Elaina Cohen v Khalid Mahmood MP

How many applications have you previously made to attend Employment Appeal Tribunal hearings remotely?

How many applications have you made for documents for Employment Appeal Tribunal hearings?

Have you deleted all copies of documents that have been provided in response to such applications and, if not, why not?

Have you ever posted material obtained in Employment Tribunal or Employment Appeal Tribunal proceedings online; and, if so, why did you do so?

Ms Cetin has applied to attend this hearing remotely and has sought copies of documents. The claimant has failed to comply with the requirement to make her application on Annex 2 of the Employment Appeal Tribunal Practice Direction 2024 (“EAT PD”). Ms Cetin has not explained why she wishes to observe remotely.

I have considered a number of applications that Ms Cetin has made for remote observation and to be provided with documents. I understand that she has made a large number of other such applications dealt with by other judges of the EAT. Dealing with these applications is taking up a considerable amount of administrative and judicial resources.

Ms Cetin has not explained why she wishes to attend the hearing or why she seeks permission to attend remotely. Ms Cetin suggests that she has complied with the legal requirements under the Remote Observation and Recording (Courts and Tribunals) Regulations 2022 (“Remote Observations Regulations”). She suggests that the EAT’s requirements go beyond the requirements in the Remote Observations Regulations. Reg 3 of the Remote Observations Regulations requires that a court or tribunal must be satisfied that “it would be in the interests of justice to make the direction”. Reg 4 of the Remote Observations Regulations requires me to take account of a number of factors, including “the safety and right to privacy of any person involved with the proceedings”. It does not limit the factors that I may have regard to in assessing the interests of justice. The EAT is fully entitled to require information about matters in addition to those specific factors set out in Reg 4 of the Remote Observations Regulations.

Having regard to the large number of applications for remote observation and for documents I consider it is necessary for Ms Cetin to provide the information requested in the above questions so that I can properly assess the interests of justice and seek to ensure the safety and right to privacy of any person involved with the proceedings are adequately protected.

If there is a medical reason for the request to attend the hearing remotely Ms Cetin should explain the reason in the witness statement and provide supporting medical evidence.

Once the questions have been answered the parties may be given an opportunity to comment if considered appropriate and practicable.

I wish to observe public proceedings of the Employment Appeal Tribunal as is my constitutional right under the principle of open justice. The EAT is a public appeal court where proceedings should be accessible to all members of the public without requiring justification. As a student journalist, I have a particular interest in understanding how employment law operates in practice, especially in cases involving MPs and public officials.

Additionally, my interest in EAT proceedings partly stems from my own experiences as a litigant in this jurisdiction, which has given me insight into the importance of transparency in tribunal proceedings. I have also published articles analysing EAT decisions, including examining the reasoning and legal coherence of various judgments, which serves the public interest in judicial accountability.

Personal circumstances make physical attendance impractical.

I have made four applications in the past fortnight. This question exceeds the statutory requirements of the 2022 Regulations. The number of lawful applications made by a member of the public to observe public proceedings is irrelevant to determining whether remote observation would be in the interests of justice for any specific hearing.

The characterisation of lawful applications to observe public proceedings as consuming "considerable administrative and judicial resources" is concerning. This burden is entirely self-imposed through the EAT's creation of elaborate procedures that exceed statutory requirements. Other jurisdictions, including the Court of Protection dealing with highly sensitive matters, process observation requests through simple email confirmation without consuming judicial time.

I have made four applications for documents in the past fortnight. These applications were for documents necessary to understand proceedings I observe or intend to observe. Access to court documents is a fundamental aspect of open justice, recognised in numerous authorities including Cape Intermediate Holdings Ltd v Dring [2019] UKSC 38. This question similarly exceeds statutory authority and appears designed to deter legitimate document access.

I have published articles and commentary analysing EAT judgments, including critical analysis of judicial reasoning and decision-making. This includes analysis of decisions authored by Judge Tayler. This is standard journalistic practice and a fundamental aspect of open justice, press freedom, and judicial accountability.

The publication of analysis and commentary on judicial proceedings serves the vital public interest in transparency and accountability of the justice system. I am under no legal obligation to seek permission for any lawful publication about proceedings I observe or analyse.

This question, like the others, appears to use a specific observation application to conduct a general investigation into my journalistic activities. The 2022 Regulations provide no authority to interrogate observers about their publication history as a condition of observing future proceedings. Such interrogation creates an obvious chilling effect on court reporting and judicial accountability, particularly when directed at a journalist who has published critical analysis of the interrogating judge's decisions.

While I permit remote attendance I refuse the application for documents.

In the witness statement produced in response to the Order sealed on 19 August 2025 the claimant describes herself as a student journalist. She did not so describe herself in the original application. She has not stated where she is studying journalism or provided any journalistic credentials. Ms Cetin refers to having “published articles and commentary analysing EAT judgments” but does not state the publication(s) in which the articles have appeared.

In her witness statement the claimant has not answered the question whether she has “posted material obtained in Employment Tribunal or Employment Appeal Tribunal proceedings online” (i.e. pleadings or documents). Ms Cetin has brought numerous proceedings in the Employment Tribunal and the Employment Appeal Tribunal. In an Order sealed on 24 May 2024 I certified appeals EA-2022-001012- RN & EA-2023-000271-RN as totally without merit. In my reasons I recorded that:

“4.

In my preparation for the four hearings listed today I have noted the written submission made by the respondent in appeal EA-2023- 000224-RN to which are attached materials that the claimant has put on the internet that make outrageous accusations against those involved in these proceedings including judges and include a photograph of a judge. I consider the apparent misuse of material from legal proceedings provides further support for my view that an in-person hearing was appropriate.”

As far as I am aware that decision was not challenged.

Ms Cetin had sought to appeal against an earlier decision of HHJ Auerbach in the proceedings. In refusing permission to appeal Lord Justice Bean certified one of the appeals as totally without merit and recorded that:

“Ms Cetin’s skeleton argument of 23 October 2023 tells me that “there have been about 30 hearings at the ETs and at the EAT (in her case) and that “all of the decisions and judgments contain false information, all of which are detrimental to me”. She describes her former employers as “hateful” and guilty of “lies, extreme racism and hostility” all of which “were covered up and/or justified in judgments”. She is exhibiting the classic signs of a vexatious litigant.”

I have been prepared to grant remote observation even though the claimant has not asserted any medical reason why she cannot attend in person having had regard to the undertaking she has given. In the light of the limited answers that Ms Cetin has provided to the questions asked in the Order sealed on 19 August 2025 I am not prepared to order that she be provided with the documents that she has requested. If a member of the public attends a hearing they may be permitted to view documents but generally will not be permitted to take the documents away. The claimant has given an address in London from which she wishes to observe remotely. She has not provided any reason why if she wishes to view the documents she could not attend to view the documents (which she would not be permitted to retain) during the hearing.

In a liability judgment, sent to the parties on 2 August 2022, the claimant succeeded in a complaint of unfair dismissal and one complaint of detriment, “marginalised and isolated in the period January 2020 until her dismissal”, done on the ground that the claimant had made a protected disclosure. So far as is relevant to this appeal complaints of automatic unfair dismissal on the basis that the reason, or principal reason, for dismissal was the making of a protected disclosure and a complaint of detriment, “sustained aggressive and bullying treatment at the hands of the respondent, including threats of dismissal”, done on the ground that the claimant had made a protected disclosure, were dismissed.

The claimant appealed. HHJ Shanks held that the finding that:

HHJ Shanks remitted the matter to the Employment Tribunal for reconsideration of the detriment and automatic unfair dismissal complaints. HHJ Shanks Ordered:

A two-day hearing was fixed to deal with the reconsideration and to assess remedy.

On reconsideration the Employment Tribunal revoked paragraph 311. The Employment Tribunal rejected the protected disclosure detriment complaint on the basis that, while there was a threat of dismissal, in the context of the peculiar relationship between the claimant and the respondent and the direct nature of the communication between them, the specifically asserted detriment of “sustained aggressive and bullying treatment” was not established.

The automatic unfair dismissal complaint was dismissed on the basis that the reason, or principal reason, for dismissal was not the making of a protected disclosure.

The Employment Tribunal then determined remedy.

The claimant seeks to appeal against the reconsideration and remedy judgment. The claimant raised two broad issues in her submissions.

Firstly, the claimant asserts that she was not allowed to raise issues about another asserted detriment and to question the respondent about why he did not investigate her protected disclosures. She also wished to raise asserted post dismissal detriment in relation to being trolled in an account that she thought was operated by the respondent.

In circumstances in which the remission was on such limited grounds and it was directed that no further evidence was required I cannot see any arguable error of law on the part of the Employment Tribunal. While a case management order was made that permitted the provision of witness statements their primary relevance was to remedy and such a direction could not alter the specific terms of the remission. I cannot see any arguable error of law in the grounds of appeal in respect of the specific matters that were remitted to the Employment Tribunal.

Secondly, the claimant contends that she believed that the remedy hearing would be on the second day of the two day listing and that she did not have a proper opportunity to prepare for the remedy hearing. A letter was sent to the parties on 26 March 2024 stating:

Employment Judge Adkin has acknowledged the slightly unconventional listing on a Friday and following Wednesday for this 2 day Reconsideration and Remedy Hearing on Friday 3 & Wednesday 8 May 2024. This is due to the very extensive dates to avoid provided by the Respondent and the need to avoid an unacceptable delay. Employment Judge Adkin is hopeful that evidence and submissions can be concluded on Friday 3 May and therefore Wednesday 8 May is likely to be deliberation only. [emphasis added]

In the light of this direction there was no reasonable basis upon which the claimant could have assumed that the remedy hearing would be dealt with on the second day. Furthermore, the claimant has not set out what matters she would have raised if she had more time to prepare or how it would have made a difference to the remedy decision. I can see no arguable error of law in the decision of the Employment Tribunal.

There are no reasonable grounds for bringing the appeal. The Rule 3(10) application is refused and the appeal dismissed.

Please give Ms Cetin any documents she wants . It was a public hearing and anything

I put in my bundles should be made available to the press. …

Once a judge has given an opinion. Even though based on lies nothing can change it .

A journalist must be able to question why the law failed me as a whistleblower and victims of crime with the documents from a public hearing

Transparency in justice is everything . But where the law fails a public voice must be heard.

We can confirm the Respondent’s instructions are to object to Ms Cetin’s application for provision of documents used in the Hearing. It is noted that Ms Cetin was not refused access to the documents, and was in fact given the opportunity to attend to view the documents. She elected to attend remotely.

Further, whilst Ms Cetin has set out various reasons as to why the documents should be disclosed to her, and her criticism of the decision made, it is not clear (and not clearly explained) how granting access to the documents will advance the open justice principle. It is also unclear for what purpose Ms Cetin requires the documents.

For the reasons set out above, the Respondent objects to Ms Cetin’s application.

However, although the court has the power to allow access, the applicant has no right to be granted it (save to the extent that the rules grant such a right). It is for the person seeking access to explain why he seeks it and how granting him access will advance the open justice principle. In this respect it may well be that the media are better placed than others to demonstrate a good reason for seeking access. But there are others who may be able to show a legitimate interest in doing so. As was said in both Kennedy [2015] AC 455 , at para 113, and A v British Broadcasting Corpn [2015] AC 588, at para 41, the court has to carry out a fact-specific balancing exercise. On the one hand will be “the purpose of the open justice principle” and “the potential value of the information in question in advancing that purpose”.

On the other hand will be “any risk of harm which its disclosure may cause to the maintenance of an effective judicial process or to the legitimate interests of others”. There may be very good reasons for denying access. The most obvious ones are national security, the protection of the interests of children or mentally disabled adults, the protection of privacy interests more generally, and the protection of trade secrets and commercial confidentiality. In civil cases, a party may be compelled to disclose documents to the other side which remain confidential unless and until they are deployed for the purpose of the proceedings. But even then there may be good reasons for preserving their confidentiality, for example, in a patent case.

Also relevant must be the practicalities and the proportionality of granting the request. It is highly desirable that the application is made during the trial when the material is still readily available, the parties are before the court and the trial judge is in day-to-day control of the court process. The non-party who seeks access will be expected to pay the reasonable costs of granting that access. People who seek access after the proceedings are over may find that it is not practicable to provide the material because the court will probably not have retained it and the parties may not have done so. Even if they have, the burdens placed on the parties in identifying and retrieving the material may be out of all proportion to benefits to the open justice principle, and the burden placed upon the trial judge in deciding what disclosure should be made may have become much harder, or more time-consuming, to discharge. On the other hand, increasing digitisation of court materials may eventually make this easier. In short, non-parties should not seek access unless they can show a good reason why this will advance the open justice principle, that there are no countervailing principles of the sort outlined earlier, which may be stronger after the proceedings have come to an end, and that granting the request will not be impracticable or disproportionate. [emphasis added]