the basic criteria. Or one can imagine a country-oriented policy that might have benefitted nationals from their true country of origin such that the fact that the grant of leave was motivated by some other concession made no material difference to their immigration history prior to naturalisation.

16.

Taking the approach in Chimi [2023] UKUT 115 (IAC) to the relevant issues, I should consider these questions:

(a)

Did the Secretary of State materially err in law when deciding that the condition precedent in s 40(2) or s 40(3) of the British Nationality Act 1981 was satisfied? If so, the appeal falls to be allowed. If not,

(b)

Did the Secretary of State materially err in law when deciding to exercise her discretion to deprive the appellant of British citizenship? If so, the appeal falls to be allowed. If not,

(c)

Weighing the lawfully determined deprivation decision against the reasonably foreseeable consequences for the appellant, is the decision unlawful under s 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998? If so, the appeal falls to be allowed on human rights grounds. If not, the appeal falls to be dismissed.

17.

I do not find the Secretary of State erred in law as to the condition precedent in s 40(3) BNA 1981. The Appellant maintained a fraud throughout his residence in the UK. He did not make full disclosure of the relevant circumstances either at the ILR or citizenship stage of his history. There was nothing in the decision-making history to break the causative link between his fraud and the grant of citizenship. There was no exercise of discretion in his favour made with full knowledge of the relevant facts. The omission of a material fact in the naturalisation application is likely to be material to obtaining citizenship by dishonest concealment such that “naturalisation was obtained by means of … fraud”, and on the facts here, I so find. Nor was there any material error of law in the context of discretion to deprive. The considerations identified in the refusal letter were perfectly relevant ones and no material factor was overlooked.

18.

The submissions provided by OTS Solicitors do not dissuade me from this conclusion. Those essentially invited me to depart from the legal directions made at the error of law stage. It will be rare for such an invitation to be taken up, but of course if the arguments made were sufficiently persuasive it is possible that I would accede to them. However I decline to do so.

(a)

I do not accept that the reference in Chapter 55 to knowledge of the relevant facts at the time the citizenship application was considered in any way limits the relevance of events leading to the grant of indefinite leave to remain. To do so would blind the Home Office to relevant considerations going to good character, contrary to a central tenet of good public law decision making.

(b)

The “real world” backdrop to the case indubitably includes the appellant’s historic and prolonged dishonesty.

(c)

The appellant's very presence in the UK was predicated on a false asylum claim and the delays and mistakes in his case arose in that context.

(d)

I do not accept that the fact that Shyti involved old Immigration Rule 395C, which expressly identified good character as a relevant consideration, indicates that discretionary decision making would exclude good character as a material criteria. I cannot envisage a rational administrative system excluding good character as relevant, at least absent an express statement to such effect.”

On 21 November 2024 Dingemans LJ (as he then was) granted permission to appeal to this court, writing:

“I have granted permission to appeal because there is a compelling reason to hear this second appeal. This is because it raises the issue of the proper test to be applied on an appeal to the FTT from the respondent, in circumstances where the FTT concluded on the facts that the applicant’s deception had not caused the grant of citizenship. The UT took a different approach to the test on the appeal, relying on Begum v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2021] AC 765. This appeal may therefore give the Court of Appeal an opportunity to consider the test to be applied on appeals to the FTT from a decision of the respondent where it may make a difference to the outcome. In Shytiv SSHD [2023] EWCA Civ 770, the issue of the proper approach to appeals from the respondent had been raised but it was not necessary to decide it, see Shyti at paragraphs 88-95.

The issue of the test to be applied is being considered in Chaudhury v SSHD (hearing 4 December 2024), Kolican v SSHD (hearing 10 December 2024) and Daci v SSHD (hearing 12 December 2024), but it is not apparent whether the issue is as defined as in this case.

I have granted permission to appeal on all grounds because they overlap, and because, whatever the proper approach to the issue of the test to be applied, the applicant will need to confront the essential reasoning of the UT which was to the effect that the applicant applied for citizenship in a false name and so, whatever other factors were in play, the deception must have been material.” {emphasis added]

By the time the case came on for hearing before this court had given judgment in Chaudhry [2025] EWCA Civ 16; [2025] KB 395 and the Supreme Court had given judgment in U3 v SSHD [2025] UKSC 19; [2025] 2 WLR 1041.Mr Berry KC, Mr McWatters and Mr Bahja submitted a skeleton argument reducing the grounds of appeal to the following:-

“Ground 1: the UT erred in failing to consider whether the FTT’s findings were perverse; and,

Ground 4: in its reconsideration decision the UT erred in remaking his decision.”

The skeleton argument of Ms Smyth KC and Ms Wakeman in response argued that the Appellant’s case departs from and in some respect expands the arguments presented to the UT, in so far as his team argue for the first time that (a) it is incorrect to apply a public law standard to the causation issue, that is to say the question of whether citizenship was obtained “by means of” fraud or false representation; or (b) alternatively, that even if the UT was right to apply a public law standard it erred are drawing distinctions between varying degrees of probability as to what would have happened in the absence of the fraud. We did not consider that the Appellant should be required to make any formal amendment to the grounds of appeal. There has been at least a change of emphasis in the presentation of the Appellant’s case but nothing requiring new evidence of fact and counsel for the Secretary of State were well able to respond to the points raised. The central issue remains the same.

The Secretary of State has power to deprive a person of citizenship status under sections 40(2) (conducive to the public good) and 40(3) BNA 1981 (fraud, false representation, or concealment of a material fact). For the purpose of this appeal, the relevant power is contained in section 40(3), which states:-

“(3)

The Secretary of State may by order deprive a person of a citizenship status which results from his registration or naturalisation if the Secretary of State is satisfied that the registration or naturalisation was obtained by means of— (a) fraud, (b) false representation, or (c) concealment of a material fact.”

At the time of the deprivation decision in this case the policy guidance relating to deprivation was set out in Chapter 55 of the Home Office’s instructions to caseworkers, headed “Deprivation and Nullity of British citizenship”. This guidance was superseded on 10 May 2023 by up to date guidance entitled ‘Deprivation of British Citizenship’. However, at the date the decision was made in this case the relevant guidance was still Chapter 55. The relevant sections for the purpose of this appeal are:

“55.4

Definitions

55.4.1

“False representation” means a representation which was dishonestly made on the applicant’s part i.e. an innocent mistake would not give rise to a power to order deprivation under this provision.

55.4.2

“Concealment of any material fact” means operative concealment i.e. the concealment practised by the applicant must have had a direct bearing on the decision to register or, as the case may be, to issue a certificate of naturalisation.

55.4.3

“Fraud” encompasses either of the above.

…

55.7

Material to the Acquisition of Citizenship

55.7.1

If the relevant facts, had they been known at the time the application for citizenship was considered, would have affected the decision to grant citizenship via naturalisation or registration the caseworker should consider deprivation.

55.7.2

This will include but is not limited to:

• Undisclosed convictions or other information which would have affected a person’s ability to meet the good character requirement

• A marriage/civil partnership which is found to be invalid or void, and so would have affected a person’s ability to meet the requirements for section 6(2)

• False details given in relation to an immigration or asylum application, which led to that status being given to a person who would not otherwise have qualified, and so would have affected a person’s ability to meet the residence and/or good character requirements for naturalisation or registration

55.7.3

If the fraud, false representation or concealment of material fact did not have a direct bearing on the grant of citizenship, it will not be appropriate to pursue deprivation action.

55.7.4

For example, where a person acquires ILR under a concession (e.g. the family ILR concession) the fact that we could show the person had previously lied about their asylum claim may be irrelevant. Similarly, a person may use a different name if they wish… : unless it conceals criminality, or other information relevant to an assessment of their good character, or immigration history in another identity it (sic) is not material to the acquisition of ILR or citizenship. However, before making a decision not to deprive, the caseworker should ensure that relevant character checks are undertaken in relation to the subject’s true identity to ensure that the false information provided to the Home Office was not used to conceal criminality or other information relevant to an assessment of their character.”

The skeleton argument originally submitted on behalf of the Appellant suggested that the decision in Chaudhry may have been per incuriam but at the hearing before us Mr Berry rightly accepted that it is binding on this court. He also accepted that as a result of Chaudhry, as he put it, “things have moved on” since the decision of the FTT in the present case and that there was little to be gained by examining the FTT decision. He accepted also that the decision in Sleiman could no longer be relied on. However, he submitted that the reasoning of the UT in the present case was too compressed and was unsatisfactory. There was, he said, no analysis of what decision the SSHD would have reached even if no false representation had been made. He submitted that his client should at least be given the opportunity to argue his case again in the light of Chaudhry.

Ms Smyth KC submitted that as the law now stood, the Appellant’s case was unsustainable. His application forms both for asylum in the first place and subsequently for naturalisation contained, in her words, “a lie on every page”.

At all times the Appellant continued to conceal the fact that he had used a false identity and had made a false asylum claim. He perpetuated the false representation that he was a Kosovo Albanian. At all times up to and including the application for naturalisation the SSHD was unaware of these material facts.

In R(KV) v SSHD [2018] EWCA Civ 2483; [2018] 4 WLR 166, Leggatt LJ said at [19]:-

“Where, as in the present case, it is established not only that deception was used but that, without it, an application for naturalisation as a citizen would not have been granted, it seems to me that it will be an unusual case in which the applicant can legitimately complain of the withdrawal of the rights that he acquired as a result of naturalisation. That is because the withdrawal of those rights does no more than place the person concerned in the same position as if he had not been fraudulent and had acted honestly in making the application. The position may be different, however, in a case where, as a result of naturalisation, the individual has lost other rights previously enjoyed which will not or may not be restored if he is now deprived of his citizenship. In such a case depriving the person of citizenship will not simply return him to the status quo ante but will place him in a worse position than if he had not been granted citizenship in the first place.”

(It was not suggested in the present case that Mr Onuzi has lost rights as a result of his naturalisation.)

In Laci v SSHD [2021] EWCA Civ 769; [2021] 4 WLR 86, Underhill LJ, having referred to the previous case of BA v SSHD [2018] UKUT 85 (IAC), said at [37]:-

“As to point (4) in BA, the broad thrust of what the UT says is that only exceptionally will it be right for a person who has obtained British citizenship by (in short) deception to be allowed to retain it. In my view that is entirely correct: the reason is self-evident. It is in line with what Leggatt LJ says in the first half of para. 19 of his judgment in KV. I note that he uses the term "unusual" rather than "exceptional". That may be because the Courts have been wary of treating "exceptionality" as a test as such, but I do not think that there is a problem here: the reason why such an outcome will be exceptional is that it will be unusual for a migrant to be able to mount a sufficiently compelling case to justify their retaining an advantage that they should never have obtained in the first place.”

SSHD v Daci [2025] EWCA Civ 18 was another case, strikingly similar to the present appeal, in which an appellant had applied for British citizenship using a false identity. Dingemans LJ said at [39]-[40]:-

“39.

In any event, as an adult, Mr Daci was asked on the form if he had ever engaged in any other activities which might indicate that he was not a person of good character, and he ticked the "No" box. Mr Daci signed a declaration confirming that the information he had given was correct. Mr Daci was not of good character because he had, in the words of the Secretary of State's good character guidance, practised deceit in his dealings with the Home Office by lying about his name, date of birth and nationality.

40.

The delay in the Secretary of State finding out about the fraud did not make the decision disproportionate. This is because Mr Daci had continued the deceit as an adult and the Secretary of State had acted promptly when the fraud became known to the Secretary of State.”

In Chaudhry it was held at [46] that where the fraud or false representation is disputed that raises a question of fact for the FTT to decide. The scope for FTT to depart from factual findings of the SSHD in deprivation cases, where deprivation is on the grounds that the appellant’s presence in the UK would not be conducive to the public good (s 40(2) of the 1981 Act), was the subject of detailed analysis by the Supreme Court in Begum (No. 1). It is unnecessary to draw on the judgment of Lord Reed PSC in that case, nor on the reaffirmation by the Supreme Court in U3 of the principles laid down in Begum, since it is agreed by both parties to this appeal that the law applicable to a case such as the present under s 40(3) is for present purposes sufficiently set out in Chaudhry.

Dingemans LJ summarised the position at [54]:-

“[In] my judgment the proper approach to an appeal under section 40A of the BNA 1981 from decisions of the Secretary of State made pursuant to section 40(3) of the BNA 1981 is:

(i)

it is for the FTT to find, in the event of a dispute, as a fact whether there was fraud, false representation or concealment of a material fact for the purposes of section 40(3) of the BNA 1981;

(ii)

the decision of the Secretary of State on the causation issue whether the registration or naturalisation was obtained by the impermissible means is to be reviewed on appeal by the FTT on public law grounds, in accordance with the principles referred to by Lord Reed in paragraph 71 of Begum (No.1);

(iii)

the exercise of the Secretary of State's discretion to make an order depriving a person of citizenship status is to be reviewed on appeal by the FTT on public law grounds in accordance with the principles referred to by Lord Reed in paragraph 71 of Begum (No.1); and

(iv)

it is for the FTT to consider whether the Secretary of State had acted in breach of other relevant legal obligations, including those arising under section 6 of the Human Rights Act. Although due weight would need to be given to the findings, evaluations and policies of the Secretary of State, the decision was for the FTT.”

The present case is factually much more straightforward than Chaudhry, where the appellant had made a successful application for naturalisation in his own name. The case against Mr Chaudhry (all of which appears to have been in dispute before the FTT and on appeal) was that he had previously attempted to obtain a passport in the name of a deceased child, with the intention of using it to obtain a driving licence. (The passport was obtained but the application for a driving licence failed.) The causative link between the deception and the obtaining of British citizenship was less clear than in the present case.

In the present case the deception is not in dispute. On the issue of causation, I consider it unrealistic to suppose that, despite the administrative mishaps in the handling of this Appellant’s case, he would have obtained ILR in 2006 if the decision-maker had known that he had obtained ELR by deception about his true nationality. But that is only the background to the critical question here, which is whether the grant of British citizenship by naturalisation in 2007 was obtained “by means of” fraud or false representation.

The whole basis of Mr Onuzi’s claim to refugee status was a false assertion that he was entitled to asylum as a Kosovo Albanian who had been persecuted or was at real risk of persecution from the authorities in Kosovo. This was entirely false because (as is now common ground) he was an Albanian himself who had lied about his identity because he did not want to be returned to Albania. In the words of the decision letter, he persisted with the deception over a period of twenty years, continued to submit fraudulent applications, and only admitted the truth after evidence of the fraud had been put to him. As DUTJ Symes rightly observed, this was a case of “historic and prolonged dishonesty”, and there was nothing in the decision-making history to break the causative link between the Appellant’s fraud and the grant of citizenship.

There is no public law error in the conclusion of the SSHD’s decision-maker in 2020 that, had the truth been known in 2007, the Appellant would have been refused British citizenship on the grounds that he was not of good character. On the contrary, I do not see how any other conclusion would have been a realistic possibility. DUTJ Symes’ decision is plainly correct, and I can see no reason to remit the case to the UT for a further hearing.

I would dismiss this appeal.

I agree.

I also agree.