Crown Copyright©

Wednesday, 7th May 2003

J U D G M E N T

1. LORD JUSTICE JUDGE: I shall ask Dyson LJ to give the first judgment.

2. LORD JUSTICE DYSON: This is a homeless housing case. The appeal is concerned with the adequacy of the reasons given by the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea (“the Council”) in its letter dated 19th July 2002 on a review of its earlier decision that the appellant was intentionally homeless. There is also an issue as to whether Her Honour Judge Knowles (from whose decision the appellant appeals) was right to admit in evidence a statement by Mr Waddington, the Council's Homelessness and Advice Manager, which purported to explain and amplify the letter of 19th July.

3. Before proceeding further, I ought to refer to the essential statutory provisions of the Housing Act 1996 (“the Act”). Section 184(1) provides that:

“If the local housing authority have reason to believe that an applicant may be homeless ..., they shall make such inquiries as are necessary to satisfy themselves - (a) whether he is eligible for assistance, and (b) if so, whether any duty, and if so what duty, is owed to him under the following provisions of this Part.”

4. Subsection (2) provides:

“On completing their inquiries the authority shall notify the applicant of their decision and, so far as any issue is decided against his interests, inform him of the reasons for their decision.”

5. Section 191(1) provides:

“A person becomes homeless intentionally if he deliberately does or fails to do anything in consequence of which he ceases to occupy accommodation which is available for his occupation and which it would have been reasonable for him to continue to occupy.”

6. Section 193 requires an authority to secure that accommodation is available for occupation by an applicant if they are satisfied that he is homeless, eligible for assistance and has a priority need and are not satisfied that he became homeless intentionally.

7. Section 202(1)(b) provides that an applicant has the right to request a review of any decision of an authority as to what duty (if any) is owed to him under sections 190 to 193.

8. Section 203(3) provides:

“The authority ... concerned shall notify the applicant of the decision on the review.”

9. Section 203(4) provides:

“If the decision is - (a) to confirm the original decision on any issue against the interests of the applicant ... they shall notify him of the reasons for the decision.”

10. Finally section 204(1):

“If an applicant who has requested a review under section 202-(a) is dissatisfied with the decision on the review ... he may appeal to the county court on any point of law arising from the decision.”

The facts

11. On 30th July 1999 the appellant entered into an assured shorthold tenancy agreement with a Mr and Mrs Dyczkowski in respect of Flat C, 27 Redcliffe Gardens, London SW10. The tenancy agreement was in his name, although at all times he lived there with his longstanding partner, Ms Blackmore, and their two children. According to the landlords, the appellant made regular payments for a few months, but started to fall into arrears in December 1999, and ceased paying rent altogether in April 2000. Possession proceedings were commenced. These culminated in an order for possession, and the eviction of the appellant and his family in May 2001. On 19th June 2001, Ms Blackmore on behalf of the appellant and herself applied to the Council for assistance to homeless persons.

12. On 10th October, the Council decided that it was not satisfied that they were homeless or threatened with homelessness because they had failed to provide sufficient information. A review of this decision was requested. On 24th October, the Council upheld its original decision but also decided that it would entertain a further application. On 23rd November, the applicant made another application on behalf of Ms Blackmore and himself. On 4th January 2002, the Council once again decided that it was not satisfied that they were homeless or threatened with homelessness, since there was no proof that rent was being paid. Once again, they requested a review. On 6th February, Mr Waddington wrote to the appellant and Ms Blackmore saying that he had decided that they were eligible for assistance, homeless and had a priority need, but that they were homeless intentionally, because they had not paid the rent and had failed to claim housing benefit.

13. The appellant appealed against this decision to the County Court under section 204 of the Act on the grounds that there had been a procedural irregularity in that there had been no offer of an interview between the date of the decision under section 184 and the review decision. At paragraph 7 of his statement in support of the appeal, the appellant said that he disputed the Council's contention that he had made himself intentionally homeless. He referred to a report dated 8th May 2002 by Dr Browne, a consultant psychiatrist, and stated that he did not believe that he had made himself intentionally homeless:

“Because of my severely disturbed mental state I would not have been capable of making such a decision”.

14. The report was exhibited to the statement. In his opening paragraph, Dr Browne said this:

“I report on Nassim Hijazi whom I examined on the 29/4/02 at the request of his solicitors, Messrs Oliver Fisher, Young Street, London W8 5EH. The purpose of my examination was to assess his mental state, make a diagnosis and give an opinion as to whether or not his mental state was such as to render him a vulnerable person and therefore to merit special consideration for housing with his local council.”

15. Dr Browne then summarised the appellant's psychiatric, personal and medical history, noting that he understood that the appellant's mental state had been deteriorating for three and a half years. He referred to a report by Dr Collinge dated 27th February 2000 which stated that the appellant was suffering from a depressive condition. He also referred to a report by Dr Kennedy dated 7th January 2002 which stated that the appellant was suffering from psychiatric problems with dementia. Dr Browne then summarised his conclusions based on his examination of the appellant to the effect that he did not show any evidence of thought disorder or any aberration in his perceptual processes: his intelligence was in the average range. I need to set out the concluding part of the report in full:

“Opinion

My opinion is to some extent based on his partner's account and also on the reports of Dr Tara Collinge and Dr Angus Kennedy. It would appear that he has been suffering from a psychiatric condition, the main features of which are a depressive condition and for which he has been treated with antidepressants including Venlafaxine and Amitriptyline plus a night sedative as outlined above. His condition appeared to merit his being encouraged to attend a day centre at the Chelsea & Westminster Hospital over a considerable period.

According to his partner's account he has 'significant problems with memory and problems with coping with daily life, i.e. going to the toilet, cooking some meals and engaging in conversation.'

Conclusion

My conclusion is that this man is suffering from a depressive condition with possible degenerative condition of the brain. This would in my opinion merit his being designated as a vulnerable person and therefore in need of special consideration for housing,

Yours faithfully.”

16. Then, beneath his signature, appears an addendum in these terms:

“I have considered the question as to whether he may have made himself homeless intentionally and in my opinion because of his severely disturbed mental state he would have been incapable of making such a decision.”

17. On 24th May, the Council decided to withdraw its decision of 6th February and to conduct a further review. The result of this further review was Mr Waddington's letter to the appellant and Ms Blackmore of 19th July 2002.

The decision letter of 19th July 2002

18. Having rehearsed some of the relevant history, Mr Waddington concluded in his letter that, by reason of the non-payment of rent and the failure to claim housing benefit, the appellant had become intentionally homeless. He then turned to the issues raised by the appellant's solicitors as to whether the appellant had the ability to manage his affairs, and he said this:

“In their application to appeal Oliver Fisher & Co refer to the fact that Mr Hijazi suffers from some neurological deficits which would impair his insight and ability to manage his affairs. I have considered Dr Ali's medical report of 29 June 2001, and note that Mr Hijazi had the following medical conditions in June 2001:

1. type II diabetes mellitus.

2. psychiatric illness with episodes of recent memory loss and may become disorientated in unfamiliar places.

3. endogenous depression.

4. severe back pain with muscle spasm.

Dr Ali states that a sudden change in Mr Hijazi's accommodation profoundly disturbed him mentally and physically which will go against the management of his existing medical condition. Now he is more depressed.

I have also considered Dr Kennedy's report of 13 June 2002, which states that Mr Hijazi has had a four year history of cognitive decline.

Dr Ali's report was written after Mr Hijazi became homeless and I accept that the effect of him becoming homeless caused a deterioration in his medical condition. However, when making a decision of intentionality I must consider Mr Hijazi's medical condition when he was living at Flat C, 27 Redcliffe Gardens, from April 2000, when he stopped paying the rent. When I interviewed Mr Hijazi on 15 January 2002, he seemed to understand the questions I asked him and provided clear responses. He seemed very aware that he had been evicted for rent arrears, he understood he had a responsibility to pay rent and was aware that he and Ms Blackmore were entitled to claim benefits, he also understood that if he applied he would have been advised that he would not have been eligible for housing benefits due to his status in the UK. I also note that prior to April 2002, Mr Hijazi paid his rent by receiving sums of money over £2000 in cash and was capable of ensuring that the landlord received the rent payments. This is a good demonstration that Mr Hijazi was capable of managing his affairs at the period just before April 2000. I also note that Mr Hijazi had the support of Ms Blackmore the whole period of time he lived at Flat C, 27 Redcliffe Gardens.

Having considered all the medical information available to me, Mr Hijazi's actions around the April 2000 and the information provided by Mr Hijazi at our interviews of 15 January 2002 and 25 June 2002 and the fact that Mr Hijazi had the support of his wife and in my view a supportive landlord, I am of the opinion that he was capable of managing his affairs and was fully aware of the consequences of not paying the rent.”

The appeal to the County Court

19. The appellant appealed to the County Court. The Notice of Appeal contained two grounds of appeal. The first was that the review did not take into account and/or gave no reason for disagreeing with the opinion expressed by Dr Browne that “the appellant would have been incapable of making a decision so as to make himself intentionally homeless”.

20. In response to the appeal, Mr Waddington made a statement dated 8th November 2002. He said this:

21. “1. I am employed by the respondent (RBKC”) as their homelessness and advice manager. My duties include making determinations under s.202 Housing Act 1986 when applicants for housing request reviews of decisions made by RBKC on their applications. I am duly authorised by RBKC to make this statement explaining further my reasons for the decision I made on 18.7.02 that the appellant was intentionally homeless.

22. 2. This statement is intended simply to clarify my decision making process in the light of the matters raised in the appellant's notice.

23. 3.I can confirm that the report of Dr Browne dated 8.5.02 was available to me. It was within the papers I read before making a decision on the review. It was part of a body of medical evidence which suggested that the appellant's mental health was deteriorating. I accepted that was the position. However, I was concerned to deal with the appellant's awareness and state of mind at the date at which the relevant acts took place, being the failure of the appellant or Mrs Blackmore to pay the rent which was due on Flat C, 27 Redcliffe Gardens, London ('the property') from April 2000. I therefore considered that the report of Dr Browne made in May 2002 and read as a whole did not take the medical evidence significantly further. Dr Browne did not purport to deal with the appellant's state of mind in or around April 2000.

24. 4.I already had the benefit of medical evidence from Dr Ali and Dr Kennedy to which I refer in the review decision letter as well as further medical information from Dr Tara Collinge (letters of 20.7.01, 8.2.02) and Dr Iqbal (for example letters of 7.9.00 and 19.11.01). I considered all of the medical evidence available to me.

25. 5.As to the second ground raised by the appellant I would simply refer to the review decision letter. It appeared to me that the appellant and Mrs Blackmore were living as an ordinary couple and that the issue of rent arrears and ways of dealing with their rent arrears would have been discussed between them. That that was the position is evident from the paragraphs starting towards the bottom of the second page of the review decision letter which deal with the case the appellant and Mrs Blackmore presented to RBKC in support of their request for a review.”

26. At the hearing of the appeal before the judge the appellant sought to rely on a further ground of appeal, namely that the Council had failed to carry out any enquiries as to the basis for Dr Browne's opinion expressed in the addendum to his report.

The judgment of Her Honour Judge Knowles

27. The first issue addressed by the judge was whether she should admit the statement of Mr Waddington in evidence. Mr Harrop-Griffiths opposed its admission on the grounds that the statement went further than a mere elucidation of the letter of 19th July 2002, and that it was therefore objectionable in the light of the guidance given in cases such as R v Westminster City Council ex parte Ermakov [1996] 2 All ER 302 and R v London Borough of Croydon ex parte Graham [1993] 26 HLR 286. The judge decided to admit the statement. At page 14 of her judgment, she said:

“Therefore, it is not, in my view, a case, in this instant matter, of there being inadequate reasons and therefore the local authority is trying to fill the gap with other reasons, particularly when there is obvious reference to medical evidence. There is a reference to Dr Ali's medical report of 29th June 2001. That report is also before me today and insofar as that report is concerned that refers, in any event, to the fact that the Appellant had psychiatric illness with episodes of recent memory loss and may become disorientated at unfamiliar places, and it refers to the [endogenous] depression, and it also makes it quite clear that insofar as the appellant is concerned that the Appellant had become worse, if I may paraphrase it in that way, by virtue of the eviction from his accommodation. It says:

'Sudden changes in the accommodation profoundly disturbed him mentally.'

So that on any basis that was a letter -- because it was specifically referred to -- that was within the forefront of Mr Waddington's mind. It is also the case, because it says so in words of one syllable, that the author had in front of him the report of Dr Kennedy of 13th June 2002. Although it is stated to be a report I think it is more in the nature of a letter simply setting out the position of the Appellant upon his discharge from hospital and what, again, is particularly significant is that that letter refers to Mr Hijazi having a four year history of cognitive decline. Not only does it say that in the letter, but it is also stated in the review letter. That is what is important and, of course, as I say, post-dates in any event the letter or report of Dr Brown.

It seems to me, therefore, that on any appreciation the fact that the Appellant had these cognitive problems [was] certainly at the forefront of the author's mind because he refers to those particular matters. He also actually sets out an extract from the letter of Dr Ali within the review letter so that those are matters that I can only but conclude were at the forefront of his mind. It is not, therefore, in my view, a question of the local authority seeking to stop up gaps in their decision letter by now introducing further evidence.

For the sake of clarity and so that there should be no mistake about what I am saying, had there been no reference to those other matters, then I would have found it much more difficult at this stage to allow the introduction of that witness statement of Mr Waddington. However, I am persuaded that because of the reasons that I have just given that this is a case of the local authority 'elucidating' and that the matter of the report, although not present within the letter of the 19th July, does not drive me to a conclusion that Mr Waddington's additional statement should not be admitted.”

28. The judge then turned to the question of whether, in the light of the statement of Mr Waddington, the decision of 19th July was unlawful for want of reasons and/or because he had failed to take into account the report of Dr Browne. She concluded that, although it would have been preferable if in his letter of 19th July Mr Waddington had referred to the report of Dr Browne, his failure to do so was not fatal because he did refer in his letter to other medical evidence which “he had obviously considered at some length”. She continued at page 18:

“Insofar as the omission is concerned, therefore, I have come to the conclusion and particularly having regard also to the position, if I may say so, of Mrs Blackmore in this matter, a position which has only been touched upon very briefly, but importantly again, Mr Beglan has referred me to the case of Nottingham ex parte Caine and the fact that there one of the principles of law which was summarised was that:

'The Respondent's committee were entitled to look at the family as a whole and to infer that the applicant was aware that her partner was withholding rent. The committee were entitled to infer that the couple would have discussed the matter. Even in the absence of any direct evidence that they had done so, the committee could not be criticised for proceeding on the basis that what was then under consideration was a normal family and a normal couple.'

So it is that the local authority in the instant case have considered the position of Mrs Blackmore and that, again, has played a rather full part in their decision.

For these reasons, therefore, I am afraid I must reject the appeal under ground one.”

29. As regards the further ground of appeal, having repeated her point that Mr Waddington had already considered other medical evidence, the judge said at page 20:

“...it is difficult to know what, if anything, would have been gained even had the local authority chosen to make further enquiries. What I shall therefore say about it is that I do, therefore, take into account the authority of R v Royal Borough of Kensington & Chelsea ex parte Bayani and what is held there. It says very simply:

'The duty to make enquiries is to make such inquiries as are necessary to satisfy the authority; as it is the authority which has to be satisfied; the scope and scale of the enquiry is, primarily, at least a matter for them; however, the inquiries must be those which are 'necessary' to enable the authority make a decision.'

It seems to me that by that stage the local authority had a wealth of medical reports and, as I say, it is hard for me to know how much further assistance would have been gained by any further enquiries being made.

I therefore find that there is no substance in the second ground of appeal and the appeal will therefore be rejected on both grounds.”

The issues arising on this appeal

30. On behalf of the appellant, Mr Harrop-Griffiths submits that the judge should have allowed the appeal on the grounds that (a) the statement of Mr Waddington should not have been admitted in evidence, since it went further than a mere elucidation of the reasons given in the letter of 19th July; (b) the reasons given by Mr Waddington in the letter for concluding that the appellant was capable of managing his affairs (and therefore intentionally homeless) were inadequate, since he did not explain in the letter why he rejected the opinion of Dr Browne; alternatively (c) the reasoning in Mr Waddington's statement for concluding that Dr Browne's opinion had no bearing on the appellant's state of mind in April 2000 was inadequate; and (d) the judge should have acceded to the further ground of appeal advanced below that the decision of 19th July was flawed because it was taken by the Council without making any enquiries in response to Dr Browne's opinion. I shall take these issues in turn.

Should the statements of Mr Waddington have been admitted?

31. There has been a good deal of authority on the question of whether, and in what circumstances, a decision-maker may, in the context of a legal challenge to a decision, supplement the reasons he gave for his decision at the time it was made. But in my judgment, for the purposes of this appeal, it is not necessary to travel beyond the decision of this court in Ermakov, where, in what has come to be regarded as a classic exposition of the relevant law, Hutchison LJ reviewed the authorities comprehensively in the context of a homeless housing appeal. The essential part of his judgment for present purposes appears in the passage starting at page 315H:

“(2) The court can and, in appropriate cases, should admit evidence to elucidate or, exceptionally, correct or add to the reasons; but should, consistently with Steyn LJ's observations in Ex p Graham, be very cautious about doing so. I have in mind cases where, for example, an error has been made in transcription or expression, or a word or words inadvertently omitted, or where the language used may be in some way lacking in clarity. These examples are not intended to be exhaustive, but rather to reflect my view that the function of such evidence should generally be elucidation not fundamental alteration, confirmation not contradiction. Certainly there seems to me to be no warrant for receiving and relying on as validating the decision evidence -- as in this case -- which indicates that the real reasons were wholly different from the stated reasons. It is not in my view permissible to say, merely because the applicant does not feel able to challenge the bona fides of the decision-maker's explanation as to the real reasons, that the applicant is therefore not prejudiced and the evidence as to the real reasons can be relied upon. This is because, first, I do not accept that it is necessarily the case that in that situation he is not prejudiced; and, secondly, because, in this class of case, I do not consider that it is necessary for the applicant to show prejudice before he can obtain relief. Section 64 requires a decision and at the same time reasons; and if no reasons (which is the reality of a case such as the present) or wholly deficient reasons are given, he is prima facie entitled to have the decision quashed as unlawful.

(3) There are, I consider, good policy reasons why this should be so. The cases emphasise that the purpose of reasons is to inform the parties why they have won or lost and enable them to assess whether they have any ground for challenging an adverse decision. To permit wholesale amendment or reversal of the stated reasons is inimical to this purpose. Moreover, not only does it encourage a sloppy approach by the decision-maker, but it gives rise to potential practical difficulties. In the present case it was not, but in many cases it might be, suggested that the alleged true reasons were in fact second thoughts designed to remedy an otherwise fatal error exposed by the judicial review proceedings. That would lead to applications to cross-examine and possibly for further discovery, both of which are, while permissible in judicial review proceedings, generally regarded as inappropriate. Hearing would be made longer and more expensive.”

32. The statement of Mr Waddington purported to show that (a) he had taken Dr Browne's report into account; and (b) he considered that the report did not take the medical evidence significantly further, since it did not purport to deal with the appellant's state of mind in or around April 2000. As regards (a), I see nothing objectionable in a decision-maker making a subsequent statement in which he identifies the material that he took into account in the course of the decision-making process. Where this occurs, he is not giving or supplementing the reasons for his decision: he is merely stating what material he took into account in reaching the decision. Even if this ought properly to be characterised as supplementing the reasons for the decision, it is at most an elucidation of those reasons and is not, in my view, objectionable. In the course of argument, Mr Harrop-Griffiths accepted that the statement could properly have been admitted by the judge to show that Mr Waddington had considered and taken Dr Browne's report into account.

33. As regards (b), in his letter of 19th July, Mr Waddington stated carefully why he considered that the appellant was capable of managing his affairs. He said that the appellant had had an understanding and awareness of his responsibility to pay rent and his entitlement to claim housing benefit, and that he had the support of Ms Blackmore during the whole of the time he lived in the flat. He also referred to the fact that the appellant was suffering from a number of medical conditions in June 2001, including “endogenous depression”, and that Dr Ali had stated in his report of 29th June 2001 that, as a result of his eviction, the appellant had become more depressed. Mr Waddington said that he accepted that the effect of his becoming homeless was that the appellant's medical condition had deteriorated, but that he had to consider the appellant's medical condition between April 2000 (when he stopped paying rent) and May 2001 when he was evicted. His conclusion that the appellant was capable of managing his affairs during this period was based on the fact that (i) the appellant had the requisite understanding and awareness of his responsibility to pay rent; (ii) his mental condition had not prevented him from paying the rent in a period shortly before April 2000; and (iii) at all times he had the support of Ms Blackmore, who was able to assist him in the managing of his affairs.

34. It is true that it was the appellant's depressive condition which Dr Browne was referring to in his addendum as the “severely disturbed mental state” which would have made him incapable of making a decision to become intentionally homeless. It is also true that Mr Waddington did not in his letter deal explicitly with the question of whether the appellant was incapable of managing his affairs by reason of this depressive condition. But in my view, he did deal with it implicitly. He recognised that the appellant was suffering from a depressive illness which had become worse in June 2001 as a result of the eviction. But, for the reasons that he gave, he was satisfied that the appellant's depression in the period before June 2001 was not so serious that it rendered him incapable of managing his affairs. He also took into account, as he was entitled to do, the impression he had formed of the appellant at interview.

35. In my judgment, the letter contained a clear and sufficient statement of his reasons for concluding that the appellant was capable of managing his affairs during the relevant period, and was not prevented from doing so by any of the medical conditions from which he was suffering.

36. Apart from stating that Dr Browne's report had been taken into account, was Mr Waddington's statement more than merely elucidatory of the reasons given in his letter? There undoubtedly was a gap in the letter. It should have referred to Dr Browne's report, and should have stated why the opinion contained in the addendum was rejected. But in my view, the judge was entitled to conclude that the admission of the statement to explain why Dr Browne's report was rejected did not infringe the principles enunciated in Ermakov. The essence of the reasoning in the letter in relation to the effect of the appellant's depressive condition was that during the material time -- that is between April 2000 and May 2001 -- it was not such as to render him incapable of managing his affairs. The addendum to the report asserted that the appellant's depression was such that he would have been incapable of making himself intentionally homeless.

37. A number of points can be made about that assertion. First, it is clear that the expressed purpose of Dr Browne's report was to advise on the appellant's then current mental state, in particular on the question whether the appellant was currently a vulnerable person who merited special consideration for housing. The expressed purpose of the report was not to advise on whether the appellant's mental condition during the period April 2000 to May 2001 was such that he was or was not capable of managing his affairs at that time. Secondly, it is strange, to say the least, that the assertion appeared in the addendum and was not heralded in the body of the report. The references to the deterioration over the previous three and a half years and to the report of Dr Collinge were no more than part of the history which one would routinely expect to find in a medical report on a patient's current condition. Thirdly, the addendum was a mere assertion, unsupported by any reasons. In particular, Dr Browne did not discuss the significance of Dr Ali's statement that the eviction disturbed the appellant “profoundly” and exacerbated the depression, which prompted the questions how depressed was he before the eviction, and what impact did that degree of depression have on his ability to manage his affairs after that time? Fourthly, there was no indication that Dr Browne had conducted any investigation of the appellant's ability to manage his affairs during the relevant period, of the kind that Mr Waddington carried out. In these circumstances, Mr Waddington was entitled to take the view that Dr Browne's report did not contain any significant material that he had not referred to in his letter. In other words, what he said in his witness statement was no more than an elucidation of his letter, and not something new in any real sense.

38. For these reasons, I would hold the judge was entitled to admit the statement of Mr Waddington.

The adequacy of the reasons in the letter of 19th July 2002 without regard to Mr Waddington's statement

39. In view of my conclusion on the issue of the admissibility of Mr Waddington's statement, this issue does not arise.

The reasoning in Mr Waddington's statement

40. Mr Harrop-Griffiths submits that inadequate reasons were given in Mr Waddington's statement for concluding that Dr Browne's report did not contain any significant new material. He submits that Mr Waddington failed to take into account that (i) the opinion expressed in Dr Browne's addendum was retrospective, and that on a reasonable interpretation of his report, Dr Browne was referring to the appellant's mental state in the period before the eviction; and (ii) the report referred to the deterioration over a three and a half year period as well as to the report of Dr Collinge dated 27th February 2000.

41. In my judgment, Mr Waddington was entitled to conclude that Dr Browne was not referring to the appellant's mental state in the period April 2000 to May 2001. There is nothing to indicate that he was specifically referring to that period. I have already made the point that the mere reference to earlier reports in the part of Dr Browne's report which dealt with the appellant's mental history did not indicate that in his addendum Dr Browne was referring to the relevant period. Reading the report as a whole, Mr Waddington was entitled to take the view that Dr Browne did not have the material to express an opinion on whether the appellant had the capacity to manage his affairs during the relevant period, and did not in fact do so. It is clear that Mr Waddington attached some importance to the fact that the appellant became substantially more depressed as a result of the eviction. In determining the appellant's mental state in the period before the eviction, Mr Waddington considered, rightly, that this deterioration had to be left out of account. He was entitled to take the view that there was nothing in Dr Browne's report to indicate that Dr Browne either had the material to enable him to disregard this deterioration, or that he did in fact disregard it. No doubt Mr Waddington could have given rather fuller reasons for concluding that the report of Dr Browne did not add anything significant to the material on the appellant's capacity to manage his affairs during the relevant period. But the essential reasoning is to be found in his statement, and in my view it is adequate.

The further ground of appeal

42. Mr Harrop-Griffiths' final submission is that at the very least it was not clear whether Dr Browne was expressing an opinion as to the appellant's mental state before the eviction. In these circumstances, a reasonable authority would have considered it necessary at least to clarify the point with Dr Browne. The Council's failure to do so renders the decision of 19th July unlawful.

43. I disagree. Mr Waddington had already considered a number of medical reports made at various times. He had explained fully and carefully in his letter of 19th July 2002 why he had decided that the appellant did have the capacity to manage his affairs during the relevant period. He was entitled reasonably to conclude that, for the reasons that I have already given, there was nothing in Dr Browne's report which required him to seek clarification of its contents in order to see whether Dr Browne might have something to say which might cast doubt on the clear conclusions that he (Mr Waddington) had reached. Mr Harrop-Griffiths accepts that, in order to sustain this ground of appeal, he needs to show that no reasonable local housing authority, if placed in the position in which Mr Waddington was placed upon receipt of Dr Browne's report, could have done other than seek clarification of the addendum. In my judgment, Mr Waddington was entitled to act as he did.

Conclusion

44. For the reasons that I have given, I consider that this appeal should be dismissed.

45. LORD JUSTICE JUDGE: I agree. I cannot usefully add anything to the judgment of my Lord.

Order: Appeal dismissed with costs. Public funding assessment of the appellant's costs.