The Attorney General v Dr Christian Mallon

This is an application by the Attorney General for a restriction of proceedings order (“RPO”) against Dr Christian Mallon pursuant to section 33 of the Employment Tribunals Act 1996.

Section 33 provides:

33

Restriction of vexatious proceedings.

(1)

If, on an application made by the Attorney General (…) under this section, the Appeal Tribunal is satisfied that a person has habitually and persistently and without any reasonable ground—

(a)

instituted vexatious proceedings, whether (…) in an employment tribunal or before the Appeal Tribunal, and whether against the same person or against different persons, or

(b)

made vexatious applications in any proceedings, whether (…) in an employment tribunal or before the Appeal Tribunal,

the Appeal Tribunal may, after hearing the person or giving him an opportunity of being heard, make a restriction of proceedings order.

(2)

A “restriction of proceedings order” is an order that—

(a)

no proceedings shall without the leave of the Appeal Tribunal be instituted before the Certification Officer, in any employment tribunal or before the Appeal Tribunal by the person against whom the order is made,

(b)

any proceedings instituted by him before the Certification Officer, in any employment tribunal or before the Appeal Tribunal before the making of the order shall not be continued by him without the leave of the Appeal Tribunal, and

(c)

no application (other than one for leave under this section) is to be made by him in any proceedings before the Certification Officer, in any employment tribunal or before the Appeal Tribunal without the leave of the Appeal Tribunal.

(3)

A restriction of proceedings order may provide that it is to cease to have effect at the end of a specified period, but otherwise it remains in force indefinitely.

(4)

Leave for the institution or continuance of, or for the making of an application in, any proceedings before the Certification Officer, in an employment tribunal or before the Appeal Tribunal by a person who is the subject of a restriction of proceedings order shall not be given unless the Appeal Tribunal is satisfied—

(a)

that the proceedings or application are not an abuse of the process, and

(b)

that there are reasonable grounds for the proceedings or application.

(5)

A copy of a restriction of proceedings order shall be published in the London Gazette and the Edinburgh Gazette.”

In summary, therefore, a section 33 restriction of proceedings order means that any existing proceedings or any future proceedings, or any existing or future applications, during the currency of the RPO, are subject to an initial review to check that they are not an abuse of process and that there are reasonable grounds for them. If the application or proceedings pass that check, they will be allowed to proceed. If they do not, they will not be allowed to proceed. It can aptly be described as “a filter and not a barrier”, to adopt the phrase of Simler LJ in Williamson v Bishop of London[2023] 1 WLR 2472, at para 37, which itself derived from the judgment of Lord Bingham of Cornhill LCJ in AG v Barker[2000] 1 FLR 759 at para 2.

An RPO will only be imposed on a person who has “habitually and without any reasonable ground” instituted “vexatious proceedings”. It is discretionary (the word in section 33(1) being “may”).

Dr Mallon holds a BSc in chemistry, an MSc in Analytical Science, a PhD in Chemical Engineering, and an Executive MBA.

He has filed evidence that he suffers from dyspraxia, autism, and ADHD. He also suffers from Crohn’s disease and some other conditions.

Dr Mallon has made numerous job applications and then brought Employment Tribunal claims alleging discrimination.

Dr Mallon has lost count of the number of proceedings he has launched in the Employment Tribunal and the Attorney General does not claim to have tracked down all of them. At one point, Dr Mallon suggested that he had made hundreds of claims, but he now thinks the number is perhaps 60 or 70. That is still a lot, of course.

Dr Mallon uses AI (artificial intelligence) to decide whether his proposed claims have merit. However, almost all of them have been unsuccessful.

The most important exception is a case he brought against Aecom Ltd which was initially struck out by an Employment Tribunal on 14 May 2019. It was reinstated by the Employment Appeal Tribunal on 25 February 2021 and remitted to a differently constituted Employment Tribunal. On 5 March 2022, the complaint of a failure to make reasonable adjustments was upheld by that Employment Tribunal. Aecom Ltd (unlike, it seems, all the other respondents to his various claims) was a former employer of Dr Mallon’s, but his claim concerned an application for a different role at a date subsequent to his dismissal from his previous role there. He was awarded £2,000 for injury to feelings and £700 interest. No remedy was awarded for financial loss. He appealed against the injury to feelings award. That appeal failed to pass the Employment Appeal Tribunal sift (under rule 3(7) of the Employment Appeal Tribunal Rules 1993) on 21 June 2023 but he successfully pursued it under rule 3(10) and the appeal was allowed to proceed on 10 January 2024. Meanwhile, Aecom Ltd had appealed the liability judgment, and was in part successful before the Employment Appeal Tribunal on 10 August 2023, which remitted one question back to the Employment Tribunal for reconsideration. Dr Mallon’s pending appeal was stayed in the meantime, by an order made on 20 December 2024.

It would not, therefore, be right to say that Dr Mallon has never made a meritorious claim. The proceedings against Aecom Ltd, although not finally concluded, have been to some extent successful. But in no other case (except by settlement) has he received a financial award. This is a striking fact, given the large number of claims he has issued.

The other cases have come to nothing, sometimes because he launched and then withdrew them; sometimes because they were dismissed on the merits; sometimes because they were so weak as to require payment of a deposit before they would be allowed to proceed (and Dr Mallon says that his policy, on advice, is never to pay a deposit in those cases); and sometimes because they were brought out of time and in circumstances where it was not just and equitable to extend the time, so that there was no jurisdiction to hear them. In a number of cases, his conduct has been found to justify the making of a costs award against him, because of specifically identified unreasonable if not vexatious conduct.

I have been provided with an 11-page Agreed Chronology of judgments and decisions, and some other events (such as withdrawals of claims by Dr Mallon). The Agreed Chronology summarises outcomes in claims brought by Dr Mallon against many different respondents in Employment Tribunals all over the United Kingdom, in England, Scotland and Northern Ireland. Most of the judgments and decisions summarised in the Agreed Chronology are in the Employment Tribunal, with only a few in the Employment Appeal Tribunal. The Agreed Chronology covers a period between 2017 and 12 October 2025, making it up to date at the hearing before me on 28 October 2025. All the judgments, decisions and other events in the Agreed Chronology were cross referenced to documents in the bundles, such as decisions and written reasons from Employment Tribunals, which I was able to read for myself. The relevant information from the Agreed Chronology is reproduced in the Annex to this judgment.

I must decide whether Dr Mallon has (in the words of section 33)

“habitually and persistently and without any reasonable ground – (a) instituted vexatious proceedings (…) or (b) made vexatious applications (…)”.

I will not deal expressly with all the cases in the Annex, although I have considered all of them. A few examples will suffice.

In Mallon v Department of Agriculture, Environment and Business Affairshis discrimination claims based upon the respondent’s failure to shortlist him for a post were dismissed by the Employment Tribunal after a full merits hearing in March 2017. The Employment Tribunal decision (para 23) noted that Dr Mallon agreed that his application form did not meet the eligibility criteria and that “the panel’s decision not to short-list on the information before them could not be criticised”. Dr Mallon also “accepted that he would not have been appointed to the post and the height of his case therefore was that he had lost the opportunity to be short-listed and interviewed for the post” (para 23). Dr Mallon’s evidence of fact lacked credibility and was not accepted (paras 59-62). His claims of direct discrimination on the grounds of disability and his claim based upon a failure to make reasonable adjustments were rejected. There was also “nothing in the evidence” to support his religious discrimination claim (para 65).

Dr Mallon’s claims in Mallon v DBA Notts Ltdwere all struck out on 22 March 2019 because they had “no reasonable prospects of success”. This was said to be “obvious and plain” (para 40). Full reasoning for these conclusions was provided in a 12-page decision.

In Mallon v Jonathan Lee Recruitment Ltd,Dr Mallon was ordered on 25 March 2019 to pay respondent’s costs of £3,995. The written Reasons noted that he had applied for “approximately 94 roles” with the respondent. He asked for reasonable adjustments but, when asked to confirm the nature of his disability and any disadvantages he believed it might cause him as a result of the respondent’s application process, he refused to say (para 5). He knew from what he had been told by an Employment Tribunal in previous unsuccessful proceedings against a different respondent that this was unreasonable (paras 8-9). The Employment Tribunal found that it was “obvious” that the claim had no reasonable prospects of success (para 12). It went on to say (in para 13):

“It seems to me that Mr Mallon had deliberately withheld information about his disability and his circumstances, when the Northern Ireland Tribunal had previously made it clear that it was not enough just to simply say “I am disabled, I need adjustments”. The effect was that the respondent was obliged to respond and defend the claim, and it incurred costs in doing so that should not have been incurred if the claimant had acted reasonably.”

In Mallon v Ginger Recruitment Services LtdDr Mallon was on 3 April 2019 ordered to pay costs of £2,000 plus VAT because of his unreasonable conduct in bringing the claim. The Employment Tribunal said in its written Reasons (para 33):

“In this particular claim, it is clear from the requirements of the vacancy advertised by the respondent that the claimant could not have realistically expected to have secured the position because he simply did not have the relevant experience. Even if he was not aware of this from the outset it was made quite clear to him in the correspondence that followed (…)”

In Mallon v Ela8 LtdDr Mallon was on 24 June 2019 ordered to pay costs of £1,845. The written Reasons found that his claim for failure to make reasonable adjustments “must always have been doomed to failure because he had the adjustment he wanted” (para 25). His other claims were also unreasonable. The Employment Tribunal found that “At best, the claimant seems to have been very confused about what he needed to do to establish discrimination” (para 27). But it went further than that, finding (in paras 31-32 and para 37) that there was “strong suspicion” that Dr Mallon (whose claims were dismissed in this, as in some of the other cases, on withdrawal) was:

“…a claimant who has no intention of pursuing a claim to a hearing because he knows it is flimsy and will not bear examination, only brings his claim because he hopes to take advantage of a respondent wanting to avoid the considerable legal cost of defending a claim that may not be worth very much, or may be worth nothing, seeking a “commercial” settlement as the lesser of two evils. The claim may be settled and he then withdraws it. Or if is stoutly defended, he withdraws and waits for another opportunity. Claims never go to a hearing. That picture suggests vexatious claims, ones where the claimant hopes to make some money by claiming, but not because of the merits of his claim.

(…)

He was routinely making claims which were either dismissed or which he withdrew. It is not known if he settled any, but none went to a hearing. It does very much look as if he brought claims to see if he could get a payment in settlement, and then abandoned them. That is not a proper use of the tribunal process”

These are not the only costs orders made against Dr Mallon. Such orders have been made in a total of seven cases. But it is not necessary to go into details about the conduct which gave rise to all the others.

In Mallon v Electus Recruitment Solutions Ltdall Dr Mallon’s claims were dismissed on 5 August 2021 after a full merits hearing. The written Reasons (para 64) decided:

“(…) that the claimant’s claim is misconceived as counsel for the respondent submits. We have found that the claimant has developed a system of applying for roles by submitting his CV without spending any time assessing whether he meets the requirements of the role, with the expressed requirement that on every occasion, no matter how weak his application for a role taken at its highest could be, the employer or agency should offer him the opportunity to make an oral application after sending him what he terms to be the “essential requirements” of the role. If this is not done, he responds with the threat of litigation and issues a claim unless settlement is reached (…) [W]e conclude that the claimant as an experienced litigant must have known that this claim had no reasonable prospect of success and we conclude that it was not made in good faith but as part of a wider campaign as the respondent alleges.”

In Mallon v Markel Consultancy Services Ltd, the claims were struck out on 10 December 2021 because the Employment Tribunal had no jurisdiction to hear them. They had been brought out of time and an Employment Judge concluded that time should not be extended, in part because the claim had “little reasonable prospect of success in any event” (Reasons para 22).

Similarly, the claims in Mallon v Rasei Ltdwere struck out on 10 December 2021, again because the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to hear them. They had been brought out of time and an Employment Judge concluded that time should not be extended, in part because the claim had “little reasonable prospect of success in any event” (Reasons para 22). The claim depended solely on an initial decision not to offer an oral interview. The next day (when Dr Mallon complained) an offer was made by the respondent to reconsider and to have a telephone conversation with Dr Mallon. But Dr Mallon ignored that (not even responding to it) and issued his claim (out of time) anyway (paras 24-25).

In Mallon v AG Barr plc,Dr Mallon’s claims were struck out for want of jurisdiction on 9 August 2022 because they were presented out of time and it was not just and equitable to extend time. The written Reasons referred to Dr Mallon as engaging in Employment Tribunal litigation “on what appears to be almost an industrial scale” (para 31) and found that he knew about the time limit before and after he brought the claim out of time and could have complied with it.

In Mallon v Steer Energy Solutions Ltd,Dr Mallon’s claims were dismissed after a full merits hearing on liability. Subsequently, on 15 June 2024, the Employment Tribunal awarded the costs against him because of Dr Mallon’s unreasonable conduct. The written Reasons said (at para 30):

“(…) the claimant’s actions in bringing and continuing with the proceedings was unreasonable in circumstances where he:

a.

had jumped straight to the conclusion that the respondent was lying when they said they had not seen his disability disclosure,

b.

refused the requested adjustment when offered,

c.

had threatened litigation and moved to early conciliation prematurely, even within his own very tight timescale, insisting on speaking to an external HR consultant, who would have had no authority in any event,

d.

was claiming there was a prospect that he may have been the successful candidate, when he knew he did not have the preferred software skills and, if he’d had an oral application, his very limited exposure to Solid Works, in circumstances where others had helped or done it for him, would have been revealed, when the respondent was, ideally, looking for at least 2 years’ experience.

e.

had no evidence to refute the disclosed evidence that the respondent had received a sufficient number of applicants who met all of their criteria, nor to refute that the job ultimately was withdrawn.

f.

pursued the claim, and, potentially, full losses on that basis, continuing with it for a year after it was made clear to him in a similar claim he had brought (against Blacktrace Holdings), that it was not uncommon for employers not to read CVs in 1-click applications. He claimed he needed oral judgments as he either did not read, or could not take in, written judgments, due to his difficulties.

g.

had ignored a costs warning letter from the respondent, which had estimated their future costs at that point at £5k to £10k plus VAT, albeit they transpired to be much higher, not least due to the claimant’s approach to proceedings, which resulted in

h.

having a large bundle and 4 day hearing in a case that simply involved whether the respondent had read the claimant’s CV, how they had shortlisted and whether they offered the requested adjustment once aware of the claimant’s disabilities.”

In Mallon v (1) Department for Business Energy and Industrial Strategy and (2) the Cabinet Officeall Dr Mallon’s claims were dismissed on 12 April 2024 (including some claims dismissed on withdrawal, and others pursued through a full merits hearing). In its written Reasons, the Employment Tribunal said (at para 8):

“The claimant was not [a] satisfactory witness. We have already pointed out that his very first encounter with contemporaneous documents led to his withdrawal of allegations relating to April 2018 and May 2020. But his evidence relating to May and August 2021 was also highly inconsistent with the actual documents: as to the application of any alleged PCP; as to claimed disadvantage; and as to the extent of any adjustments which were offered. More importantly however our conclusion is that the claimant’s claim was fundamentally dishonest. We do not accept that he was a serious potential applicant for the various roles for which he expressed an interest. The roles were at a high level; they were very different in nature; requiring different experience and expertise. We accept the evidence of Mr Whiteley that the claimant was not a realistic candidate for any of them. Our conclusion is the claimant knew he was not a realistic candidate. He did not intend to pursue an application. What he was intent upon was setting up the potential for bringing a claim for discrimination with a view to securing an award of compensation or a settlement.”

None of these decisions questioned or disbelieved Dr Mallon’s case about his disabilities. They took them into account so far as relevant. The decisions cannot be explained away by arguing that they failed to understand or make proper allowance for his neurodivergence and other disabilities. Nor can his conduct be justified by reference to them. This can be seen, for example, in the written Reasons for awarding costs against him in Mallon v Energy Systems Catapult Ltd(dated 25 November 2024) at paras 37-39 and para 68.

By an Order of Lord Fairley, President of the Employment Appeal Tribunal, on 10 March 2025, the hearing of the application which I am now considering was given a fixed date, and 17 live appeals before the Employment Appeal Tribunal were stayed in the meantime.

The key words in section 33 of the Employment Tribunals Act 1996 echo the same words in section 42 of the Senior Courts Act 1981, which confers powers on the High Court similar to those I am now being asked to exercise in the Employment Appeal Tribunal. Section 42, like section 33, requires a finding that a person “has habitually and persistently and without any reasonable ground – (a) instituted vexatious (…) proceedings”. Consequently, there is guidance to be found in the cases on section 42 as well as the cases on section 33.

In AG v Jones [1990] 1 WLR 859 CA it was decided that findings made in previous cases (such as those to which I have already referred) can be regarded as definitive and reliable. Per Lord Donaldson of Lymington MR at 863D-F:

“The fifth and last issue of law arose out of Mr. Jones' wish to challenge the conclusion of various judges in the underlying proceedings that his conduct in those particular proceedings had been vexatious or had involved an abuse of the process of the court. We ruled that he was not free to do so. If any such conclusion was, or was thought by Mr. E Jones to be, erroneous, the remedy was to appeal in those proceedings or, where it was said that the judgment was vitiated by the fraud of other parties, to take appropriate steps to have the judgment set aside. But if that was not done, the decision must stand and is capable of forming the basis for the court being satisfied upon an application under section 42 that Mr. Jones had habitually and persistently and without any reasonable ground acted in the manner referred to in subsection (l)(a) and/or (b).”

Lord Donaldson also explained why the making of an order was proportionate. He said (at 865C-D):

“The power to restrain someone from commencing or continuing legal proceedings is no doubt a drastic restriction of his civil rights, and is still a restriction if it is subject to the grant of leave by a High Court judge. But there must come a time when it is right to exercise that power, for at least two reasons. First, the opponents who are harassed by the worry and expense of vexatious litigation are entitled to protection; secondly the resources of the judicial system are barely sufficient to afford justice without unreasonable delay to those who do have genuine grievances, and should not be squandered on those who do not.”

What he says about the resources of the judicial system remains true today.

In AG v Covey; AG v Matthews[2001] EWCA Civ 254, the relationship between section 42 and Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (as enacted into domestic law by the Human Rights Act 1998) was considered. The making of an order was found to be Article 6 compliant. Per Lord Woolf LCJ at paras 60-61:

“[60] (…) it is useful to refer to the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in Tolstoy Miloslavsky v United Kingdom (1999) 20 EHRR 442. In that case the court said:

“59.

The Court reiterates that the right of access secured by Article 6(1) may be subject to limitations in the form of regulation by the State. In this respect the State enjoys a certain margin of appreciation. However, the Court must be satisfied, firstly, that the limitations applied do not restrict or reduce the access left to the individual in such a way or to such an extent that the very essence of the right is impaired. Secondly, a restriction must pursue a legitimate aim and there must be a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aims sought to be achieved.”

[61] Guided by what was said by the European Court in that case, I have no doubt that the Divisional Court was right to come to the decision which it did. By choosing different targets for his litigation, Dr Matthews caused a variety of different defendants to suffer some disadvantage by litigation. But in deciding whether the conditions set out in s.42 are met, it is necessary to look at the whole picture. It is the cumulative effect of Dr Matthews' activities, both against the individuals who are drawn into the proceedings and on the administration of justice generally that has to be taken into account. When this is done, I have no doubt that to make an order against Dr Matthews does pursue a legitimate aim and that there is a reasonable relationship and proportionality between the means employed and the aims sought to be achieved. Furthermore, because of the ability of the court to give permission for the bringing of any proceedings which are justified, the limitation which is imposed does not restrict or reduce the access left to the individual to an extent that the very essence of the right of access to justice is removed.”

In AG v Wheen[2001] IRLR 91 CA, Keene LJ (with whom Mummery and Nourse LJJ agreed) accepted that the power to make an order is always discretionary but rejected a submission that a lull in the issue of vexatious proceedings should have spared the respondent from the order made against him in that case (para 15, Keene LJ noting that “there had been no indication from Mr Wheen that he would not institute proceedings in the future”).

Although Dr Mallon did at one point appear to reduce the volume of his claims (which can be seen from the dates in the Annex), he explained to me that this was only because of the difficulties of COVID. I can see that he is still extremely active in bringing proceedings and it is clear to me that he wishes and intends to continue to be active. Despite his lack of success, he believes in what he is doing and he is undeterred by his defeats.

AG v Wheen is authority for the proposition that past decisions have evidential value even when there is a pending appeal (para 26). It also says that the institution of proceedings may be vexatious within the meaning of the statute even if they have not been pursued after the payment of a deposit has been ordered (paras 28-30). Those are both points I bear in mind in Dr Mallon’s case.

A recent and relevant review of authorities on section 42 and its cognates (such as section 33) was conducted by Simler LJ in Williamson v Bishop of London[2023] 1 WLR 2472 at paras 16-19 and paras 33-37.

When assessing what may be “vexatious proceedings”, the question posed by section 33 is whether they have been instituted “habitually and persistently and without any reasonable ground”, which may be the case even if a person is acting with the best of intentions. It is the effect, and not the intention, which makes proceedings vexatious: see the oft-quoted dictum of Lord Bingham of Cornhill LCJ in AG v Barker[2000] 1 FLR 759 at 764C-D:

“‘Vexatious’ is a familiar term in legal parlance. The hallmark of a vexatious proceeding is in my judgment that it has little or no basis in law (or at least no discernible basis); that whatever the intention of the proceeding may be, its effect is to subject the defendant to inconvenience, harassment and expense out of all proportion to any gain likely to accrue to the claimant; and that it involves an abuse of the process of the court, meaning by that a use of the court process for a purpose or in a way which is significantly different from the ordinary and proper use of the court process.”

Dr Mallon submitted a number of written arguments and materials to me, including a bundle of authorities, and also addressed me orally. I have carefully considered all of them.

He said that his various diagnoses had been given to him later in life and he had picked up from a Citizens Advice website that he should disclose that he is disabled on his CV. He had not been told to define what his disability was or where to put that information. He allowed a number of proceedings to be dismissed on withdrawal after one Employment Tribunal judge (in a London case) had pointed out that his disability was only mentioned at the end of his CV. He now puts it on the first page of his CV. He briefly touched on the circumstances of some of the cases in the Annex, but did not, it seemed to me, manage to undermine any of the relevant findings in them.

He referred to putting in 4,000 job applications at one point, and explained that he has always applied through volume to find work, but has only more recently disclosed his conditions. He cannot always work out what is essential for the job and what is desired, so he asks for that in his CV.

He is 50 years old; he has a PhD, and he is neurodivergent and has other conditions such as Crohn’s disease and high blood pressure. These conditions, he said, affect his communications under stress, but do not take away his integrity. He said that he never set out to abuse any process of any Employment Tribunal or employer. Every case he brought has been to secure fair access to work and reasonable adjustments. When he has been wrong, he has accepted that and withdrawn his claims. He said he is not malicious and that adverse findings against him have been based on the perception of others who do not fully understand neurodiversity. However, having read the reasons given for those decisions, I can see that he is wrong about that. The reasoning always accepts the fact of his disabilities; makes adjustments and allowances for them when appropriate; and reaches conclusions which are entirely consistent with a thorough understanding of and sympathy for those disabilities.

Dr Mallon resisted the RPO sought by the Attorney General. However, by way of compromise, he suggested that, if anything needs to be put in place in response to his record of allegedly vexatious proceedings and applications, it should not be an RPO but should be a voluntary filter mechanism of his own devising, which should be in place for 2 to 5 years, or whatever the court might decide. He would agree that, before starting any new case, he would pause and review it, and, if he was in any doubt about it, he would send it to an official email address for an independent review before he started any claim. He said that this would help the Tribunal and ensure that only cases that had sufficient merit would be pursued. He said that neurodivergent people should not be seen in a negative light for seeking work or their rights. He said that a permanent RPO or other order would go too far as it would (as he put it to me) “effectively end my ability to enforce my rights for the rest of my working life which is 16 years”. If any restriction were necessary, he asked that it be time limited and conditional, or that his voluntary filter system be adopted as a proportionate alternative. I do not accept that the RPO would end his ability to enforce his rights. An RPO only means that the Appeal Tribunal must be satisfied that the proceedings or application are not an abuse of process and that there are reasonable grounds for the proceedings or application (section 33(4)). Provided those conditions are satisfied, leave can be given and, upon the giving of leave, the case proceeds. Cases in which leave is not given are cases in which there is no proper claim, and so there has been no denial of rights.

Dr Mallon said he has reflected deeply on what has happened and how he can change. He said he has moderated his conduct and he is trying to focus on solutions rather than problems. He is not someone who defies the system. He said he is a person acting in good faith trying to work, and trying to be a parent to a son whom he believes also to be neurodivergent. He asked to be judged on his intent, and his effort to improve, and not on his past misunderstandings. He asked for any measure to be time-limited, proportionate and consistent with the Equality Act. However, there is nothing in the record which I have examined to suggest any improvement, and Dr Mallon did not give any specific example or explanation of a change in approach on his part which would give any reason to hope that he will stop making vexatious claims or applications if no RPO is made against him.

I am entirely satisfied, having reviewed the cases in the Annex, and particularly in the light of the points I have highlighted in paras 7 to 27 above, that Dr Mallon has habitually and persistently and without any reasonable ground instituted vexatious proceedings in the Employment Tribunal. I accept the findings of the Employment Tribunals which I have quoted, which cast doubt on his assurances that he acted in good faith. Even if his intentions were honourable, however, he has not taken on board the lessons of his experience, or the warnings of specific Employment Tribunals, including reasoned decisions and costs orders. Instead, he has continued to act in the same way in scores of cases over a number of years, and there is no reason to think that this will stop if an RPO is not made.

The effect of his vexatious claims and applications has been to cause unnecessary trouble and expense to scores of companies and other bodies to whom he has made hopeless applications for employment and against whom he has made completely baseless allegations of discrimination. It has also occupied an unacceptable amount of time in Employment Tribunals, which have had to process and dispose of these vexatious claims, often after full hearings, and usually on the basis of carefully reasoned decisions which will have taken a significant amount of time to produce. The resources of the tribunal system are limited, in terms of money, people, and time, and it is unacceptable that they should continue to be wasted on Dr Mallon in this way. The strain on litigants who have to respond to Dr Mallon’s claims is also not to be underestimated, and they are entitled to protection from claims which are an abuse of process and which are not based on reasonable grounds. Costs orders, even when made, never fully compensate for the expense incurred, and are not even designed to cover the non-pecuniary expenses, such as management time, and the toll taken by litigation on witnesses and other human beings. The fact that a claim is wholly without merit does not mean that it has no impact on the people or companies against which it is made. On the contrary, a groundless and unjust allegation can be at least as distressing and shocking, for the person at the wrong end of it, as a claim which has some basis in law and fact.

Dr Mallon has not taken any notice of the decisions against him, although they are numerous, and have always, so far as I can see, been accompanied by clear and careful reasoning. Instead, he has simply carried on in the same way as before; abandoning some claims but launching others. He continues to maintain that he acted for the best, and offers no real prospect of desisting from pursuing vexatious proceedings if he is not positively disciplined in the claims he makes by the filter mechanism of an RPO. Such a mechanism is now required.

Dr Mallon’s proposed alternative filter mechanism has no advantages over a section 33 order and, being ad hoc, is less suitable and less likely to be proportionate and efficient and in accordance with the overriding objective than an RPO, which is an established, tried and tested mechanism established by Act of Parliament to deal with this situation.

I am satisfied that I should in my discretion make an RPO against Dr Mallon. I am satisfied that this does not breach his rights under Article 6. Per Simler LJ in Williamson v Bishop of London[2023] 1 WLR 2472, at para 19:

“It is now well established both at common law and as confirmed by the Strasbourg jurisprudence, that courts may regulate their own procedures to prevent abuse, and that this entails that the right of access to the courts may be subject to restriction, provided always that this does not reduce the access that remains to the individual to such an extent that the very essence of the access right is impaired; and provided that any restriction pursues a legitimate aim and there is a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be achieved.”

An RPO against Dr Mallon is necessary in the interests of justice. Since it is a filter and not a bar, it does not reduce Dr Mallon’s access to justice; certainly not to the extent that the very essence of the access right is impaired. Any claim that has merit will be allowed through the filter. Any claim that is an abuse of process, or does not have reasonable grounds, does not deserve to go any further. The ability to issue such claims, and to have them reviewed under the RPO, is itself a means of access to justice. Properly understood, it does not disadvantage Dr Mallon. In fact, it protects him from the risk of an adverse costs order later on, as well as serving its main and proper purpose of protecting others.

The imposition of an RPO is, on the facts of this case, a proportionate means of protecting the Employment Tribunal system and potential respondents from abuse in the form of vexatious claims and applications by Dr Mallon, including those already pending and not yet decided, as well as those he may initiate in the future.

Finally, I have considered whether to make the RPO for a specified period, or not. Section 33(3) of the Employment Tribunals Act 1996 provides:

“A restriction of proceedings order may provide that it is to cease to have effect at the end of a specified period, but otherwise it remains in force indefinitely.”

Based upon the cases I have been referred to by Counsel for the Attorney General, the usual order seems to be for an indefinite rather than a specified period but every case must be considered on its facts. A decision has to be made in every case about whether it would be more appropriate and proportionate to impose an order which remains in force indefinitely, or for a specified period.

In AG v McCluskey(2009) UKEAT/0118/09/RN, Burton J gave the following reasons of the Employment Appeal Tribunal for not making the RPO for a specified period (para 55):

“…in the circumstances of this case we conclude that it is appropriate to make an order which remains in force indefinitely. We have no confidence whatever that the Respondent has learnt anything from the constant warnings she has received, and the only way in which her continued abuse can in our judgment be prevented is by imposing the filter on a permanent basis.”

In Dr Mallon’s case, I see no sign that he will ever change his ways. If the RPO is for a specified period, he is likely to bring vexatious claims after the end of that period and, although it would then be open to the Attorney General to apply for a further RPO, some harm will already have been done. Because Dr Mallon’s claims are based on a constant stream of fresh job applications, there is no reason to think that the stream of claims will abate at any particular future date.

I am therefore satisfied that it is both appropriate and proportionate for the RPO against Dr Mallon to continue indefinitely.