ON APPEAL FROM CHESTER COUNTY COURT
(HHJ HALBERT)
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
Before:
LORD JUSTICE CHRISTOPHER CLARKE
Between:
GRACE AND ANR
Applicants | |
- and - | |
BLACKHORSE LTD | Respondent |
(DAR Transcript of
WordWave International Limited
A Merrill Communications Company
165 Fleet Street, London EC4A 2DY
Tel No: 020 7404 1400 Fax No: 020 7831 8838
Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)
Mr Thomas Brennan (instructed by Howlett Clarke) appeared on behalf of the Applicants
Miss Kate Urell (instructed by DWF) appeared on behalf of the Respondents
Judgment
Lord Justice Christopher Clarke:
I have come to the conclusion that it is appropriate to give limited permission to appeal. The permission will be limited to the issues, firstly as to whether or not the first and second appellants have a claim not barred by the Limitation Act under the Data Protection Act 1998, as set out in respect of the first claimant in ground 4 of the appellant’s Amended Notice of Appeal. That Notice of Appeal needs to be amended and I shall permit it to be amended, so as to raise the issue of the second claimant’s claim under that Act. The two claims raise for present purposes the same issues, and in those circumstances it seems to me appropriate that they should both be subject of the Court of Appeal’s consideration.
Secondly, I propose to grant leave to raise the point which is ground 6 of the Amended Notice of Appeal, that is to say the question as to whether or not the second appellant’s caravan was repossessed in circumstances where there was not an order entitling the respondents to retake the caravan such that the consequences specified in section 90 and section 91 of the Consumer Credit Act apply. I do so with some hesitation, but it appears to me arguable, in circumstances where there is no written order requiring possession to be given of the caravan at a specified date and the only written order that presently exists is an order made after the caravan had been repossessed, which gives judgment for its delivery up (which has already been effected), that there is not a sufficient order for the purposes of that section and in particular no order which specifies when possession is to be given.
I do not propose to grant permission to appeal on any other grounds since it seems to me that they have no realistic prospect of success and there is no compelling reason why I should grant permission. As I have said, the Notice of Appeal will require amendment to raise the issue of the second appellant’s claim under the Data Protection Act, and the argument that is to be put before the Court of Appeal must be recast so that it incorporates and incorporates only those matters in respect of which I have granted permission to appeal.
Order: Application granted in part