Hakeem, R (on the application of) v The Valuation Tribunal Service & Anor

The applicant, Mr Hakeem, applies for permission to appeal against an order of Cox J, by which she dismissed his appeal against a decision of the London North West Valuation Tribunal, dated 14 July 2009. The proceedings arise in this way. Under Section 6 of the Local Government Finance Act 1992, and in particular Section 6(2), there is a hierarchy of persons who are liable to council tax in respect of any given property, with residents of various kinds at the top and the owner of the property at the bottom.

The London Borough of Enfield decided that the applicant, as owner of a specified property in Enfield, was liable for the payment of council tax for the period 1 August 2002 to 17 January 2008. The applicant appealed to the tribunal, contending that the property had been let to a Mrs Banyure between 2002 and 2007 and that she as resident tenant, and not he as owner, was liable to the council tax. The tribunal, after hearing evidence from the applicant, amongst others, and reading documents which included Mrs Banyure's tenancy agreement, found that she had been resident at the property from 1 September 2002 to 30 August 2003 but not thereafter; that is to say, not in the period 31 August 2003 to 17 January 2008. It also found that there was no evidence that anyone else was residing at the property during that period, so that the applicant, as owner, was the person liable under Section 6 for the council tax during that period.

The applicant then appealed to the High Court, to which an appeal lies on a point of law pursuant to regulation 51 of the Valuation and Community Charge Regulations 1989. Cox J dismissed that appeal; her judgment is neutral citation number [2010] EWHC 152 (Admin). She dealt with matters very clearly, setting out the factual background and the legal framework, then dealing at paragraphs 16 to 27 with the applicant's various submissions and the reasons why she rejected them. I will not repeat her analysis.

In his grounds of appeal to this court the applicant has advanced submissions under the headings of "unaddressed issues" and "disputed issues". In his written skeleton argument for today's hearing he has included a number of additional matters that have arisen from applications made, or purported to be made, since the application for permission to appeal was first lodged with this court.

One of those is an application that the tribunal should state a case for the opinion of this court. The applicant has indicated today that that application is withdrawn. That is very sensible of him; it was a misconceived application.

Then there is an application under CPR Part 18 for an order that the council provide further information and an application for an order for specific disclosure by the council. Those proceedings have no part to play in the matter before me, firstly because the only question that can be raised on an appeal to the High Court, and therefore to this court, is whether the tribunal erred in law in the decision it made (for which further information and disclosure should not be needed); secondly, because these matters were not, so far as I can see, raised before Cox J; and thirdly because in any event this court would not entertain applications for further orders unless and until permission to appeal were granted and it was considered that further orders were necessary for the proper conduct of the appeal itself.

So I return to the core question of whether permission to appeal should be granted for an appeal from the order of Cox J. As to that, the applicant's first and, in my view, insuperable obstacle is that this would be a second appeal within the meaning of the rules (CPR 52.13); permission will not be granted unless the court considers that the appeal would raise an important point of principle or practice or that there is some other compelling reason for the Court of Appeal to hear it. Sullivan LJ, when refusing permission to appeal on the papers, took the view that those criteria were not met. So do I; notwithstanding the submissions made by the applicant and his attempt to persuade me that his submissions raise important points.

In any event, again in agreement with Sullivan LJ, I take the view that the case would not merit the grant of permission even if the ordinary and less restrictive first appeal criteria applied.

The tribunal's findings of fact are not open to challenge on an appeal on a point of law unless it can be shown that they were findings not reasonably open to the tribunal on the evidence before it. The applicant plainly now understands that point. The assessment of the witnesses and the other evidence was a matter for the tribunal. Although the applicant has made various points on the evidence in his written material, I am satisfied that the tribunal's assessment of that evidence and the conclusions reached upon it could not be said to have been unreasonable.

There is an argument that the tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction by dealing with liability up to 17 January 2008 whereas the council's bills for council tax ran only up to 1 November 2007. In my view, there is nothing in that point. The tribunal's decision makes clear that it was dealing only with the applicant's appeal against the council's decision that he was the person liable to council tax in respect of the property. The tribunal states that the period for which the council decided he was liable was 1 August 2002 to 17 January 2008. There is nothing to show that that was wrong; but, even if it was wrong, the outcome of the appeal was a finding that the applicant was not liable for the first part of that period but that otherwise the appeal against the original decision, whatever period that decision extended to, was dismissed. The tribunal's decision on the appeal was not capable of extending, and did not purport to extend, the period for which the council had determined that the applicant was liable to council tax. If he is right that the council's determination extended only to 1 November 2007, the dismissal of his appeal did not affect that end date. To that extent, perhaps, I am able to give him some comfort by this judgment.

He has other arguments, for example about the concept of residence and ownership in Section 6 of the 1992 Act, as well as an argument to the effect that he was exempt as a student. It is still not clear to me that these points were advanced before the tribunal, but in any event I am satisfied that on the material before me there is no force to any of them.

I should mention one point in particular. The tribunal referred to Mrs Banyure as resident and falling within Section 6(a). That must mean Section 6(2)(a), which applies to a resident freeholder. It was never suggested before the tribunal that Mrs Banyure was a freeholder owner, and the argument now advanced, as I understood it, that she falls to be treated as such by virtue of the definition in regulation 6(5), is to my mind untenable. It is clear to me that the tribunal's finding of fact that Mrs Banyure was resident as a tenant brings her within 6(2)(b) or (c), not (a). There was in that respect an error in the tribunal's decision but it was of no materiality. The essential part of the reasoning was that Mrs Banyure was resident and therefore liable until August 2003, and that no one was resident at the property thereafter, which is why liability for the rest of the period fell on the applicant as owner.

No useful purpose will be served by a more detailed examination of any of the applicant's submissions. I dealt with them briefly in order to explain to him that, in my view, this case would not get permission to appeal even if it were a first appeal. As it is, however, it is a second appeal and, as I have said, the criteria for a second appeal are not met. That is a sufficient reason why permission cannot be granted. So the application before me must be refused.